[redacted]

SECRET

PART

FOREIGN OFFICE

DEPT. FAR EASTERN

TITLE: CHINA — POLITICAL AFFAIRS (INTERNAL) PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

FC 1/5

File No

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE
LRB.		2/4	FRB. + PA		13/8.			12
LRB		3/4.	FRB.		16/8.			
LRC		4/4.	Reg		19/8.			
JRB.		5/4.	FRB. + PA		4/9.			
ORC		8/4.						
FRB.		9/4.						
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FRB.		24/4.						
PA.		25/4.						
FRB.		26/4.						
PA.		26/4.						
FRB.		2/5.						
PA-		3/5						
FRB.		8/5.						
ORC		7/5.						
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ORC		13/5.						
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REGISTRY ADDRESS

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11.1.67		FC 1/5.	

[redacted]

SECRET

FOLIO NUMBERS OF TOP SECRET AND SECRET DOCUMENTS IN THIS JACKET

FORMER FILES

FC1201 - ('66)
FC1192/1 - 3 ('66)

RELATED FILES

FC1/2.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
11 JAN 1967
FC1/S.

COPIES TO:- ① Cand' Prodd 11/1/67 ② Mr Hensley ③ PUSD ends (1)

(1200/66) CONFIDENTIAL

The Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.
4 January, 1967.

Dear David,

During the past few days the People's Daily and Peking's posters have provided us with material which may shed a little more light on what has happened (and what is going to happen) in that vital component in the Cultural Revolution - the People's Liberation Army.

2. You will now have seen in NCNA (No. 010113) translated excerpts of the Liberation Army Daily New Year editorial which was published in the People's Daily on 2 January, and also the summary in our telegram No. 4 of 3 January. The five principles for army work in 1967 set out in the editorial confirm the heavy emphasis on participation in the Cultural Revolution and on political and non-military rôles which we have seen during recent months and which was in accordance with the directive from Mao revealed in the People's Daily editorial of 1 August (telegram No. 639 of 2 August).

3. The first principle demands still further improvement in the Army's performance in the Cultural Revolution and the study of Mao. There is a strong hint of difficulties with "leading cadres", who are directed to "take the lead in speaking out their innermost thoughts and in struggling against their own ego". This section also contains an interesting reference to the Kutien meeting of December 1929, which was an occasion when the military policies advocated by Mao were opposed by the field commanders.

4. The third principle, that, at the same time as being a fighting force, the Army "must do well as a work force and a production force", is pure Mao, an uncompromising restatement of the tenets of the revolutionary days. The Army is to take a "long-term view" of construction work, do well at agricultural and sideline production and "gradually set up some small and medium-sized factories". This programme would certainly not seem to be one which would produce a well-trained and mobile modern army, nor does it suggest any intention to indulge in external military adventures. The injunction that the Army must "train new Communist people who can handle both military and civilian affairs and both industry and agriculture" suggests that it is envisaged that the spread of P.L.A. people into all fields of Chinese life is expected to continue.

5. The passage on the fourth principle concentrates on the "bold" promotion of commanders to "responsible, crucially important posts", and cites the three criteria which Lin Piao has laid down for the training, selection and promotion of cadres. Not surprisingly, these call for people who "hold high the red banner of Mao's thought", put proletarian politics to the fore, and are linked with the masses and possess revolutionary verve and drive. Military proficiency is not mentioned, but is no doubt meant to be included in the phrase "of course, we must also take note of the lesser points". The three criteria are the "essentials".

6. The fifth principle stresses the need for vigilance and the preparation to smash any aggression by the United States. There must be more study of Mao's writings on people's war. Mao's works should be /used

D. C. Wilson, Esq.,
FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

used as the basic textbooks in military training, although technical skills and close-quarter and night-fighting should also be mastered. Political and ideological work among the frontier guards, island garrisons, and units engaged in production work, apparently needs to be strengthened.

7. There is a call to the P.L.A. to put the militia "on a solid basis organisationally, politically and militarily". It will be interesting to see if this is put into effect. We have heard little of the militia in recent months. Finally, the editorial confirms that the P.L.A. is to train the students and Red Guards of middle schools and colleges and is asked to regard this "as an important political task that should be accomplished".

8. Also of interest in connexion with the P.L.A. have been recent articles in the People's Daily marking the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Mao's essay "Strategic Problems in China's Revolutionary Wars". Some of these were used merely as vehicles to carry standard political themes (e.g. the need for the practical application of Mao's Thought - "we learn to fight by fighting", etc.), but those of 24 December (NCNA 122317) and, especially, that of 30 December (NCNA 123037 and 123106) have a more direct military relevance.

9. Again, we have a firm restatement of Mao's military theories - the need to wage a people's war which relies on the masses. Examples from the P.L.A.'s past achievements, the "revolutionary practice of the world's people" and the successes of the people of South Viet Nam, are cited to prove that people's war is the only way to defeat modern armaments and equipment "however developed". The Soviet revisionists are attacked for their belief in the "bourgeois theory that weapons are omnipotent" and that "in modern war, rockets and nuclear weapons can decide everything".

10. The 30 December article then (NCNA 123106) rehearsed the 'classic' Mao doctrines - one against ten strategically, ten against one tactically; one must fight to annihilate, not just to rout; guerilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions; lure the enemy by giving up some areas; never divide forces to defend all the positions.

11. The final section discusses the correct political and military lines, "which do not emerge spontaneously and without contention", and stresses the need to carry on an irreconcilable struggle against all kinds of erroneous lines. If they are not defeated "We shall not be able to win victory in the revolution and the revolutionary war".

12. It is quite possible that these articles are published for the benefit of those directing the Communist struggle in Viet Nam, to convince them that Mao's methods of people's warfare offer the only way to ultimate victory, and perhaps to argue against over-ambitious North Vietnamese military tactics. It is also possible, however, that they are intended yet again to spell out very clearly to any members of the P.L.A. who may still harbour tendencies to "professionalism" that the Chinese forces must not be tempted along a bourgeois and revisionist path.

13. The People's Daily editorial of 2 August indicated that professionalism was at the root of the differences within the P.L.A., and evidence is now steadily accumulating that this is the case. John Boyd, in his letter 1200/66 of 21 December, referred to the charges on this score levelled at Lo Jui-ching. In the latest crop of posters (my 1010/67 of 4 January) we now have attacks on Yeh Chien-ying (49 and 51) for opposing the idea of a revolutionary army and suppressing students. The attack on Yeh is all the more surprising as he has only recently emerged as a Member of the Secretariat, and one of his speeches (originally delivered in July 1965) was selected for prominent publication in the People's Daily on 2 August, 1966(Alan Donald's letter 1220/66'S' of 12 August). In this speech Yeh emphasised that Mao had consistently opposed the "purely military viewpoint and warlordism". One should at this point sound a note of caution before writing off Yeh Chien-ying. The posters, though some are prominent, are as yet few in numbers.

14. The reports of the "arrests" of Liang Pi-yeh, Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the P.L.A., and Hsiao Hsiang-jung, Director of the General Office of the Ministry of National Defence (item 28 of poster collection), offer no information about their crimes. Liang was missing on 1 August (John Boyd's letter 1200/66 of 28 September), and therefore, in his case at least, his fall is not entirely unexpected. Two other military figures under consistent attack are Chao Erh-lu and Cheng Han-t'ao (item 3), who are said to be persisting in the Lo Jui-ch'ing line. Our records show Chao as a member of the National Defence Council, but we have no knowledge of Cheng. We should welcome any information on these two which may be available to you or other recipients of this letter.

15. I am copying this to Emrys Davies in Hong Kong, Miss Draycott in I.R.D., Brewer in J.R.D., Tozer in D.I.S. and Gilmore in Washington.

Yours ever,
Ros.

(R. W. Whitney).

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Mr. Bryant 20/1

Far Eastern Department. (R. Deason) FMW

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
24 JAN 1967
FC 1/5

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PLA.

The "reorganisation" of the Cultural Revolution Group in the PLA and the Liberation Army Daily editorial of 14 January are the first major official admissions since the Liberation Army Daily editorial of 2 August, 1966, that all is not well within the armed forces.
The August editorial referred to a recent struggle against "representatives of the bourgeoisie .... who had got hold of important posts in the army".
This appeared to have been a belated explanation for the removal of Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff, probably at the turn of the year. Although it is difficult to believe that the dismissal of Lo and a few of his supporters e.g. Liang Pi-yeh and Hsiao Hsiang-jung would have put an end to differences of view, the PLA has been presented since August as being solidly behind Mao, Lin Piao and the Cultural Revolution. There have, however, been occasional indications that the PLA has needed attention - Lin Piao's call in October to raise Mao-study to a new stage, and Hsiao Hua's address to an Air Force meeting - and some indication that units of the PLA in Peking may have been out of step in its relations with Red Guards - reports of clashes in an Academy in Peking.
We are now informed that although considerable success has been achieved in revolutionising the PLA since Lin Piao took charge of the Military Affairs Commission, "bourgeois ideology" still exists and the struggle against it is sharp and complicated. This struggle is declared to be serious because the PLA is the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "guns of the people must be in the hands of those loyal to Chairman Mao ....."

ie 1965/66?

2. Resistance is said to come primarily from those in authority taking the capitalist road (presumably revisionists) and die-hards clinging to the bourgeois line (presumably "professionals"). Resistance also comes from "cadres within our Party whose world outlook has not been really remoulded", who are muddle-headed and without a proper understanding of the aims of the revolution. Resistance takes various forms. Those taking the capitalist road (like their counterparts in the Party and Government) wave red flags while resorting to all sorts of tricks to suppress the revolutionary left. Others take the view that "there is no great problem with the army and it does not matter whether or not the great cultural revolution is conducted there." These may be the "professionals" who object to the time that has to be devoted to political work. Then again, there are those who while prepared to support the revolutionary left, have little enthusiasm for its excesses and try to find "a middle way or compromise".

/3.

3. The editorial observes that arrangements for conducting the cultural revolution in the army should be different from those of other organisations. The significance of this is no doubt that the armed forces have to have a discipline of their own and this must be observed. The editorial goes on to say that the revolution is at present unfolding in the "higher-level leading organs, military academies, schools and cultural and art organisations". These bodies are exhorted to draw upon the experience of the revolutionary rebel groups in Shanghai, and, through struggle, eliminate the die-hards and those taking the capitalist road. Other units of the army are not called upon to expose and eradicate opponents of the cultural revolution, but to concentrate upon study and improving their understanding of the issues of the revolution.

4. There can be little doubt that some resistance to the cultural revolution has been developing in the PLA, but it is not possible to judge the seriousness of it from this editorial. Some of the trouble no doubt has its origins in army relations with the Red Guards, particularly in the period of confused Red Guard activity when some clashes occurred. It also seems clear that there is still considerable uneasiness in the army about the increasing emphasis on political activity at the expense of military training. But the major question would seem to be the extent to which the "higher-level leading organs" have been questioning the wisdom of the methods of the cultural revolution in so far as they may be seen to threaten the stability of government and economic development of the country. It is possible that the inter-locking Party-PLA machinery is tending to create a sympathetic understanding between leaders of the two organisations not only at the centre but in the regions and provinces.

.....

(F. Brewer)
18 January, 1967.

Copied to:-

I.R.D.
P.U.S.D.

F.O. 0M 24/1

CONFIDENTIAL

3

(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

3 February, 1967.

Please refer to your letter of 4 January (1200/66) to David Wilson on the People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution.

2. Since you wrote, Yeh Chien-ying (whom you mention in paragraph 13) has been described as a member of the Party Political Bureau, and he has been prominent in entertaining, on Lin Piao's behalf, the Albanian Military delegation.

3. According to the records kept in Research Department, Cheng Han-t'ao (whom you mention in paragraph 14) was from September 1960 to March 1962 a Deputy Minister of the Third Machine Building Ministry. In 1952, he was a Deputy Director of the General Arsenal Bureau of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, and in January 1955 he was appointed an assistant to the Second Ministry of Machine Building. Chao Erh-lu is a member of the Party Central Committee and a Vice-Chairman of the State Economic Commission, as well as a member of the National Defence Council. Of the military figures under attack (excluding Yeh Chien-ying), Chao Erh-lu and Chang Ai-p'ing have attended one or two of the mass rallies held from August to November, but there is no record of any appearance in the last nine months by the others, i.e. Lo Jui-ch'ing, Hsiao Hsiang-jung, Liang Pi-yeh and Cheng Han-t'ao.

(J. B. DENSON)

FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

R. W. Whitney Esq.,
Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

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30/4·40

140

Registry No. FC1/5

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate.

.....

Draft.

To Mr. R.W. for double check
Whitney,
Peking

from
Mr. ~~D.C. Wilson~~
J.B. Jarson.

Please refer to your
~~Thank you for your~~ letter of
6 David Wilson
4 January (1200/66), on the People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution

2. Since you wrote, Yeh Chien-ying (whom you mention in paragraph 13) has been described as a member of the Party Political Bureau, and he has been prominent in entertaining, on Lin Piao's behalf, the Albanian Military delegation. It will be interesting to see whether Lin Piao himself receives the visitors

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/ an assistant

DO NOT WRITE OR TYPE ANYTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
30 JAN 1967
SENT TO BY | TYPE JS
DESPATCHED | 2/2/67

(52742) 8/64 SL S.

an Assistant to the Second Ministry of Machine-Building. CHAO ERH-LU is a member of the Party Central Committee and a Vice-Chairman of the State Economic Commission, as well as a member of the National Defence Council. Of the military figures under attack (excluding YEH CHIEN-YING), Chao Erh-lu and CHANG AI-P'ING have attended ~~two~~ one or two of the mass rallies held from August to November, but there in ~~Research Department has~~ no record of any appearance in the last nine months by the others, i.e. Lo Jui-ch'ing, Hsiao Hsiang-jung, Liang Pi-yeh, ~~Hsu~~ and Cheng Han-t'ao.

Incidentally, Research Department are unable to explain the ~~ref~~ references to ~~"P"~~ "pu-yuan ho-ping".

WRITING IN THIS MARGIN.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN

CONFIDENTIAL

(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

31 January, 1967.

Please refer to your letter of 4 January (1200/66) to David Wilson on the People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution.

2. Since you wrote, Yeh Chien-ying (whom you mention in paragraph 13) has been described as a member of the Party Political Bureau, and he has been prominent in entertaining, on Lin Piao's behalf, the Albanian Military delegation. It will be interesting to see whether Lin Piao himself receives the visitors.

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(J.B. Denson)

Far Eastern Department

R.W. Whitney, Esq.,
Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

31 January, 1967.

Dear Roy,

Please refer to your letter of 4 January (1200/66) to David Wilson on the People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution.

2. Since you wrote, Yeh Chien-ying (whom you mention in paragraph 13) has been described as a member of the Party Political Bureau, and he has been prominent in entertaining, on Lin Piao's behalf, the Albanian Military delegation. ~~It will be interesting to see whether Lin Piao himself receives the visitors.~~

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(J.B. Denson)

Far Eastern Department

R.W. Whitney, Esq.,
Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Reference FC1/5. (4)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
16 FEB 1967
FC1/5

Far Eastern Department.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE P.L.A.

You have no doubt noticed in Summary of World Broadcasts FE/2386 of 8 February a report from Nanchang that a rally on 4 February decided to "rebel" against the commemoration of Army Day on 1 August - the anniversary of the Nanchang uprising in 1927. The broadcast described this development as "another clap of spring thunder" in the struggle against those taking the capitalist road. The denunciation of such a well-established anniversary is indeed surprising; Army Day had received mention only a few days before in connection with the re-printing of Mao's 1929 article "On correcting mistaken ideas in the Party".

2. It was argued at the rally that 1 August should never have been chosen since the mutiny in the Nationalist army did not really lay the foundations of the People's Liberation Army. The Nanchang rebels fought their battles as purely military actions; they had no understanding of people's war and consequently lost their battles. It was Mao who provided the correct line for building a people's army after the Autumn Harvest uprising in Hunan in 1927. It was Mao who formed the proto-type of the People's Army - the Worker-Peasant Red Army.

3. All this sounds as though the rally was just seeking to put the record straight, but that this was not so was shown in the references made to those who were alleged to be decrying Mao's strategic principles:-

> "A handful of schemers and careerists in the Party who have taken the capitalist road, with the guts of dogs, have gone all out to distort, turn upside down and fabricate the history of the revolution, working hard to embellish the Nanchang 1st August uprising, in order to sing the praises of their own virtue. They have publicly opposed your great strategic principle of surrounding the towns with the rural areas and seizing the towns last, which gained victory in the Chinese revolution. They have gone all out to create counter-revolutionary public opinion, trying to usurp the Party, Army and Government, vainly hoping to make China change colour."

The report also emphasised that Mao's principle that the Party has absolute leadership over the Army must be preserved - "we certainly cannot allow the gun to control the Party."

/4.

4. These are quite strong imputations that there are important people in the Army standing out against Mao, and that they are people who had a leading part in the Nanchang Uprising. Chou En-lai, Ho Lung, Chu Teh, Lin Piao and Ch'en Yi were all involved in the uprising, but it would seem that of these the finger is most likely to be pointed at Ho Lung. The rally sent a message to Mao, but to date we have seen no other reports of similar action to denounce 1 August Army Day, and the national press has not yet given this event any publicity as far as we are aware. The rally may, therefore, have been a local affair with a purely local initiative.

(F. Brewer)
13 February, 1967.

Copied to:-

I.R.D.

It is certainly an interesting and confusing episode. Perhaps the target is Ho Lung, but Chou En-lai and Lin Piao were involved with equal prominence. In fact who is the present leadership, except Mao itself?

Mr. Denson

Mr. Johnson

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
FEB 1967
TOP COPY
FC 4/5

En Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel.No. 205 18 February 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 205 of 18 February.
Repeated for information to Washington POLAD Singapore and Hong Kong.

People's Daily of 18 February carries article describing role of People's Liberation Army in Shansi after seizure of power.

2. Army is helping masses to consolidate and establish "revolutionary order", resolutely suppressing counter revolutionary activities and taking over or protecting organs of propaganda, public security, government administration, judiciary, industrial enterprises, communications etc. After the seizure of power manifestations of "small group mentality" and individualism appeared in the ranks of the proletarian revolutionaries and threatened unity. P.L.A. has conducted propaganda effort to correct these tendencies.

3. Article reports that there have also been people among revolutionaries who have maintained that no one in authority should be trusted and all should be swept away. P.L.A. have emphasised to these people importance of dealing with leading cadres in accordance with Mao's teaching. Masses should carry out class analysis and not merely consider cadres performance at a particular time, but all their work. If cadres have made mistakes during the movement they should be helped to reform.

4. Proletarian revolutionaries have come to realise that there are four advantages of uniting with the revolutionary leading cadres.

(a) It strengthens Proletarian Revolutionary Party,
(b) it isolates and strikes a blow at the small handfull in authority following the capitalist road,
(c) it is beneficial to the work of consolidation and construction after the seizure of power,
(d) it is helpful for "grasping revolution and promoting production" so that it is possible quickly to establish a new production system.

5. Same issue People's Daily also carries commentator article emphasising that role played by P.L.A. in Shansi provides an excellent model for the army throughout the whole country.

Mr.Hopson

Sent 0817Z/18 February
Recd 0915Z/18 February

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F.E.D.

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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
27FEB 1967
FC1/5

6

Ex. Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 234 24 February, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 234 of 24 February. Repeated for information to Washington, Polad Singapore and Governor Hong Kong.

People's Daily of 24 February reprints editorial from today's issue of Liberation Army Daily entitled "The People's Liberation Army is the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat".

Following is summary.

2. P.L.A. has the tasks of preparing for war, defending China and protecting proletarian cultural revolution. Revolution is now in key stage in struggle between the two lines and the enemy is collapsing. However, small handful in party are still frantically attempting counter blows and imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries in various countries are colluding with internal class enemies to create an anti-China tide, even to the point of military provocation.

3. P.L.A. must therefore increase its vigilance and its organisational discipline so that it unites its actions under the banner of Mao's thought. Proletarian revolutionary discipline is an essential condition to a victory for the revolution and this is the policy laid down by the Central Committee and the Military Affairs Committee headed by Chairman Mao.

4. P.L.A. must at all times and in all situations resolutely uphold highest degree of discipline. In the present extremely acute and complex struggle it is essential that the P.L.A. adheres to the "three points of discipline" and "the eight points of attention". Only in this way can its fighting strength be increased and unity with the masses enhanced. P.L.A. must carry out the correct policy of the "three-way alliance".

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0840/24 February
Recd. 1132Z/24 February

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.D.
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News Dept.
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J.I.R.D.

XXXXX

BG/4

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to Far Eastern Dept. Foreign Office

From: D.E. Evans, Esq., OBE, GM

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Metropole Buildings, Northumberland Avenue, LONDON W.C.2

Telephone: WHItehall 7022, *ext.* 5790

Our reference: D/DSTI/S/9/1/7

Your reference:

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 28 FEB 1967 FC1/5.

28 February 1967

Dear Appleyard,

You wrote to Far Eastern Department (reference 1200/66) on 12th October 1966, with a copy inter alia to Tozer, about an article referring to the Scientific and Technical Commission for National Defence of the PLA. We have received a comment on this from the Scientific Intelligence Group, JIB(Australia) which I am passing on in case you have not had it by any other channel:

> "(a) This is the first reference we have seen to the Chinese People's Liberation Army National Defence Scientific and Technical Committee. The article reveals that this Committee has subordinate units but does not in any way indicate the function of the Committee or its units.
>
> (b) The conference was convened by the Committee and was "a delegates' conference of activists in the study of the works of Chairman Mao". From this we conclude that the delegates need not have been scientists but were probably Party cadres from the various units subordinate to the Committee.
>
> (c) We have recently obtained a full translation of the article concerned and from it we deduce that the purpose of the conference was to insure that a proper attitude was being taken to the Cultural Revolution and also that it be made publicly clear that scientists were active in the field under rigorous conditions and achieving considerable success.
>
> (d) We would not care to speculate as to whether the Committee is responsible for development and testing of military nuclear weapons as there is nothing really in the article to suggest this."

We ourselves have nothing to add to this. As a general observation on the study of the thoughts of Chairman Mao, one can see a close analogy with the former Russian practice of acknowledging in scientific papers the guidance derived from the thoughts of Lenin (and/or Marx, Stalin etc) and from the inspiration of the Party. The most eminent scientists, whose professional writings would command world-wide respect, indulged in this type of dutiful acknowledgment. It was not necessarily cant, humbug or the price of a peaceful career. Nor did it imply that Lenin et al had given any direct guidance on, for example, the behaviour of plasma.

/The ...

L.V. Appleyard, Esq
Office of the British Charge d'Affaires
PEKING

CONFIDENTIAL

The scientist and technician, it has to be remembered, can be a dangerous member of a Communist society in that he can, in the description of newly discovered phenomena or the formulation of theory, expound ideas which are in opposition to the fundamentals of Communist belief, and which can be used or misused, deliberately or accidentally, in order to undermine, to challenge dogma before the implications of its development have been properly assessed. Moreover he is thought to be especially expert, and therefore valuable, to western thought; he can also, if influenced by the "ivory tower" esoteric worlds of learning, knowledge for its own sake, waste resources and research into developments.

As a personal expression of what these - by western standards, hypercritical - safeguards mean, I would offer an interpretation something on the following lines: "In working my work, I have been assisted by the practical approach to the technical problems of progress evolved collectively by the Communist Party and formulated by the expositions and examples of the Communist leaders, and I have therefore been encouraged by the positive certainty that a solution or possible in materialist terms is inherent in any correctly expressed problem, and the intellectual tools provided by Communist method have given me a powerful advantage in the particular type of problem described here. This has remained latent every stage in my observations or thinking to turn my result into the frame of reference of Communist ideology; any apparent incompatibility or difficulty in expression in materialist terms must result from my own limitations, and therefore encouraged me to define where my knowledge or concepts were inadequate and thus led me to a deeper understanding of the problem. As a responsible member of Communist society I am not here arrogantly presenting my personal observations or views, but work which owes its objectivity to the collective approach, has been tested rigorously against the main body of Communist philosophy, and is also dependent upon "idealistic" concepts not expressible in materialist terms. Furthermore, since knowledge is acquired for the benefit of the community and not for personal interests, I have consciously tested my work at each stage against my responsibilities towards the material progress of the community".

Perhaps in the Chinese environment the content of hypocrisy may be higher, the expression cruder or the form less pronounced, but the Russians expended a heavy investment in the ideological training of their scientists, and it would be surprising if the Chinese did not find the same necessity. In the USSR the ending of the "personality cult" makes it less necessary to personify the doctrinal framework in the names of the leaders - a development which Maoists are perhaps unlikely to favour!

I am sending a copy of this letter through channels to the F.O.

Yours sincerely,

Copies Sent to:

Mr Wilson
Mr Brown
Enter.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 7 MAR 1967
FC 1/5

I. D. (CFK) minute.

I rather doubt the conclusion in the last paragraph that the P.L.A. will now shake itself free from political control. It is more playing a very political role and the Centre with party leaders will probably remain strong.

2. I would be interested in any comments which we might send to Peking.

(1018/67)

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

1 March, 1967

Dear John,

It has become a truism to say that the key role in the Cultural Revolution is now being played by the People's Liberation Army. We therefore thought that it might be helpful to offer some comments on how we see the present position within the PLA and its relationship with the leadership, the Party and the revolutionaries.

2. We could, conveniently, take up the story from 13 January, when it was announced that the Cultural Group in the PLA had been reorganised (our telegram No. 46 of 13 January) and was to include several civilians who had played a prominent part in the national movement, including Chiang Ch'ing herself as Adviser. The composition of this Group and the press articles which greeted its formation (such as the Liberation Army Daily editorial of 14 January - our telegram No. 59 of 16 January) strongly suggested that its purpose was to conduct a purge throughout the Chinese forces. This seemed to represent a surprising blow to the prestige of Lin Piao, whose name, interestingly enough, was not mentioned in the Liberation Army Daily Editorial of 13 January (para. 3 of our telegram No. 46), and of the PLA itself, which had hitherto been held up to the rest of Chinese society as a model of ideological rectitude. It was also surprising that the extremists were prepared to risk disrupting the Army at a time when the Cultural Revolution movement was already in troubled water, following its extension to the factories and the countryside. The most likely explanation seemed to be simply that they were overweeningly confident that they could ride out the storm they were creating. Another possibility is that the extremists, already appreciating that the Army would soon have to be called in to assist them, decided that a rapid purge was essential before it could be relied upon to give them effective help.

3. The Liberation Army Daily of 14 January disclosed that a "very sharp and complicated" struggle was in progress in the Army against the "handful" and soon the heads began to roll. One of the first to go was Liu Chih-chien, Deputy Director of the General Political Department and formerly responsible for the Cultural Revolution in the Army. He

/had

J.B. Denson, Esq. O.B.E.,
Far Eastern Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

had also been one of the members of Chen Po-ta's C.R. Group. He was soon followed by a much bigger fish, Ho Lung. Ho was accused, inter alia, of retaining a wide network of accomplices within the PLA and a number of military leaders fell or were seriously attacked on this count, such as two of the Deputy Commanders of the Air Force Liu Chen and Ch'eng Chun and the Political Commissar of the Navy Su Chen-hua.

4. Soon after this, the most eminent Chinese soldier of all Chu Teh, also came under heavy attack and was disgraced. There were a number of other casualties in Peking and a few indications that the purge was to spread to the Regions. For example, according to a Red Guard newspaper, Huang Hsin-t'ing, Commander of Ch'engtu Military Region and another linked with the activities of Ho Lung, was paraded through the streets and by 18 February was being described as the "former" Commander.

5. One curious episode concerned Hsiao Hua, the high ranking and apparently powerful Director of the General Political Department. Attacks on him appeared, many in handfalls distributed in Peking by soldiers, around 20 January but were soon suppressed. This was later said to have been the work of the Commander of Peking Military Region, Yang Yung, who was reported to have "jumped the gun" following a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission on 19 January. Yang quickly paid for his mistake. The head of the PLA CRG, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, was reported by a Red Guard newspaper to have told revolutionaries to "do what they liked with him". He was paraded on 22 January and has been under sustained attack since. There were reports that Chou En-lai had said, ominously, that the question of Hsiao Hua was an internal one which was still to be settled. Whatever this may mean, Hsiao continues to appear.

6. Another curious development was a speech by Chou En-lai on 21 January in which he apparently found it necessary to defend Chen Po-ta and deny that Ch'en would ever slander the PLA. It seems fairly clear that within and around the Army the turmoil was considerable. Notwithstanding this, on 23 January Mao was reported to have sent Lin an instruction telling him to cancel previous directives and to throw the Army into the CR on the side of the revolutionaries. According to Chou En-lai, the decision not to intervene had been taken at a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission on 4 November ("this was the wish of Liu Chih-ch'ien"). The change of policy could be interpreted as a reflection of confidence of the extremists in the loyalty of the PLA and of their

/belief

belief that Chiang Ch'ing purge committee had done the work it had been set up to do on 11 January. A more likely explanation, however, would seem to be that Mao had, in fact, no other choice. His revolution was running into such difficulties that he had to call in the Army, hoping that enough had been done to ensure its loyalty. It was at once clear that the move had met with opposition. The Liberation Army Daily of 24 January (People's Daily 25 January) spoke of those who maintained that the Army should not get mixed up in the movement.

7. Thus, the PLA moved in and soon the concept of the tripartite alliance of revolutionary organisations, the military and revolutionary cadres was produced and presented as the new key to seizing and retaining power. The results, however, were surprisingly meagre for the revolutionary left. Apart from Shanghai, only Shansi, Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Fukien and the city of Tsingtao could be declared in the national press as places where power had been seized in a satisfactory manner. In much the greater part of China, the central provinces and the sensitive border areas, things do not appear to have gone according to plan. There have been many reports from these regions that the Army had in fact entered into the political area but was supporting the wrong side. The revolutionaries were being suppressed.

8. In Peking we can know only very little of what is going on in the provinces and so it is difficult for us to say what is happening and why. In some cases, it is likely that the military commanders simply do not know which group of revolutionaries and revolutionary cadres to support. The advice they are given in the press, that they should choose those who are really following Mao's line must be impossible to carry out in practice. This may well be the explanation of what is happening in Sian (Leonard Appleyard's letter 1018/67) of 1 March), where the PLA are not interfering in the squabbles between the revolutionary groups. In many more cases, however, it seems highly likely that the military commanders are settling for the policy by which they can most easily maintain or restore law and order. This is likely to be by working in conjunction with some of their former colleagues in the Provincial and Regional Party Committees to suppress those groups who try to cause trouble, condemning them as "counter-revolutionary" organisations who are disturbing revolutionary unity and discipline. Commanders in the border regions must be particularly anxious to keep the situation in check and it is noteworthy that there have been many reports of the suppression of revolutionaries in Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia.

9. It was interesting to see that at the same time that the PLA was stepping into the Cultural Revolution, the purge within its ranks seemed to be stopped. On 28 January, the Military Affairs

/Commission

Commission published on eight point directive, which Chou En-lai tells us was drawn up by Mao and Lin, which in effect suppressed the Cultural Revolution (i.e. attacks on superiors) in the Army. Since this date there have been only a few isolated attacks on military figures, except for the complaints of would-be revolutionaries in the provinces. The timing of this development suggests that the Army may have agreed to join in the Revolution on 23 January in return for an undertaking that the purge would be called off but, I need hardly say, this is only speculation.

10. One of the biggest puzzles concerning the PLA at present is the position of Lin Piao. In our telegram No. 239 of 25 February we set out some of the reasons why there are now suspicions that he may have suffered a setback. Curiously enough, the three issues of the People's Daily which have appeared since the telegram was sent have each contained references to Lin Piao. Furthermore on 26 February, I bought a remarkable document on the streets of Peking which described the achievements of Lin Piao in glowing colours and also carried a paean of fulsome praise by Yang Ch'eng-wu. I attach brief extracts from the document (the original is being sent to Leslie Smith for full translation and copying) which give an idea of its flavour. The points to be made about this work seem to be that someone thought it was necessary to defend Lin Piao (and to stress that his health was good) andthat Yang Ch'eng-wu, unless the document is a forgery, has pinned his colours still more firmly to Lin Piao's mast. The evidence about Lin's position is still inconclusive but the question mark still hovers over him.

11. Looking back over the past two months therefore we are faced with many puzzles. We cannot hope to solve them at this stage; all we can do is to draw attention to what appear to be the main mysteries. If we turn now to the present situation and the future role of the PLA there are signs that the strains on the PLA of its recent enforced interference in political affairs are beginning to tell. It is not yet coming apart at the seams but it is almost certainly much less responsive to central direction than hitherto. It is finding its new role, as the most important partner of the tripartite alliance, a very difficult one to play and one for which, by training, organisation and perhaps, in many cases, temperament, it is ill-equipped. With the decimation or demise of the Party apparatus, it must expect to have to carry a heavy administrative burden for some time to come. A force with a tradition that "the Party controls the Army and not the Army the Party" now finds the positions dramatically reversed.

12. A series of new relationships will have to be worked out in the future - between Mao and the Army leadership, the PLA and what is to replace the old Party and Government machines and, within the Army, between the Centre and the Regions. The purge will also have had its effect - upsetting what was no doubt an intricate pattern of personal relationships and leaving a new legacy of bitterness. It is really much too early to try to guess the pattern of the future but there must be changes from the old equations. One possible

/effect

effect, for example, could be that the army will ultimately now be able to obtain greater professional freedom having shaken itself clear from political control.

13. I am copying this letter with the enclosure, to Brewer (JRD), Wilson (IRD), Tozer (DIS) Smith and Davies (Hong Kong) and Gilmore (Washington.

Yours ever,
Ray.

(R. W. Whitney)

Extracts from Pamphlet entitled "The Life of Comrade Lin Piao and Army Group Commander Lin Piao taught me how to be a Divisional Commander (by Yang Ch'eng-wu)"

(Undated pamphlet published by the Peking Branch of the Ching Kangshan Brigade of Peking Engineering College. Reprinted by the Ch'ing Yun Precision Instrument Factory Half-work/Half-study Education Department and by the Harbin Red Rebels.)

FOREWORD

Lin Piao has been constantly and resolutely loyal to the thought of Mao Tse-tung. He has carried out an uncompromising struggle with all sorts of "leftist" rightist errors of line.

..... Since he took over the work of the Military Affairs Commission he has held high the banner of Mao's thought and creatively applied it .....

Speech by Yeh Chien-ying on 25 September, 1966 .....

"A happy event has recently occurred in our Party which should be celebrated, that is Chairman Mao has chosen his own number one successor. For several decades the Chairman has been seeking the man who will in the end succeed him. The experience of 40 years of revolutionary struggle has proved that Lin Piao is the richest in the experience of revolutionary struggle, is the greatest statesman and strategist and has the greatest qualities of leadership and is the best successor to Mao .....

To have the brilliant leadership of Chairman Mao and Comrade Lin Piao is just like Marx and Engels. With Chairman Mao and Comrade Lin our revolution will win victories everywhere ....."

On the 5th October, 1966, Yeh Chien-ying at the All Army Conference for mobilising the Cultural Revolution in military schools and academies, pointed out ..... "Among the party leadership ..... (Lin) is the youngest, and the fittest. This year he is only 59 and is the youngest in the leadership ..... His health has been examined for many years and from top to toe ("brains to stomach"). There is nothing wrong with him. Lino Piao only has a partial injury to the nervous system (Chu-pu Shen-ching Shou-sheng) which cannot affect his thinking or his physical health.

The Life of Comrade Lin Piao (pages 3 to 18)

Details of Lin's education and early career in which his revolutionary spirit and loyalty to Mao Tse-tung are stressed. Praise of Lin's achievements on the Long March and in the war against the Japanese. His role as Director of the Chinese People's Resist Japan Military and Political University. His contribution to

/the

the three year rectification movement 1941-1943. Appointed Commander in Chief of the North East Democratic United Army in August 1945. His success as Commander of the North East Field Army from November 1947 to March 1948. Appointed Commander of the Fourth Field Army in November 1948.

Liberation

In 1954 appointed Vice-Premier. Great success in the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957. In 1958 appointed Vice Chairman of the C.C.P. In September 1958, after the anti-Party element Peng Teh-huai had been dismissed, Lin appointed Minister of National Defence and took over the work of the Military Affairs Commission. Advocated and promoted Mao study. 1963 publication of Regulations Concerning Political Work in the P.L.A. 1965 abolition of military ranks. 3rd September, 1965, publication of "Long Live Victory of People's War". October 1966 called upon the P.L.A. to take the study of Mao to a new stage. At the 11th Plenum in August 1966 Chairman Mao selected Lin Piao as his Number One successor. At the meeting of the Central Committee Work Conference in October 1966 Lin Piao spoke and criticised the Bourgeois reactionary line of Lin and Teng. On the 16th of December, 1966, Lin Piao published a foreword to the reprint of the Selections of Quotations from Chairman Mao.

Army Commander Lin Piao taught me how to be a Divisional Commander by Yang Ch'eng-wu (pages 19 to 24)

Nine Principles which Lin Piao is said to have taught Yang Ch'eng-wu. Most seem fairly routine but may repay study as an indication of accepted doctrine in the P.L.A. at present:- e.g. must act quickly, examine carefully, be familiar with the maps, take decisions in plenty of time, emphasise the importance of politics."

Reference FC1/5 Enclosures (9)

Conclusions

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
15 MAR 1967
FC1/5

Mr. Butler (P.U.S.D)

You enquired about evidence to support the ~~submissions~~ about the People's Liberation Army contained in paragraph 9 of this paper. The sort of evidence we had in mind for the "important differences" was the replacement of the Chief of Staff and the statement in an editorial of the 'Liberation Daily' of 1 August, 1966 that there had been "three great struggles" against representatives of the bourgeois military line, the last having taken place "not long ago". The reasons for the "renewed controversy" referred to were the decision to re-organise the Cultural Revolution group for the P.L.A. which was followed by increasing attacks on senior officers including venerable figures such as Marshals Ho Lung and Chu Teh. We assumed that some elements in the Army objected to the implicit criticism of its purity and the further emphasis on "politics first". These same "professionals" may also have objected to the later decision to throw in the Army in support of revolutionary groups.

2. There is no direct evidence of P.L.A. Commanders disobeying orders. But the situation in some areas is very confused; there have been reports of the Army preventing revolutionary groups from "seizing power" in Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. This may merely have meant that they were causing unrest and creating instability and that local Commanders decided to restore order and not that their fundamental loyalty to Mao or Lin Piao was affected.

Mr Denson, FE Dept

John Denson
(J. B. Denson)
17 February, 1967

Many thanks. My own impression, for what it is worth, is that there is a purge in the Army as well as the Party – but much less so; and that the Army is fairly solidly obeying orders.

Mr Denson FE

M O Butler 22/2

P.a. 15/3

ANGLO/AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS ON CHINA

Experts from the State Department and Foreign Office met in London on 6 and 7 February to discuss the situation in China, its possible outcome and implications for China's foreign policies. The following is a summary account of the views they expressed.

The Nature of the Cultural Revolution

2. It was generally agreed that among the important and decisive influences at work in the Cultural Revolution, the most important were:

(a) sharp disagreement over economic policy ("Red" versus expert) in the context of the third five-year plan:

(b) divergent views over foreign policy and methods for reversing the series of Chinese failures in 1965.

(c) disagreement over the role of the P.L.A., in particular as related to China's fears that the Vietnam war might escalate to involve China; and

(d) a struggle for power, linked with the possibility of Mao's losing effective control.

3. The British tended to place emphasis on the prophylactic nature of the campaign which they saw as the culmination of a series intended to prevent China succumbing to Soviet-type revisionism. In the course of this

/campaign,

campaign, problems of policy and power had later become involved. The Americans held the view that differences over policy and power played a much more important part in precipitating the campaign.

The Leadership

4. It was agreed that Mao had played the leading part throughout the campaign, although he might have been ill or incapacitated in late 1965 and early 1966. He remained in control of his own faction and appeared to be exercising the main initiative in developing the campaign.

5. The Cultural Revolution as it developed led to the disgrace of a number of important leaders in the Politburo; among them Peng Chen (Mayor of Peking), Lo Jui-ch'ing (P.L.A. Chief of Staff), Liu Shao-ch'i (Chairman of the Republic), Teng Hsiao-p'ing (General Secretary of the Party) and T'ao Chu (Party Propaganda Chief).

6. Lin Piao appeared to have been designated as heir apparent to Mao, but there were doubts about whether he would be able to fulfil this role without the benefit of Mao's support. Lin's strength was derived from the P.L.A. and not from the Party organisation in which he is not known to have strong support.

7. Chou En-lai (Prime Minister) had played a prominent role throughout the campaign,

/urging

urging moderation at each successive stage. With the alienation of the Party apparatus, it was thought that the support of Chou En-lai and the Government apparatus was increasingly important to Mao.

The Opposition

8. It was agreed that there had been widespread and stubborn opposition to the campaign and to extreme Maoist policies. Much of this opposition had been centred in the Party apparatus which was resisting the campaign and obstructing its implementation. The opposition, however, appeared to lack either organised leadership or cohesion. The Americans tended to take a more serious view than the British of the nature and strength of the opposition in the Party in the bureaucracy and possibly in the army. We agreed that there was so much genuine confusion that it was difficult to know the real strength of the opposition.

People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.)

Is there real evidence for this? MDS 16/2

9. It was agreed that there had been and continued to be important differences within the P.L.A. The P.L.A. was now being used by the Mao/Lin group in an attempt to maintain order. This was in sharp contrast to the P.L.A.'s previous role and the change of policy may well have brought renewed controversy amongst the army leadership. It was

But what is the evidence? ?

/thought

thought that the P.L.A. in general would probably remain loyal to orders from the Mao/Lin group, although in certain regions (e.g. the South West, Tibet, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Fukien) P.L.A. commanders might support local Party officials opposed to this group. It was noted that in several areas the military commander and party secretary were the same person.

Is there any evidence of PLA commanders disobeying orders? MDS 16/2

The Effect of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Economy

10. It was agreed that the damage done so far to the Chinese economy was impossible to quantify but it might be considerable. There had already been serious local disruption of transportation and interference with industrial production which must have delayed the implementation of programmes for economic development. Should the Cultural Revolution continue for a long period and be extended into the rural sector and further into the factories, the prospects for dislocation would be much more serious.

The Outcome of the Cultural Revolution

11. It was agreed that this was impossible to forecast. It clearly would not finally be resolved for some time and the present state of confusion would continue. It was believed that the formation of Paris-type communes was conceived by Mao as a means for establishing

/a new

a new apparatus of central control. The British side tended to view the shorter-term prospects for the success of this aim more favourably than did the Americans.

12 Of the various possible outcomes, it was agreed that a durable victory for Maoist policies was unlikely. However the opposition had got to show that it had the power to overthrow the Mao/Lin group itself. At present the most likely outcome appeared to be a prolonged stalemate in which Mao's policies would be moderated and government administrators such as Chou En-lai would have an important role to play.

13. The possibility of civil war could not be ruled out but the British thought this to be unlikely. However an extended stalemate could foster the rise of regionalism. Another possibility was that the P.L.A., which had already assumed an important role, would take on administrative tasks where existing organs had become ineffective.

Foreign Policy

14. It was agreed that the Cultural Revolution was essentially inward-looking and that Chinese leaders would be preoccupied with internal problems for some time to come. This did not exclude the possibility of irrational action particularly in peripheral areas. Increasing zenophobia could make China more

/sensitive

sensitive to external events.

15. The Cultural Revolution had resulted in a very sharp deterioration in Sino/Soviet relations. Whatever its outcome, it was thought unlikely that there could now be any fundamental improvement in these relations. The emergence of a "revisionist" leadership in China could however result in some tactical rapprochement for economic and military reasons. But this seemed unlikely and certainly could not happen before Mao left the scene.

16. On Vietnam it was likely that the Chinese would continue to oppose any negotiated settlement other than on their own unacceptable terms. On the other hand, they were also likely to continue to avoid direct military involvement. Their present aid to North Vietnam was likely to continue despite internal disturbances. It was thought that China would not seek a change of status in Hong Kong. Hong Kong was however an area in which the irrational factor could be particularly important in determining China's response to any incident.

17. Irrespective of the outcome of the Cultural Revolution, China's attitude towards Formosa would not change. This would continue to be the decisive factor in China's relations with the United States.

/13.

18. On China's representation in the United Nations, it was thought that the excesses of the Cultural Revolution had largely contributed to the failure of Peking to obtain the China seat last year. Until the outcome of China's internal crisis became clearer, the British thought it was impossible to make any worthwhile forecast about Peking's prospects in the General Assembly's debate this coming Autumn. The American view was that an Albanian type resolution would have even less chance this year than last. The British thought that the emergence of a more moderate regime in China would much improve Peking's chances in obtaining the China seat. The Americans thought that, so long as the question of Formosan representation remained unsolved, even increased support for Peking would not secure the seat for them. They also considered that a renewal of the Study group proposal would reduce Peking's chances.

Registry No.

90

Top Secret.
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Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Draft.

R.W. Whiting
Records.

fr.
Mr Denson

Copy
Mr Gilmore
Washington

[Enclose A-B as Reg A attached]

Many thanks for your interesting letter 1018/67 of 1 March about the rôle of the P.L.A.

2. I thought you might find it useful to have some comments on your letter which have make use of material from monitored broadcasts which you would not have seen when you wrote. Although they have been prepared by Research Department they take into account our own views as well.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Brian Gilmore in Washington but not elsewhere.

16/3

M.F.P

K. Brandt etc See minute below HB 14/3

FE/ It was indeed surprising that the decision was taken to re-organise the P.L.A.'s Cultural Revolution Group when the Cultural Revolution appeared to be in troubled waters - an action which seemed to suggest that a mass purge operation would be conducted in the P.L.A. It is possible, however, that disagreements at the highest level at the centre, necessitated some action which needed to be explained away to the public and P.L.A. units. The struggle against Liu Chih-chien, Ho Lung and others named in paragraph 3 of Mr. Whitney's letter preceded the reorganisation of the Cultural Revolution Group and did not follow it as suggested in the letter - part of the reorganisation itself was the dismissal of Liu Chih-chien from his post as head of the Group in the P.L.A. The Liberation Army Daily editorial of 14 January was, moreover, curiously worded. It did not apparently call for a purge campaign throughout the forces, but only in limited sections - in academies, institutions and cultural bodies and in the "higher level leading organs". The public was aware of "revolutionary" activities in military academies in Peking and the reference would come as no surprise - it would be reasonable (and not seriously prejudicial to discipline) to conduct the cultural revolution in academic and some research bodies of the P.L.A. The editorial insisted on discipline and emphasised that there must be no "plucking out" in ordinary P.L.A. units. The announcement may, therefore, have been intended to limit the scope of cultural revolutionary activity in the P.L.A. while giving unavoidable intimation that there had been some trouble with people at the top in Peking. Since the announcement, there has been no evidence of an extensive purge in the armed forces.

2. In deciding that the P.L.A. should intervene in support of the "revolutionaries"in the mass movement (paragraph 6 of Mr. Whitney's letter) and that it should engage in administrative tasks, Mao and his supporters evidently recognised that a difficult situation had arisen in some provinces and that it was necessary to restore order and discipline as quickly as possible. In making this decision, they were probably influenced above all by their concern for the economic situation.

3. Although the Liberation Army Daily had implied that there was opposition to the decision for the P.L.A. to intervene, as far as one can judge from the latest reports, the P.L.A. seems to be standing up well to the additional strains placed upon it (paragraph 11 of Mr. Whitney's letter). With the possible exception of a few areas, notably the border regions of Sinkiang and Tibet, the armed forces have apparently remained responsive to central direction. We have now had several reports of Military Districts convening conferences with representatives of "revolutionary" cadres and masses on the subject of Spring farming. In holding these conferences, the local military commanders are clearly acting on instructions from the centre.

/4.

4. The leading rôle now being taken by the P.L.A. in administrative and economic affairs does give the impression that the PL.A. is usurping civil authority. However, the use of the army in this way has its theoretical justification in Mao's view of a "people's army" and more immediately in the press expositions of the "three-way alliance". In future, whether or not the P.L.A. continues to take a leading rôle in administrative affairs will presumably depend on the development of the economic and political situation, but it seems likely that a form of "three-way alliance" (i.e. involving the P.L.A.) will be preserved in the new provincial Revolutionary Committees.

5. Despite the new responsibilities given to the P.L.A. there is no suggestion that its tradition of obedience to the Party has been discarded or that the P.L.A. has shaken off political control (paragraphs 11-12). In the past, the Chinese Communists have emphasised that the Party controls the P.L.A. through the latter's loyalty to the central Party leadership and through the system of Party Committees within the P.L.A. Throughout the leadership changes of 1966, the unity of political and military command has been preserved at the highest level of leadership, and there is little sign of any weakening of Party control within the P.L.A.

6. Nevertheless, as the civilian Party organisation has been undermined by the Cultural Revolution, the P.L.A. and the Party within it have obviously gained a larger share of authority. At present Mao and his followers appear to be using the P.L.A.'s chain of command to fill the gap left by the damaged Party and administrative machinery. I agree with Mr. Whitney (paragraph 12) that a series of new relationships have to be worked out, and this will doubtless entail problems of conflicting personal loyalties for many of those involved.

7. As regards Lin Piao's position (paragraph 10), I agree with Mr. Whitney's comments. In the last two months, the signs have been that Lin's name is to be retained as that of Mao's most trusted deputy. It may be speculated, however, that he will assume more of a figure-head rôle than in the previous period since August 1966.

/B

K Walker

JRD, CrK

14.3

R. Wilson.

R. Walker > I have considered R. Whitney's letter to the PLA & the minute above is in effect a combined effort and was signed urgently by R. Walker in my temporary absence. I endorse two copies in case you would like to complete the cycle by sending to Area 2 and Mrs. Newbery.

J Rose. CRK.

14/3.

Reference ..... FR/15. .....

This is a very useful minute, with the general line of which I agree. I have already sent a copy to Area II of D.I.S.

2. I think it would be useful to send comments to Rebecca and attach a draft.

I.E. Duke 15/iii

M. Dewdney

Letter to issue.

16/3

pa.

m 3

(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 March, 1967

Sent 16/3

Many thanks for your interesting letter 1018/67 of 1 March about the rôle of the People's Liberation Army.

2. I thought you might find it useful to have some comments on your letter which make use of material from monitored broadcasts which you would not have seen when you wrote. Although they have been prepared by Research Department they take into account our own views as well.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Brian Gilmore in Washington but not elsewhere.

(J. B. Denson)

R. W. Whitney, Esq.,
Peking.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
20 MAR 1967
FC1/5

RESTRICTED

(1200/67)

Office of the British Chargé d'Affairs,

PEKING.

14 March, 1967

Dear David,

In the light of the editorial from Red Flag No. 5 which laid down the ground rules for P.L.A. participation in take-overs, we have been looking again at Chang Jih-ch'ing's account in the People's Daily of 28 February, of how the Army took part in the Shansi seizure of power. There were excerpts in N.C.N.A. of 1 March.

2. Chang Jih-ch'ing began from the premise, which had already been hammered home in the official press, that there was no question of the Army standing to one side. The Army must intervene and the only problem was which side would it support. Some people argued that if the Army intervened this would weaken its stability. Chang rejected this argument on the grounds that the masses would immediately welcome the intervention so that the soldiers would have no need to threaten the Army's stability. Chang argued that only by bringing in the Army could the new organisations be given a "powerful leading core".

3. The way in which the Army intervened in Shansi was spelled out in some detail. The Army either took over critically important "proletarian dictatorship" units and State Planning Departments or sent small numbers of "control troops" (Chih Ching Pu Tui) who carried out 24 hour patrols in the area. The P.L.A. also took a direct part in the take-over of some units and sent armed forces to places where the opponents of the chosen "revolutionaries" were firmly entrenched, to assist the "revolutionaries" and "revolutionary" leading cadres in their seizure of power. In other important units where the revolutionaries had not acquired superiority of numbers the P.L.A. carried out a military take-over to ensure that production continued normally and to "prepare the conditions" for take-over by the right group. In places where the leadership had serious problems but where take-over was not necessary the P.L.A. sent representatives to help in the "reform" of the leading group. The Militia also played an active part in these manoeuvres. Apart from these examples of direct local intervention the P.L.A. also sent out propaganda teams to factories, schools, villages and on to the streets to proclaim that the P.L.A. were on the side of the "leftists" and

/to

D.C. Wilson, Esq.,
F.E.D.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

to persuade the "counter-revolutionary" or "reactionary" organisations to disband.

4. In order to keep a firm grip on the situation the P.L.A. also took over the Provincial Public Security Bureau, Courts and Procurator's Office. A "Proletarian Dictatorship Committee" was set up composed of representatives from rebel organisations, "revolutionary" cadres from political and legal departments and the P.L.A. The new Committee took control over the Public Security Bureau, Courts and Procurator's Office and dealt with "counter-revolutionary" organisations and "bad elements".

5. We had wondered whether intervention by the P.L.A. would have any effect upon the reliability and unity of the local forces who would be obliged to suppress organisations with a claim to legitimacy at least equal to that of those on whose behalf the P.L.A. were acting. It is interesting that "some people" also voiced the same doubts, probably within the ranks of the P.L.A. itself. We have heard reports that the Army in Tibet is split between the more elderly officers who support Chang Kuo-hua and the younger men who perhaps want a less cautious and more activist policy in the Cultural Revolution. Certainly in Shansi the idea of Army intervention has been questioned, although it is by no means clear who Chang's opponents were. It is interesting that the Commander of the District (mentioned as late as January 1966) Ch'en Chin-yu has not been heard of since the take-over and it is tempting to ascribe these views to him. However, we have no definite evidence of this and Ch'en may have fallen into disgrace for other reasons (e.g. connections with figures under attack at the centre etc.).

6. The scale of P.L.A. intervention in the Shansi take-over was clearly very wide and ultimately decisive. The Army were quite prepared to send armed forces to places where the struggle had not swung in the way the Army side wanted and to intervene with sheer military force on behalf of minorities. At the same time they made every effort to warn people whose side they were on and reserved the right to oust anyone opposed to them. With the Public Security organs, Courts and Procurator's Office virtually under P.L.A. control it is evident that the Shansi seizure of power was almost entirely a military take-over in which the revolutionary rebels took only a supporting rôle. Chang's stress upon a "powerful leading core" shows that he was concerned more with restoring order than with letting the masses have their way.

7. I am copying this letter to G.E. Tozer (D.I.S.), F. Brewer (J.R.D.), Miss K.M. Draycott (J.I.R.D.), E.T. Davies (Hong Kong), L.C. Smith (Hong Kong) and B.T. Gilmore (Washington).

Yours ever,
Leonard.

(L. V. Appleyard)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
31 MAR 1967
FC1/5

Agree Sent 31/3. Mr Wilberforce
Cov. dr Pradd
F.H.
(12)
enter. J.C.S.

(1200/67) RESTRICTED

The Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.
31/3.

21 March, 1967.

FR for advice on para 6. please
Cento B 5/4

Dear David,

Until the last few weeks, little had been heard of the militia for some time. Now, with the Liberation Army Daily editorial of 16 March (NCNA and our telegram no. 300 of 17 March), it seems to have come firmly back into the Chinese scene.

2. The editorial makes it clear that the main reason for this re-emergence is that, where necessary, the militia is to form the military component of three-way alliances in (lower-level) departments and units where power must be seized. The militia must also follow the People's Liberation Army in assisting in the imposition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and in the support of the "broad masses of the left".

3. It is not surprising that the P.L.A., some of whose members have in earlier years been seen to harbour a number of doubts about the practical value of the militia, is now glad of its help. The Army is now carrying an extraordinary burden which increases almost daily, the latest addition being the call to "support" the work of industrial production contained in the Central Committee letter of 18 March (NCNA 19 March and our telegram no. 308 of 20 March). It clearly seems to be impossible for the P.L.A. to be effectively represented in all areas and organisations where current doctine requires a military presence, and the answer must therefore be to rely on the militia.

4. This raises the important questions of who controls the militia and how. Until the Cultural Revolution, it was generally recognised that, although the P.L.A. had obvious responsibilities for the training, supply and use of the militia, final control rested with the Party organisation at each level. Now, the increasing role of the Army, particularly in the provinces, has made organisational adjustments necessary. Army control of the militia seems to have been strengthened and correspondingly Party control eroded.

5. It appears that the newly strengthened links between the P.L.A. and the militia are to be maintained by means of "People's Armed Forces Departments at all levels" (see, for example, the broadcast from Sian Radio on 16 February - "News from Chinese Provincial Radio Station No. 195", p.6 .). These Departments, according to Kiangsi Radio, work under the Provincial Military Districts (China News Summary No. 159 of 2 March, p.2.). Presumably the staffing of these Departments has put yet more demands on the hard-pressed corps of officers of the P.L.A. After the disturbances of recent months, the Departments must face many difficult problems in weeding out from the militia those elements now regarded as unreliable. In most cases the leaders of the local militia were presumably those cadres who have been most heavily criticised.

6. We shall be on the look out for more references to the People's Armed Forces Departments, and would welcome any information on them from you or other recipients of this letter.

7. I am copying this letter to Emrys Davies/and Leslie Smith in (2) Hong Kong, Brian Gilmore in Washington (2), Eric Tozer, D.I.S., Frank Brewer, J.R.D., and Colin Wilson, J.I.R.D.

Yours ever,
Ray,
(R. W. Whitney).

D. C. Wilson, Esq.,
FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
Foreign Office.

RESTRICTED

Reference FC 1/5. (12)

per dfd

M. Wilson (FEI) 10/11

We do not think the "Peoples Armed Forces Departments are new. There are references to them in past years. We cannot say from our records precisely how these Departments fit into the administrative machine. All the references we have seen are to "County and municipal People's Armed Forces Departments." Their functions, we think, are to co-ordinate ~~the~~ action between the P.L.A and civil authorities, but we cannot say (where) they are themselves civil departments or county/municipal departments of the PLA. They may be staffed by representatives of both civil & military.

2. We will keep a look out for information which will help to clarify the status of these Departments.

3. We agree with Mr. Whitney Read reports from several provinces suggest that the PLA has increased its control over the militia. There is some doubt about the extent of civilian Party control over the militia. The provincial regulations for the Shansi Revolutionary Committee, adopted on 18 March (SCMP III of 21 March) state

"The Militia Mobilisation Dept. (of the Shansi Revolutionary Committee) is mainly responsible for military training work in various revolutionary organisations. It is responsible for organising military manpower, helping and educating demobilised servicemen, sponsoring people's air defence and national defence work, and helping the

Ed (2829)

the Provincial Military District carry out
civil defence training, manpower mobilisation
and organisation work in time of war and other
preparations against war".

The functions of this Dept. seem to be wider
than its title implies. It is interesting to
speculate whether these functions are those of
the People's Armed Forces Department.

J. P. Mawer
Cpl. JRD.
5/4/67

13

FC 1/5.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

17 April, 1967.

Please refer to your letter 1200/67 of 21 March 1967 to David Wilson about the militia, and in particular about the "People's Armed Forces Departments".

2. The best I can do by way of comment is to pass on to you the attached copy of a minute by Frank Brewer. In it he suggests that, while the Departments are not new their status is not entirely clear. It may be that the functions are those of the Militia Mobilisation Department set up in Shansi, although the evidence which you quote suggests that the People's Armed Forces Departments are working to the P.L.A. District authorities, whereas the Militia Mobilisation Department works to the Revolutionary Committee. Perhaps they are the same thing before and after the "takeover of power".

3. Copies of this letter go to the recipients of yours.

(T. J. B. George)
Far Eastern Department

R. W. Whitney Esq.,
Peking.

P.G. 18/4

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Registry No. FC 1/5

~~Top Secret.~~
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~~Confidential.~~
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~~Unclassified.~~

M.. Brewer JRD 12/4

first.

JRP. 13/4

copied as (12)

copy of (5) /

copy of minute on (2)

DRAFT

To:—

R. W. Whitney

Type 1 +

From

T.J.B. George

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Please refer to your letter 1200/67

of 21 March 1967 to David Wilson

about the militia, and in particular

about the "People's Armed Forces Departments"

That letter implies that I can do

by way of comment is to

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entirely clear. It may be that

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Copies of this letter go to the recipients of yours.

Yours,

17/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
17 APR 1967
FC1/5

Sent 19/4 Mr Hewby
Lord Road
FH
Arle

14

RESTRICTED

(1200/67)

Office of the British Chargé
d'Affaires,

PEKING.

12 April, 1967

Dear David,

The Chinese press has been carrying a large number of reports recently of P.L.A. units going into factories all over China to help the workers "grasp revolution and promote production". The Central Committee letter of 18 March to cadres, workers and staff in mines and factories revealed that the Central Committee had formally authorised the despatch of troops to factories although in many areas groups of soldiers had already been going into industrial enterprises for some time. It is perhaps worth saying a brief word about what the soldiers have apparently been doing once they moved into the factories.

2. We have had an eye-witness account of what happened in a Canton factory when the P.L.A. arrived. David Oancia, the Toronto Globe and Mail correspondent, happened to be in Canton visiting a chemical factory early in March. The People's Daily of 12 March reported that the local military commands in Peking, Shenyang, Tsinan, Foochow and Canton were sending troops to various factories at that time. In fact as the manager was showing Oancia round the sound of drums and gongs was heard and a P.L.A. propaganda truck roared into the yard. The workers immediately downed tools to welcome them. Oancia asked the manager what the P.L.A. were expected to do and how long they would stay. The manager was obviously taken completely by surprise at the arrival of the P.L.A. and could only answer that whatever they did he welcomed them anyway. In the event they stayed for half a day which was spent in calling meetings to read Mao quotations and harangue the workers about not wasting time and sticking to their posts. The workers gladly took the rest of the day off to listen to them. In the evening the soldiers jumped into their truck and clattered off again.

3. In Shanghai, Kweichow, Heilungkiang, Shantung, Shenyang and the Tuk'ou area of Szechwan the P.L.A. had begun to send units into factories from the third week in February onwards. This is almost a month before the Central Committee decision was revealed in the letter to mines and factories. In Shansi the Army took over certain key industrial points such as the railways, power stations and water works as early as the middle of January when the initial seizure of power had been completed (People's Daily 29 March). Two months later, in early March, troops were sent to important industrial enterprises such as steel works, national defence industries and communications and telegraphic installations. At the same time representatives from the Armed Forces Department (perhaps including militia members) were also

/despatched

D.C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

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despatched to various other factories. In Shenyang no less than 2,000 army political workers were sent into the 160 factories in the city. The soldiers toured the workshops, canteens and hostels and in some cases took up residence there and laboured alongside the workers.

4. The Liberation Army Daily editorial of 22 March (People's Daily of the same day) laid down the general rules for the P.L.A. in the factories. The soldiers were first and foremost sent to propagate Mao's thought and to do political and ideological work. They must study the local situation within each factory and make full enquiries about the different workers' groups before taking any direct action. The general sense of the editorial was that wherever possible the Army should avoid trouble and should rely on propaganda and persuasion. The P.L.A. were obviously under pressure in some places to arbitrate between different factions and sometimes to take over a factory on behalf of one of the groups. In Shanghai some of the propaganda teams appear to have yielded to the temptation to lay the law down. Their main task was clearly to get production going again and to restore normal working discipline. In many instances they were called on to stimulate workers and cadres to form new "leading groups". This often entailed taking the side of cadres who had been subjected to rough treatment at an earlier stage in the movement and who were naturally unwilling to expose themselves to more trouble. In some factories there was still a good deal of anarchism and factionalism and it must have required all the prestige of the P.L.A. to restore normal production. On the other hand, it was obviously impossible for the P.L.A. to rely on propaganda alone in all cases. Some "reactionary" organisations were suppressed and an article in the People's Daily of 11 April suggested that in some cases the P.L.A. set about disbanding various groups by force almost as soon as they arrived. The articles of course say nothing of the Army being obliged to take action against recalcitrant workers refusing to go back to work. This must also have happened.

5. The decision to launch the P.L.A. into the factories cannot have been an easy one. To some extent the leadership's hand had been forced since many local military commanders had already sent the Army into industry before the Central Committee letter was published. Nevertheless all the widespread activity now being undertaken by the P.L.A. must place a strain even on its vast manpower resources. Large numbers of soldiers have been despatched to the countryside and others have been sent to schools to drill the children. The Army is already carrying out many of the normal administrative tasks usually done by the Party and Government network. The decision to send the soldiers into the factories must also have placed many local commanders in an acute dilemma between obeying one set of directives to restore order in the factories and another set to be circumspect with the revolutionary rebels. The account of the propaganda teams in Shanghai (People's Daily of 11 April) shows that in a lot of cases order came before revolution.

6. I am copying this letter to F. Brewer (J.R.D.), Miss K.M. Draycott (J.I.R.D.), E.T. Davies and L.C. Smith (Hong Kong) and B.T. Gilmore (Washington).

Yours ever.
Leonard

(L. V. Appleyard)

FC1/1 pw (15)

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(10216)

19 July, 1967

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
21 JUL 1967
FC1/5

Dear David,

Cultural Revolution

Since I have not seen them drawn to attention elsewhere, I might perhaps mention two small points which have interested the State Department recently and might therefore interest you.

2. The first was that they picked up a reference at the end of June (I do not, I am afraid, have the details to hand) to a "congress" or "conference" of the P.L.A. to be held next summer. Donald was interested in this for the novelty both of what appeared to be a sort of public rally of the P.L.A., and also of the Chinese announcing any major function in advance.

Mao study

3. The second was a reference in the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao of 30 March (just come to light) to the fact that it was to be printed also in Chengtu for distribution in Szechwan and Tibet.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Whitney in Peking.

Yours ever,

Brian Gilmore

(B. T. Gilmore)

D. C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(16)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3
-2 AUG 1967
FC 1/5

En Clair

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 989 1 August 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 989 of 1 August. Repeated for information to Washington, POLAD Singapore and Saving to Moscow and Hong Kong.

People's Daily of 31 July carries Red Flag editorial entitled "The Proletariat must take a firm hold of the gun". Main points are as follows.

2. The people cannot liberate themselves if they do not take hold of the gun and do not use revolutionary arms to oppose counter revolutionary arms. The greatest crime of the revisionists, such as Khrushchev, Thorez, Togliatti, Dange and Namboodiripad, is that they are opposed to the people waging armed struggle, the Chinese top person taking the capitalist road has also opposed armed struggle and called for the parliamentary road. However, in many parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, revolutionary people are driving out their opportunist leaders by waging armed struggles.

3. In striving for restoration the bourgeoisie seeks to control the Army. Therefore it is imperative that the proletariat take a firm hold of the gun and keep firm hold of the Army. Peng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ching were the agents within the Army of the top party person who is the general representative in the forces seeking capitalist restoration and was ringleader of the anti-party bloc exposed at the Lushan Conference. Peng and Lo opposed Mao's thought and tried to turn the PLA into a bourgeois army. Instead of putting politics first they peddled revisionist trash abroad and gave priority military technique over political and ideological work. Peng and Lo maintained illicit relations with foreign countries and carried out conspiracies to usurp control of the party and the Army. Lo formed an anti-party conspiratorial clique in collusion with P'eng Chen, Lu Ting-yi and Yang Shang-kun.

4. However, Lin Piao has made outstanding contributions in the struggle to make the PLA a highly proletarianised and militant revolutionary army. In order to prevent the restoration of capitalism Lin Piao laid particular emphasis on ideological struggle and the proletariat's control of the armed forces. The PLA have made great contributions during the Cultural Revolution in supporting the Left, in industry and agriculture, and in the work of military control and military-political training, the further strengthening of army civilian unity is an important guarantee for the complete victory of the Cultural Revolution.

/5. In some places

5. In some places there are some responsible people in local garrisons who in the work of supporting the Left have committed errors which are sometimes errors of direction and line. So long as they realize their errors, confess the and correcf them, it is still a problem of awareness and they will meet with understanding and support from the masses. But if these people stubbornly refuse to correct the errors, then it is not a question of awareness and the essential nature of the errors will change. Those responsible people in local garrisons who have shortcomings or errors in their work of supporting the Left must be helped to change. Contradictions between troops and the revolutionary masses must be handled strictly in accordance with the principles of internal contradictions among the people, and not as antagonistic contradictions.

6. Points in my paragraph 5 above are not in N.C.N.A. translation.

7. Same paper carries supporting editorial of its own and another from Liberation Army Daily. Acting Chief of General Staff Yang Chen-wu used the same themes in his speech at Army Day banquet last night.

Summary by Saving telegram No. 7.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Moscow 84.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0530Z/1 August 1967

Recd. 1031Z/1 August 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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ARCHIVES No.31
-2 AUG 1967
FCO 17/5

En Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 990 1 August 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 990 of 1 August.

Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong and Polad Singapore.

People's Daily of 1 August celebrates Army Day with a full front page photo of Mao, quotations from Mao on people's war, and a reprint of the full text of Lin Piao's article "Long live the victors of the people's war". There are also large photos of Mao with Lin Piao and Chou En-lai.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0800Z/1 August
Recd 1051Z/1 August

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To:— B. T. Gilmour
Washington
Copy R. W. Whitney
Peking.

From D. C. Watson.

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
- 2 AUG 1967
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Ed. (3746)

Thank you for your letter 1026 of 19 July about the widespread distribution of the Shanghai WEN HUI PAO.

2. I had not previously heard that the WEN HUI PAO was printed also in CHENGTU. I suppose the reason must be that the paper has now achieved nation-wide stature as a sound revolutionary organ. You probably remember that I had gave his personal blessing to the "take over" of the paper in January and just recently it does seem to have got back on the People's Daily for

revolutionary heroes. Interestingly enough, the Wen Hui Pao, unlike the Shen Shanghai paper Liberation Daily, can be obtained on subscription in Peking.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ray Whitney in Peking.

J.C.D

K-2

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(18)

(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

3 August, 1967.

(15)

Thank you for your letter 1026 of 19 July about the widespread distribution of the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao.

2. I had not previously heard that the Wen Hui Pao was printed also in Chengtu. I suppose the reason must be that the paper has now achieved nation-wide stature are a sound "revolutionary" organ. You probably remember that Mao gave his personal blessing to the "take over" of the paper in January and just recently it does seem to have had the edge on the Peoples Daily for revolutionary fervour. Interestingly enough, the Wen Hui Pao, unlike the other Shanghai paper Liberation Daily, can be obtained on subscription in Peking.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ray Whitney in Peking.

(D.C. Wilson)
Far Eastern Department

B. T. Gilmore, Esq.,
WASHINGTON.

Desp. in Reg. 4/13.
P.a. See (15).

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
17 AUG 1967
FC 1/5

(19)

Cypher/Cat A
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 1080 15 August 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 719 of 15 August.
Repeated for information to Foreign Office, Washington and Polad Singapore.

Not Recd — Wilford's letter to me of 6 August (not to all).

Position of Huang Yung-sheng: Commander Canton Military Region.

We suspect that Huang is too concerned with reimposing order in Kwangtung and restoring unity among the rival factions in revolutionary organisations and probably within the PLA itself to have time to play a very active role in regard to Hong Kong. His own position seems far from secure. He is under sustained poster criticism in Canton and the Peking leadership are likely to be dissatisfied with his achievements in the military region (Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan). His appearance at the Army Day celebrations here cannot be conclusive evidence of his loyalty -- to and standing with Peking. It is worth noting that a number of figures who attended are in serious trouble, e.g. T'an Chen-lin and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, and that following the Wuhan episode the Maoists badly needed to put on display as many military commanders as possible.

2. It seems likely therefore that hotheads in the border villages or in Canton will continue to have considerable freedom for independent initiatives over Hong Kong.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 500.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0535Z/15 August
Recd 0936Z/15 August
[Repeated as requested]

Copy all in D.I.S. { Fuzel Nanking Saigon.

Sent 2/8 2 p.c.

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I & G.D.
News Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

PPPP

FRD Celks

any views?

(1200/67)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 23 AUG 1967

FC1/5

Sent 25 Copy

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

16 August, 1967.

Dear David,

The Chinese press has always been very careful not to reveal the official numbers of Army units mentioned in newspaper accounts. It was therefore all the more surprising to find that the People's Daily of 12 and 14 August, in describing reactions to Lin Piao's letter to Peking Mao-study activists and to the establishment of the Tsinghai Revolutionary Committee, referred to a number of Army units as having derived encouragement from the news. The references included the unit numbers and in some cases the areas where they were operating. I have made a list of these numbers, together with the appropriate areas (where they have been given) and have included it as an appendix to the letter.

2. We have been wondering why the press has departed from precedent in revealing so many unit numbers. We have noticed from time to time that various Red Guard newspapers have leaked unit numbers in their reports but we have generally put this down to careless security on their part. The present example is quite different. In view of the numbers of units stationed in each area it would be hazardous to suggest that only those units which were mentioned have been found worthy of official approval and the rest have proved unsatisfactory in the present campaign. This would indicate an extremely serious situation which we do not consider has so far been reached. At the same time, one possible explanation may be that confusion is so widespread among the units in each area about how to discharge their duties in the Cultural Revolution, that it has become necessary for the Army leadership to nominate various units whose actions have been defined as absolutely correct. If this is the case, then all other units would be expected to fall in with their views on past disputes and on the future conduct of the campaign. The situation would therefore be somewhat analogous to the confusion among various civilian rebel groups like, for example, those in Honan, where the "7 February Commune" has been repeatedly sponsored in the official press. The test now for true revolutionaries in Honan is whether or not they support the 7 February commune.

3. If this explanation is correct then the processes of establishing which Army unit is truly revolutionary have been taken out of the hands of the Local Commander and has been taken over by the centre. In view of the open split which has occurred in the Army leadership at the centre, where Hsiao Hua and the General Political Department are under heavy poster attack, this apparent confusion in the Provinces places the position of the Army as a whole in a very grave light. Bearing in mind the serious implications of all this, we should be particularly grateful for the comments of the military experts. The area in which these units have been operating is the most sensitive

.../one

D.C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

one in the whole of the country at present. The Provinces mentioned, apart from Kirin in the North-East, form a solid block in the centre of China. Since the Wuhan "Million Heroes" seem to be still active according to provincial newspapers, any confusion among the Army commands in that area becomes even more significant.

I am copying this letter to Eric Tozer (D.I.S), Captain A.I. Kennedy (SMISHK), Frank Brewer (J.R.D), Kathleen Draycott (I.R.D), and Emrys Davies in Hong Kong.

Yours ever,

Leonard.

(L.V. Appleyard)

CONFIDENTIAL

A P P E N D I X

Army Units listed in People's Daily: 12 and 14 August, 1967.

Province	Area	Number
Chekiang	Wenchou	6517
Chekiang		6299
		7350
		6409
Kirin	Yen Pien	3168
Hunan	Changsha	6900
Hupei	Wuhan	8199
Kiangsi		6011
Shensi		8133
Szechwan	Tzu Kung	7848
Named in "Front Line" (P.D. 12/8)		
		6037
		8133
		7848
		3174
		6163
		8250
		6810
		6011

Of those named in the "Front Line" the following were also mentioned separately above with their areas:

Shensi	8133
Szechwan	7848
Kiangsi	6011

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Reference FC1/5 (W 20)

Mr. Welson.

We agree with Mr. Applegards suggested explanation that it was become necessary to terminate cents whose actions & are considered to have been correct to deal other cents should deal with problems in a similar way. It is, however, still difficult to see which central group makes the decision. Could it be the Cultural Revolution Group in the PLA?

2. SCMP III, 25/8 page Biographies a Checking provincial broadcast in which two cent members are quoted. One of these "65/7" was included in the People's Daily issues seen by Mr. Applegard. The other has appeared in & central publications. Presumably cent members are published only where some central body (or "inspectors" from the centre) have given its blessing. If not, there could be more confusion.

F.E. J.G.W. 31/8

F Glover
CFK
30/8/67

Ed (1626)

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Copy as usual +12) ✓ 12) ✓ A Copy on FC 1/1 (433)

(21)

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

14 November, 1967

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 NOV 1967
FC 1/5

Dear David,

You will have noticed the very long article by Yang Ch'eng-wu, the Acting Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, entitled "Establish in a thorough-going way the absolute authority of our great supreme commander Chairman Mao and of his great thought" which was carried in all the Peking papers on 3 November. It was translated in full in the N.C.N.A. bulletin of 4 November (item No. 110309), covering fourteen pages.

2. Judging by the prominence given to the article, its length and the fact that it was written by Yang Ch'eng-wu, who, as far as we can recall, has never produced anything on this scale before, it was clearly meant to be a document of some importance. The difficulty is to discover precisely where its significance lies. During the past week we have shopped around for the views of a number of our colleagues without receiving much enlightenment. All are agreed that it is important but none is able to say why. I offer you here a few of our own thoughts with due warning about their speculative nature.

3. Taking the article at face value, Yang is making violent attack on Lo Jui-ch'ing, his predecessor as Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army and in the usual terms - the debate between politics first and military first. Lo is accused of opposing Mao's military theories, for example on "army building" (chien chün), on establishing the people's militia on a solid basis "organisationally, politically and militarily", on people's war and on the concept of "active defence". He is said to have opposed Mao since as long ago as the time of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, to have sought in various ways to ~~have~~ prevented the spread of Mao's thought and to have ordered the study of Liu Shao-chi's works throughout the Army. He is also accused of putting forward his "theory of non-conformity with the State" (pu ho kuo-t'i). The precise content of this theory is not spelt out but the implication seems to be that Lo tried to keep the P.L.A. isolated from the rest of Chinese society.

4. One possible aim of the article could be to concentrate any fire which is being directed against the P.L.A. on to Lo Jui-ch'ing and perhaps a small group which could be shown to have links with him. This would be in line with what is happening to cadres in the Party as a whole. The great majority are now declared good and worthy of salvation whilst criticism is directed at only the "very small handful". After the stresses on the P.L.A. in the last few months, and given the Maoists' dependence on the military in the present situation, it would be a logical move for them to try to make their peace with as many army cadres as possible. It is worth noting here that the reappearance of Yeh Chien-ying and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien for the 1 October celebrations and the rally on 6 November, after weeks or months in limbo, may be an indication of this trend. However, there is no doubt that the shake-up in the P.L.A. reached quite serious proportions and the total absence of references to Hsiao Hua and his General Political Department suggests that it is far from over. This impression was reinforced

Letter to Peking. pa JRD (C/K) minute by

I agree with the line of argument.
Do you have any comments to put to Peking?

D. C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department

CONFIDENTIAL

by the Liberation Army Daily editorial of 9 November (our telegram No. 230) on the need to carry out the work of "education about the present situation" which ended with a call to the Army to do still better in following Mao's line. Another purpose of the article, therefore, is no doubt to provide further ammunition to be used against the rump of incorrigibles. Yet for such a lengthy tract it has only very little to say on the great military debate, and nothing in this field that has not been said before, and that one must conclude that there are other objectives in view.

5. One of these would seem to be to give a boost to the position and the achievements of Lin Piao. Throughout the article Yang pours sickening adulation on the head of his immediate superior and presumed benefactor, portraying him as the one man who has consistently and heroically defended the authority of Mao's thought and of Mao himself against all assaults of the heathen. This again is in line with other indications of a campaign to improve Lin's standing, such as his speech to the rally on 6 November (our telegram No. 224).

FE1/29 (3)

6. The suspicion lingers that there may be yet another objective, although here one ventures further into the realms of speculation. Lo Jui-ch'ing and Liu Shao-ch'I are shown as people who have dared to launch direct attacks on Mao himself. Liu is said to have demanded, in 1964, that Mao should "abdicate" and Lo to have made numerous attacks on the "cult of personality". It is interesting to note that similar charges were made against Lu Ting-i in another long article by Chung Hsüan-tsao in the People's Daily on 9 November. Could it be that these things are being said again after eighteen months of the Cultural Revolution? The article also recalls a number of earlier attacks on Marxism-Leninism which could well be relevant today; it was, for example, described as "prejudice and empty talk which does not fit reality". Hu Shih is brought to task for opposing Marxism with his call to "study more problems and talk less 'isms'".

7. The article rebuts these implied charges with praise of Mao which is so nauseating that one is tempted to the belief that it is deliberately produced by his enemies in order to bring him into ridicule ("a genius of the calibre of Chairman Mao appears in the world only once in hundreds of years" etc). Whilst this is always a possibility it seems however much more likely that the Chinese are able to produce this sort of thing simply because they have lost all sense of proportion. Yang makes the usual catalogue of claims for Mao's achievements - some more credible than others. We are yet again reminded of the hydrogen bomb and the guided missile and told of the "continuous leaps forward in industry and bumper harvests year after year" and that the masses have never before been in such high spirits. There are also a number of references to the need for a strong leader and the authority of Lenin and of Marxist mythology is invoked to prove this point ("Marxists have always placed great weight on the individual genius of proletarian leaders, regarding it as an important aspect to be considered in choosing leaders"). These are backed up with dire warnings of what might befall if Mao and his thought do not remain supreme - "the fruits of our revolution... might all be lost overnight". In evaluating these points Yang is not only defending Mao and his thought; he is also defending Lin, whose position and chances to the succession are closely linked with the supremacy of the thought of the master.

/8.

8. One would not wish to appear to be too sensational and to be suggesting that Mao is about to be toppled in some sort of palace revolution. Nothing that we have seen so far amounts to concrete evidence which would justify such a view. However, there does seem to be a well-justified anxiety on the part of the leadership about the pass to which China has been brought as a result of their performance over the past year and more. This is underlined for example, by the latest campaign to persuade the Chinese people of the correctness of Mao's "recent directive" in which he tells them that the situation is "not just fairly good but excellent" (our telegram No. 230). It is very likely that many Chinese both in the P.L.A. and in the country as a whole have doubts about this statement and possibly some about the man who made it.

FE1/1 (420)

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Spendlove in Washington and to Emrys Davies in Hong Kong.

Yours ever,
Roy.

(R. W. Whitney)

"Serious Political Incident" in a Chekiang City

SWB Tm

Hangchow, Chekiang provincial service 11.30 GMT 21.8.67

Precis of report, with quotations:

21.8/B10

Nearly 50,000 proletarian revolutionaries of Wenchou city, Chekiang, held an oath-taking rally on 20th August to bring about a new upsurge in the great proletarian cultural revolution in the city. Commanders and fighters of units 6517 and 6299 of the PLA, together with representatives of proletarian revolutionaries in Shanghai, Peking, Wuhan, and other areas, and the Chekiang Provincial Revolutionary Rebel Joint General Command Headquarters, also attended the rally. . . .

Registry No. FC(15

28/12

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22

Top Secret.
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Restricted.
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Staff in Confidence.

To:—
R.W. Whitney
Pekcsg.

From
D.C. WILSON
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department
F.E.D.

Many thanks for your letter of 14 November about the Yang Ch'eng-wu article of 3 November. [A——B]

2. [A——B].

D.C.W.

2/xi

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Reference FC1/5(w21)

F.E.D. (Robertson)

A

I agree with ~~Roy Whitney's~~ Yaw view of the ~~Yang Ch'eng-wu~~ article. The recent spate of criticism of various leaders and policies must have led to widespread confusion in the P.L.A. as in other sections of the community. Many officials and military officers may have begun to think that the best hope of restoring normality to China lay in Mao and Lin stepping into the background. Yang's article seems to reflect the leaders' anxiety over such attitudes. At the same time, it is probably designed to counteract speculation at the lower levels that recent moves to slow down the Cultural Revolution might be taken as a sign that Mao and Lin were no longer in overall control.

3. It is also interesting that Yang discusses at great length Lo Jui-ch'ing's alleged opposition to Mao, but says very little about disagreements over practical policy for the P.L.A. This suggests that the leaders wish to limit both the targets and the subjects discussed in the criticism campaign, especially as regards the P.L.A.

4. One of the most puzzling features of the P.L.A.'s current situation is the apparent prolonged stay in Peking of several senior regional officers ~~are~~ Ch'en Hsi-lien and Huang Yung-sheng, the Commanders of Shenyang and Canton Military Regions. ~~are examples.~~ It seems likely that many of these senior officers have been engaged in political discussions with the central Party leaders, and it is possible that they have been able to exert pressure for a moderation of the Cultural Revolution. Some of these military leaders, e.g. Huang Yung-sheng and Liu Hsing-yuan from Canton, have received severe criticism from Red Guards in their own areas, ~~and may~~ wish to delay their return until the criticism has ceased.

And I wonder if a reason for their prolonged stay in Peking is that they

B.

(F. Brewer)
China and Korea Section,
Joint Research Department.

24 November, 1967.

Used in a letter to Peking.

p.a.

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22

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(FC 1/5)

29 November, 1967

p.a. J.C.A. 30/x

Many thanks for your letter of 14 November about the Yang Ch'eng-wu article of 3 November.

2. I agree with your view of the article. The recent spate of criticism of various leaders and policies must have led to widespread confusion in the People's Liberation Army as in other sections of the community. Many officials and military officers may have begun to think that the best hope of restoring normality to China lay in Mao and Lin stepping into the background. Yang's article seems to reflect the leaders' anxiety over such attitudes. At the same time, it is probably designed to counteract speculation at the lower levels that recent moves to slow down the Cultural Revolution might be taken as a sign that Mao and Lin were no longer in overall control.

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/from

R. W. Whitney, Esq.,
Peking.

Dep. in Reg 30/11.

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(D.C. Wilson)
Far Eastern Department

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RECEIVED IN
FAR EASTERN No.31
1967

FC 1/5

Very interesting Desp. If there had been really serious trouble in Fukien we would surely have heard more about it from other sources. 19/12.

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
Peking.

19 December, 1967.

Dear David,

There are increasing indications of trouble between the central leadership and the People's Liberation Army.

2. The most serious manifestation seems to have been the recent events in Fukien. Unfortunately, because of what appears to be a determined attempt by the Chinese authorities to suppress reports on the situation in the province, we have no information to add to that reported in our telegram No. 355 of 18 December but it is fairly certain that much of the trouble there has been caused by some of the units in the Foochow Military Region coming out in opposition to Mao. This suggests that the Fukien affair could be as serious for the Maoists as the incidents in Wuhan in July.

3. Han Hsien-ch'u, who is believed to have replaced Yeh Fei as Commander of the Military Region last year, is one of the group of senior regional officers, which you referred to in your letter FC 1/5 of 29 November, who appear to have stayed in Peking for some months. Posters criticising Han have recently appeared and there are rumours that he is opposed to Maoist policies. (It is possible that his agent in Fukien was one Huang Kuo-chang (7806/0344/6134) whom I have seen denounced in one or two posters as a "traitor". The only record we have of Huang is that he was a Fukien delegate to the National People's Congress in 1965 but Research Department may have more information about him.) According to some of the East Europeans here, the primary motive for Han Hsien-ch'u and the other military commanders remaining in Peking is not so much because they wished to stay here until the storm of Red Guard criticism in their own areas had abated, as you speculated in paragraph 4 of your letter, but rather because their loyalty to Mao was suspect and they were being subjected to "education". It is, of course, possible that both explanations are correct, the extent to which one explanation is more valid than the other depending on the individual concerned. Huang Yung-sheng, for example, has recently returned to Canton, where he was earlier under severe criticism by Red Guards, and so presumably now has the approval and the backing of Peking.

4. The thesis of our bloc colleagues is supported by the recent spate of articles on the PLA in the Chinese press. In my letter of 12 December I discussed the treatment of the heroic deeds of No. 4 Platoon of 6011 Pu Tui, which seemed intended, inter alia, to stimulate the rest of the armed forces into carrying out to the letter all Mao's directives, and to display direct personal loyalty to him. On 12 December the People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily launched yet another campaign which centred on what was said to be one of Mao's most recent instructions: "Fighters (i.e. soldiers) should be included

.../in the

D.C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

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in the study courses sponsored by the Army". It was obvious that a message of some considerable significance lay behind this seemingly innocuous injunction. One possibility was that this was simply intended, yet again, to hold the Army up to the nation as a model to be followed - that the aim was to ensure that the broad masses became still further involved in Mao study. The subsequent press campaign soon revealed that the objective was quite otherwise, nearer to home and more pointed. All the follow-up articles carried a heavy implication that PLA officers and cadres had become far too divorced from the mass of soldiers (a theme which has recurred at quite regular intervals since Liberation). As the editorial accompanying the first publication of the slogan in the People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily of 12 December said with surprising bluntness:-

"For our Army to be able to play a greater role in the Cultural Revolution, it must take Mao Tse-tung's Thought as its guide and improve the relations between higher and lower levels and between cadres and masses".

The criticism of the PLA contained in the articles was all the more striking because it was accompanied by virtually none of the usual fulsome praise.

5. These implications of such serious shortcomings in an Army which had allegedly "since Lin Piao took over the work of the Military Affairs Committee" been the exemplar of revolutionary enthusiasm and Mao's predominance, were reinforced by many calls to "greatly establish" ("ta shu t'eh shu") the authority of Mao and his Thought. It is perhaps even more significant that Peking posters have called for Lin Piao's authority also to be "greatly established" and it is fairly certain that one of the major aims of these campaigns is in fact to establish Lin's own position in the Army. Contrary to earlier claims, it is now implied that there are many sections of the forces where these tasks have yet to be accomplished. Apparently the thinking of many army cadres needs to be "revolutionised" and they are urged to do this by becoming the pupils of the masses.

6. Another article of interest and relevance appeared in the People's Daily of 15 December. This told of the adventures of the Party Committee (N.B.) of4411 Pu Tui, a naval unit operating patrol boats, which since 1963 ("the turning point") has waged a campaign on behalf of the Mao-Lin line and against the bourgeois militarist line of China's Krushchev and his agent Lo Jui-ch'ing. The Committee had had to endure many vicissitudes and when it disobeyed the various "black directives", which subordinated political requirements to military ones, it was condemned for its "crimes". Nevertheless, as in all good fairy stories, virtue triumphed in the end and the Committee's steadfast loyalty to Mao and Lin and opposition to orders from the military hierarchy was vindicated.

7. It now seems possible to draw together the threads of these various campaigns - the calls for direct personal loyalty to Mao (and, by implication, Lin) and obedience to all their instructions, the reproof of the military cadres and warning that they must learn from the soldiers and emulate the latter's devotion to the Chairman and the hint that unit leaders and Party Committees should oppose instructions they receive which are not in accordance with Mao's line. It appears to be an attempt to secure the Army for the Mao-Lin side by winning over the mass of soldiers and lower echelons,

.../thus

thus bringing very strong pressure to bear on to those military commanders and middle-level cadres who are either hostile or unco-operative but who could not be removed without the most serious consequences.

8. It is tempting, although, given the paucity of information available to us, perhaps not particularly rewarding, to speculate on how the military establishment divides on this issue. We must certainly assume that Lin Piao remains firmly linked to Mao, although perhaps even he at times asks his master to relieve some of the pressures which are now on the PLA. Yang Ch'eng-wu is on the same bandwaggon and there are no signs that he wants to get off. Then there is Wu Fa-hsien, who, judging by the appearances he has made in recent months may well have taken over Hsiao Hua's responsibilities as Director of the General Political Department or from Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien as Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the PLA. Some East Europeans are inclined to cast Liu Po-ch'eng, "the One-eyed Dragon" who has not appeared in public for some time, in the role of leader of the opposition. They claim that Liu, who is now 76, has always been a determined foe of Lin Piao. It seems quite likely that supporting him would be the majority of the Chinese military establishment, including the old Marshals, such as Ho Lung, Yeh Chien-ying and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien and the present military regional commanders which we have noted as being in Peking.

9. As I have said, this sort of assessment is highly speculative but what is clear beyond all reasonable doubt is that this is a critical period in the relationship between Mao and the military. If the latest campaigns do not achieve the desired response among the soldiers, Mao and Lin may well not be able to dragoon the generals into providing the assistance that they need so badly in their current efforts to restore control in China. The odds seem to be that the campaigns will not in fact succeed. One suspects that the great majority of both soldiers and officers are likely to be seriously discontented with the present state of affairs and probably with the leadership that produced it. As the only cohesive force left in the state, the PLA is burdened with running everything from provincial committees to primary schools, it is faced with a mighty task of maintaining internal security and is subject to frequent criticism and even physical attack for "meddling" (see page 1 of People's Daily of 17 November) in the affairs of revolutionary groups. The probability is that, unless they are prepared for very serious consequences for themselves if not for the Chinese state, the Maoists will have to bring themselves to accept a compromise with the generals.

I am sending copies to Frank Brewer in JRD, Colin Wilson in IRD, Eric Tozer in DIS, Emrys Davies in Hong Kong, Roy Spendlove in Washington and Reg Hibbert in Singapore.

Yours ever.

Ray

(R.W. Whitney)

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Referen RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
29 JAN 1968
FC1/5

(23) — MR. WHITNEY'S LETTER OF 19 DECEMBER, 1967.

Mr. D.C. Wilson,
Far Eastern Department.

You may wish to reply as follows to the personality questions raised in paragraph 3:-

A/ Joint Research Department have no recent information on Huang Kuo-chang (7806/0948/3864 - not 7806/0344/6134). He is not known to have served in the P.L.A. He appeared as a Secretary of the Foochow Municipal Party Committee in 1956.

J.R.D. think that one of the main reasons for the presence of Regional and District military leaders in Peking may be so that they are on call to take part in discussions with revolutionary groups from their areas. We have seen several reports of discussions being held in Peking between provincial revolutionary groups. Such discussions appear to have been taking place under the general supervision of Chou En-lai with the purpose of forming "revolutionary alliances" between the contending factions. J.R.D. agree, nevertheless, that there have recently been some hints of new strains in relations between Mao and his closest supporters on the one hand and sections of the P.L.A. leadership on the other. It is interesting that the P.L.A. have recently been reminded that they should "support the Left, but not any particular faction" - this implies that that military Commanders are not allowed to take a strong line in attempting to put an end to conflicts among revolutionary groups.

A

K Walker

(K.C. Walker)
China and Korea Section,
Joint Research Department.

26 January, 1968.

pa J.C.D. 1/II

Ed (2829)

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Registry No. F1/5

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~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
Open.

Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate.

Draft.

R. H. Whiting
Peking.

Thank you for your letter of 19 December about the People's Liberation Army.

2. You enquired in your third paragraph about HUANG KUO-CHANG [A — B]

J. C. WILSON
FED.

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25

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(FC 1/5)

31 January, 1968

Thank you for your letter of 19 December about the People's Liberation Army.

2. You enqured in your third paragraph about Huang Kuo-chang. Joint Research Department have no recent information on Huang Kuo-chang (7806/0948/3864 - not 7806/0344/6134). He is not known to have served in the P.L.A. He appeared as a Secretary of the Foochow Municipal Party Committee in 1956.

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(D. C. Wilson)
Far Eastern Department

R. W. WHitney, ESq.,
Peking.

Desp. to Peking. 31/1/68.

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En Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 134 21 February 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
21 FEB 1968
FC1/5

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 134 of 21 February
Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong and POLAD Singapore

'People's Daily' of 20 February reports that Mao and Lin Piao met representatives of the Peking Garrison and other PLA units on 19 February. Also present were Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Li Fu-ch'un, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan.

2. A second name list included Chen Yi, Li Hsien-nien, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Suryu, Wu Fa-hsien and fifty other senior figures mostly PLA.

Sir D.Hopson

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(27)

(January 1967-February 1968)

CHINA: THE ARMY AND THE NATION ~~IN THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION~~

I. The need for providing the Army with clear guidance as to the courses of action that were both permissible and desirable in the conduct of the Cultural Revolution must have become singularly apparent to the leadership in Peking after the Wuhan Incident of late July, when two key members of Central Cultural Revolution Group were kidnapped by 'counter-revolutionaries' with Army support. This event revealed the strains under which the Army had been operating since its first projection into the struggles of the Cultural Revolution in January; and the premium that had been placed upon Army loyalty by the ambiguous and contradictory nature of official instructions. On the one hand the Army was required to support the 'genuine' Left, but on the other was forbidden to open fire on revolutionary organizations of any affiliation, even if military establishments were to be broken into and arms seized. (April 67) Moreover, revolutionary organizations were not to be suppressed without the permission of the Central Committee and even an arrest required proof that the suspect was a counter-revolutionary. These restraints were intended to appease the Left, who had made frequent complaint that the Army had supported their opponents. Identification of the 'genuine' Left among the numerous revolutionary factions must often have been difficult and so mistakes could have occurred, nevertheless the Army has acted above all in the interests of law and order without distinction as to alignment. After the Wuhan Incident, Left extremists made sharp inditement of the Army's conduct and demanded that the 'small handful in the Army taking the capitalist road' be plucked out, thereby presenting a potentially serious threat to the Army's internal cohesion.

2. An attempt had been made to conduct the Cultural Revolution by more peaceful methods in June, on the pretext that contradictions among the People are not mutually antagonistic. Violent struggle was forbidden; and the Army was charged with the responsibility for enforcing law and order, but by this time the Army had already begun to remain aloof and to avoid embroilment in the uncertainties of the general situation. It was not until 9th August that a more definitive guidance was provided, though rather within the context of preventing another Wuhan Incident through a firmer central control than of a move toward alleviating the Army's position. Lin Piao, in his address to senior officers on that day, apart from giving

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new emphasis to the familiar theme of 'supporting the Army and cherishing the People',merely required that all local decisions be in future referred to Peking for approval.It was not until late August that really positive steps were taken in the Army's favour: when Mao personally commended the 'support the Army' campaign;and when a directive was issued that all arms taken from the Army illegally must be handed in.

3. The change in official policy in the conduct of the Cultural Revolution became abundantly clear at the beginning of September, when on Ist and 5th Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) made speeches appealing for an end to factional strife through the forming of alliances;and inveighed against the disruptive activities of the extreme Left. Attempts to make trouble in the Army were described as like that of tearing down the Great Wall.On 5th September,also,the Army at length received a clear directive to fire-for-effect in a last resort, where persuasion had failed.The Army had thus received a mandate for its self-protection,but was still required to exercise patience and forbearance.

4. The level of factional strife decreased in September,but has since increased again,though not to the same earlier intensities. Disruptions to railway movement,caused by factionalism,were evidently sufficiently serious at the beginning of December,after the Autumn harvest,for Mao to issue a general order against pillage and sabotage. The occasion of the New Year was taken as opportunity to summon certain Army leaders to Peking for consultations - a method of personal diplomacy to which Mao has increasingly resorted;and to issue a new appeal to the nation for unity.The reference to Party-building suggests that its restoration is increasingly regarded as the fundamental solution to present difficulties. Tribute was paid to the 'tremendous contribution' the Army had made to the Cultural Revolution; and it was declared that in the struggle to win 'all-round victory', now beginning,the Army would undertake 'still further tasks of yet greater importance'.

5. The atmosphere of 'criticism and repudiation',that was given further sanction in the New Year message,is not however conducive to a re-emergence of stability and confidence,and must be a continuing factor in dissuading displaced Party officials from coming forward for reinstatement.The reconstruction of the Party is likely to be

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be a slow process and must await implementation of the Revolutionary Committee system in depth as the framework upon which Party authority can rest. This task is being energetically pursued;and the achieving of Revolutionary Committees is gathering momentum in central provinces,but progress remains slow to non-existent in western and in eastern areas,where factionalism apparently still continues recalcitrant. The drought conditions of eastern areas must also inhibit the will to resolve differences.Three Provincial Revolutionary Committees were formed in January,including a Municipal Revolutionary Committee for the notorious Wuhan,making a total of nine provinces with full committees and four with Preparatory Groups,representing in all half the number of provinces.Progress has also been achieved in forming Revolutionary Committees in depth,again particularly in central provinces.In each case the chairman of a committee holds a military appointment.The predominant influence of the Army over this programme is therefore manifest.

6. The achieving of alliances and Revolutionary Committees has so far proved to be no guarantee against factional disturbance reoccurring; Shantung,which formed a committee early last year,has been one of the worst affected areas. The alliances will have even less value if the pace of their formation is to be forced in order to meet the dead-line of the Spring period set by Mao for the basic resolution of alliance problems.There would be a much greater chance of their success if the shortage of consumer goods could be overcome and unemployment reduced.In this connexion,the persistent efforts of Chou En Lai,from late September,to restore order on the railways may be accounted the most practical contribution to the desired internal stability since the directive of 5th September permitting the Army to fire-for-effect in a last resort.

7. The current resurgence of factionalism must be particularly disturbing,since it would almost seem to have the characteristic of being endemic.There have recently been strong denunciations of violence and factionalism in provincial newspapers and in radio broadcasts,in which the term 'civil war' has sometimes been used. The similarity of the charges suggests that a co-ordinated nationwide campaign is in progress.Disobedience and lack of responsiveness to central directives are probably encouraged by a belief of those concerned that that they have the tacit support of elements within the

top leadership.The general reluctance on the part of the Army to take repressive measures may encourage this belief. Those who participate in factional strife must at all events resent any curtailment of their new-found freedoms under the Cultural Revolution and must see in the policy of forming alliances according to trades and occupations a decision to break up their organizations beyond retrieve.

8. The campaign to eliminate factionalism may be interpreted as a prerequisite of that to form alliances and could partly explain the national preoccupation with questions of factionalism at the present time. The actuality of factionalism could therefore be rather less than might appear to be the case. The Army is repeatedly instructed to 'support the Left, but not any particular faction', on the grounds that experience had shown that where one side was supported and the other ignored mutual hostility became deeper and the situation deteriorated still further.The correct course for the Army to adopt was to unite the greatest number of people ,regardless of their affiliation, ~~who could be united~~ and lead them along the path of Mao's thought.

9. A further campaign to promote solidarity between servicemen and civilians,with special emphasis on the fostering of alliances,was launched at the beginning of this year and is reaching a climax with the Spring Festival,since this is the time when visits are traditionally exchanged.The directive issued in mid-January by the Preparatory Group for Kwangtung (Canton) Provincial Revolutionary Committee calling for a massive drive to support the Army may be taken as ~~exemplary~~ typical for the nation as a whole. Mao-study courses were to be set up,in which the spirit of self-sacrifice of yet another soldier-hero in the service of the community was to be upheld for emulation.The calls of Mac and of Lin Piao in August for the mutual support of Army and People;and the two September speeches by Chiang Ching calling for an end to violence were also to be subjects of study.A particular feature of the directive, ~~but one which might not necessarily apply throughout the country~~, was the requirement that all localities in the province make a success of conscription and the re-settlement of ex-servicemen;and that good political and organizational work be undertaken in order to ensure fulfilment of this year's quotas on conscription and demobilization.This movement was reported to have been suspended

for the duration of the Cultural Revolution.The decision to reopen the movement,which in normal times would involve about 25 per cent of the Army,suggests that the risk of throwing the Army slightly off balance is acceptable under present circumstances in the province.

I0.The Army remains widely committed in the civil sphere and has been given a renewed mandate through the New Year message to support industry and agriculture.Military Control Commissions are still running half the number of provinces,in addition to all media of communication;and military propaganda teams continue to tour the towns and villages.There are also incidental tasks to be performed such as supervising the reopening of schools and providing a certain amount of political and military training to students.~~The Army must~~

The Army must welcome therefore a return to more normal conditions, which a restoration of the Party at lower levels should bring, and the resultant opportunities to divest itself of some of the extra responsibilities taken on during the Cultural Revolution, as long as it did not thereby lose its dominant position.

force and has the unique distinction of an intact organization and communications structure. Moreover the military branch of the Party system seems to have suffered less from the purges of the Cultural Revolution than civilian counterparts and should therefore be in a position to take the lead in bringing them back to life.The Army is thus the sole agency capable of implementing policy on a national scale and its co-operation is therefore vital.

I2. The effect of the Cultural Revolution upon overall military capability remains unknown,but some impairment must have occurred if only through disruptions to training programmes.The ability to conduct guerrilla,or People's,warfare is likely to have suffered considerably less than that to conduct open warfare~~,and could even have been enhanced,since the corresponding skills of being able to move in all manner of terrains and to communicate by all means must have been well practised.~~

13. Such evidence as there is suggests that 'forces of manoeuvre' and of high operational readiness (ie Field Armies) have been largely preserved from acquisition of new administrative tasks under the Cultural Revolution, so as to ensure their continued availability for movement between provinces in the event of emergency. Therefore, although their normal military training must have been subject to interruption, the overall military capabilities of this type of formation or unit may not have been so seriously affected. The main weight of the new administrative responsibilities is likely to have fallen on Military District troops: those who like the 'Regional Forces' of earlier days, are solely committed to their area, thus leaving the forces of manoeuvre free for strategic movement.

M. Dixon to see Enter. d/a. 28

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20 FEB 1968
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Office of the British Charge d'Affaires, PEKING.

19 February, 1968

Dear David,

Hans Bargmann, the West German press correspondent here, tells us that a few days ago he witnessed a ceremony in the Hsin Ch'iao Hotel in Peking in honour of the departure of seven young men who were members of the staff.

2. When he later questioned one of the older hotel employees about the ceremony, the latter told him, without making any attempt to conceal his delight, that the seven were being sent off to join the P.L.A. He said that the present plan was to call up immediately 250,000 young men between the ages of 18 to 22, mostly middle school students, from all parts of China and to recruit a further 250,000 during the summer. The youths were being told that they were to serve for only two years rather than the normal four or five year terms of military service.

3. Bargmann tends to be a fairly unreliable source but there are a few indications which support this particular story. We have ourselves seen a number of squads of young men being marched about Peking wearing P.L.A. uniforms without the red collar badges. John Weston also saw what appeared to be the end of a departure ceremony similar to the one described by Bargmann.

4. According to some East Europeans, this is the first recruitment for the Army for the past two years (during which period there have been no discharges). The purpose, it is emphasised both by some East Europeans and by the Russians here, is not directly connected with the Vietnam war but is related to internal political considerations. One, probably the main, aim seems to be to remove the most extreme Red Guards from their various revolutionary organisations and subject them to military discipline (Bargmann says he identifies some of the seven recruits from the Hsin Ch'iao as being those who took a leading part in various violent incidents last summer). The recruitment is also almost certainly intended to enable the P.L.A. to return some of its members now engaged on support-the-left activities to more normal military duties. Yet another factor could be that military service is seen as one solution of the problem facing the authorities of what to do with large numbers of students who are now graduating.

I am sending copies of this letter to Colin Wilson in I.R.D. Frank Brewer in J.R.D., D. Tozer in D.I.S. McKearney in P.U.S.D. Emrys Davies and Leslie Smith in Hong Kong, Roy Spendlove in Washington and Reg Hibbert in Singapore.

Yours ever,
Roy.

(R. W. WHITNEY)

D. C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

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Far Eastern Department.

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY:

LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY REGIONS AND DISTRICTS

The attached lists, prepared by Miss Cockell of this Section, examine the positions of senior officers attached to Military Region and District Commands in 1966-7, including changes made during the Cultural Revolution. These lists supplement the information given in Appendix "B" of our note "China's Cultural Revolution: Its Effects on the Military Leadership", dated 6 February, 1968.

2. We would welcome comments by other interested Departments.

(F. Brewer).
China and Korea Section,
Joint Research Department.

6 March, 1968

Copied to:-

I.R.D.
P.U.S.D. (Mr. McKearney)
P.U.S.D. (for D.E.I.)
Ministry of Defence (Commander Fradd).
Mr. J.F. Ford.

Dir.

Please enter and circulate with 1966 list

B.U. to Mr Boyd

No Red. 14 April

Thanks for file 16/4

FC1/5. W.(29).

THE P.L.A: LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY REGIONS

Explanatory Notes:

The attached list is arranged, in alphabetical order, according to Military Regions, with the Military Districts shown under the Military Regions to which they are subordinate.

The list is divided into two parts: on the left side of each sheet are listed the leading officers of each Military Region and District, i.e. Commanders, Political Commissars, Deputy Commanders and Commissars and Chiefs of Staff, who were known or presumed to hold posts in 1966; on the right are the leading officers of each Military Region and District noted during 1967 (these were generally described in reports as "responsible persons"). The "remarks" columns give some background details of the officers concerned. In the case of officers who made their last officially reported appearance in 1966, other relevant information (e.g. criticism by Red Guards during 1967) is summarised in the left-hand "remarks" column. The ranks given for some officers are those last noted, before the abolition of ranks in 1965.

* indicates that an officer who was last noted in November 1967 or earlier, has appeared again during the first two months of 1968.

The following abbreviations have been used:

CCP	...	Chinese Communist Party
MD	...	Military District
MR	...	Military Region
MRC	...	Municipal Revolutionary Committee
PLA	...	People's Liberation Army
PRC	...	Provincial Revolutionary Committee

March 6, 1968.

THE P.L.A: LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY REGIONS

CANTON MILITARY REGION (MR)	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			**Responsible persons:**		
Huang Yung-sheng		Col.Gen. Alternate Member, Central Committee; Member, Secretariat, Central-South Bureau; C.C.P; Member National Defence Council.	Huang Yung-sheng	30.12.67	Appearances from July to mid-November 1967 in Peking: re-appeared in Canton 27.11.67. Criticised in Canton Red Guard press up to September 1967. Chairman of Preparatory Group for Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee (PRC)
Deputy Commanders:					
Wen Nien-sheng		Lt.Gen. 1950 Deputy Commander, Hunan MD;	Liu Hsing-yuan	30.12.67	Appearances from September to November 1967 in Peking; re-appeared in Canton 27.11.67. Criticised in Canton Red Guard press, August 1967.
Chan Ts'ai-fang		Lt.Gen. 1957 Commander, Public Security Troops, Kwangtung; Member, National Defence Council.			
			K'ung Shih-ch'uan	21.12.67	Appeared on many occasions in Canton since May 1967 and in Peking on 1 October 1967. Lt.Gen. 1951 Head of Political Department, Kwangtung Political-Military University; 1962 Alternate Member, Central Party Control Commission; 1967 Member, Political Department and Production H.Q., Preparatory Group for Kwangtung PRC. (1968 described as 3rd Political Commissar)
Kuo Ch'eng-chu		Maj.Gen. 1963 Deputy Director, Political Department, Canton Garrison.			
Ch'en Fa-hung		Maj.Gen.			
Political Commissar:					
T'ao Chu	1966	In disgrace since December 1966, following appointments in mid-1966 as Head of Party Propaganda Department and Member of Politburo Standing Committee	Wen Nien-sheng	October 1967 *	See 1966 list
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Liu Hsing-yuan (2nd)		Lt.Gen. Member, National Defence Council	Chan Ts'ai-fang	27.11.67 *	"
Yen Fu-sheng		Lt.Gen. 1955 2nd Political Commissar, Hunan MD.	Wen Yu-ch'eng	31.12.67	See 1966 list. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking. December 1967 named as Deputy Chief of General Staff.
Chief of Staff:			Yang Mei-sheng	27.11.67	Lt.Gen. 1965 Commander, Canton Garrison.
Wen Yu-ch'eng		Lt.Gen.	Yen Fu-sheng	12.12.67	See 1966 list.
			Hsiao Yuan-li	23.12.67	1950 - 1955 Kiangsi Government official; 1955 P.L.A. Commander; 1960 Deputy Commander, Canton Garrison
			Kuo Ch'eng-chu	1.10.67 *	See 1966 list
			Ch'en Fa-hung	12.12.67	See 1966 list. No noted appearances between November 1966 and 1 October 1967 in Peking; has since made frequent appearances in Canton MR. Member of Preparatory Group for Kwangtung PRC.
			Jen Ssu-chung	30.12.67	April 1967: first noted appearance in Canton MR; 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking. In 1960 was described as Division Commander, Tibet MR.

/Ch'iu Kuo-kuang

	Up to 1966			1967	
CANTON MILITARY REGION con:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
			Responsible persons con:		
			Ch'iu Kuo-kuang	21.12.67	1959 Head of Rear Services Department, Canton MR; 1964 Member of Canton MR Party Committee Standing Committee; 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
			Chiang Hsieh-yuan	17.10.67 *	1960 Commander of 123 Division, Kwangtung MD; this is his first noted appearance for seven years.
			Li Fu-yao	17.10.67	1966 responsible person, Political Department, Canton MR.
			Ch'en Ching-shan	29.11.67	1965 Unit Commander, Canton MR; 1966 responsible person, leadership offices, Canton MR.
			Leading Naval and Air Force personnel, recently active in Military Region:		
			Wu Jui-lin	30.6.67	Vice-Admiral. 1965 A Commander, South China Sea Fleet.
			Wu Fu-shan	30.9.67	Lt.Gen. Air Force
			Li Hua-min	17.10.67	Maj.Gen. 1951 Kwangtung Air Defence Force.
			Hsiang Wei	2.5.67	Responsible person, Air Force. Maj.Gen. 1964 Head of P.L.A. Changsha Political School; 1965 Director, Political Department, Canton MR.
			Lung Tao-ch'uan	20.11.67	Leading member, Air Force. Maj.Gen. 1956 - 1957 Director, Political Department, Air Defence Force; 1965 Air Force Commander, Canton MR.
			Note:		
			21.2.68. Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee established, with Huang Yung-sheng as Chairman.		

/HUNAN MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
HUNAN MILITARY DISTRICT (MD)	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Lung Shu-chin		Maj.Gen.	Lung Shu-chin	1.10.67	August 1967 criticised in Red Guard press. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Deputy Commanders:					
Wu Tzu-li	Feb.1962	1949 Assistant Director of Communications Department, Central and South China Military and Political Commission. Has not appeared for some years, but under poster attack in 1967.	Liu Tzu-yun	3.4.67	See 1966 list.
			Cheng Po	20.10.67 *	September 1967 first appearance in Hunan MD. Member of Preparatory Group for Hunan PRC.
Ho Neng-pin	18.12.66		T'an Wen-pang	20.10.67 *	See 1966 list.
Liu Tzu-yun			Lin Kuo-hsing	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
Li Hung-mao	18.12.66				
Wang Feng-yi	18.12.66	Sen.Col.			
Ch'en Yen-ch'ing	18.12.66				
Wang Li-chung	Mar.1966				
Political Commissar:					
Chang P'ing-hua	1.10.66	Alternate Member, Central Committee, CCP; 1st Secretary, Hunan Provincial Committee; Secretary, Central South Bureau; Deputy Director, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, CCP; Member, Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group. Under criticism since October 1966.			
Deputy Political Commissar:					
T'an Wen-pang (2nd)		Maj.Gen.			
Lin Teh-chun	Feb.1966				
Lin Kuo-hsing		Director, Political Department.			

/KWANGSI MILITARY DISTRICT:

KWANGSI MILITARY DISTRICT (MD)	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ou Chih-fu		Maj.Gen.	Ou Chih-fu	1.10.67	See 1966 list. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Deputy Commanders:					
Chen Kai-lu			Wei Kuo-ch'ing	14.11.67 *	See 1966 list. All appearances during 1967 were in Peking. February 1967 under poster criticism. (1968: appointment announced as leading member of Preparatory Group for Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region Revolutionary Committee and appeared in Nanning 6.1.68)
Chiao Yu-shan					
Political Commissar:					
Wei Kuo-ch'ing		Member, Central Committee, CCP; Governor of Kwangsi; Member, National Defence Council; 2nd Secretary, Central South Bureau	Chiao Yu-shan	20.12.67	See 1966 list.
			Chen Kai-lu	9.3.67	See 1966 list.
Deputy Political Commissars:			Li Shih-tsai	1.3.67	See 1966 list.
Li Shih-tsai (2nd)		Maj.Gen.	Liu Chung-kuei	(1968)	Sen.Col. 1962 Military Attaché, Hanoi. 1965 Deputy Commander, Kwangsi MD. First noted appearance for three years.
Wang Hsi-yung	21.11.66				

/KWANGTUNG MILITARY DISTRICT.

KWANGTUNG MILITARY DISTRICT	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Huang Jung-hai		Maj.Gen. 1965 Member, Standing Committee, Kwangtung Provincial CCP Committee.	Chen Teh	Dec.1967	See 1966 list. Member of Preparatory Group for Kwangtung PRC.
Deputy Commanders:			Huang Jung-hai	30.12.67	See 1966 list.
Chou Chih-fei			Liu Yuan-sheng	Dec.1967	"
Sung Wei-shih		Maj.Gen.	Wu Chiang	27.11.67 *	"
Liu Hsing-lung		Maj.Gen.	Chou Chih-fei	27.11.67	"
Liu Yuan-sheng			Chiang Hsien-yu	Dec.1967	See 1966 list. Member of Preparatory Group for Kwangtung PRC.
Sun Cheng-chien		1963 Chief of Staff			
Chiang Hsien-yu			Liu Hsing-lung	20.11.67 *	See 1966 list.
Wu Chiang			Sun Cheng-chien	21.4.67	See 1966 list.
Political Commissar:			Chang Shih-chieh	17.10.67	Maj.Gen. 1962 attached to Air Force unit, Kwangtung MD.
Chao Tzu-yang	1.10.66	1st Secretary, Kwangtung Provincial Committee, CCP; Secretary, Central South Bureau. Under criticism since mid-1966. Dragged out and paraded - replaced in August 1966 by CHEN TEH (see below).	Sung Wei-shih	Nov.1967	See 1966 list. All noted appearances during 1967 have been in Peking.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Chen Teh (2nd)		Maj.Gen.			
Sun Cheng	Mar.1966	August 1966: Transferred to Ministry of Public Health, Peking, since when he has been under criticism.			
Pao Chi-hsiang	3.8.66	Maj.Gen. 1951 Deputy Chief, Kwangtung Provincial Public Security Bureau.			

/CHENGTU MILITARY REGION:

CHENGTU MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Huang Hsin-t'ing	1.10.66	Member, National Defence Council. Under criticism since January 1967. February 1967 was paraded. May 1967 was replaced by LIANG HSING-CH'U (from Canton).	Liang Hsing-ch'u	1.10.67	Lt.Gen. 1956 Deputy Commander, Kwangtung MD. 1963 Deputy Commander and Deputy Political Commissar, Canton MR. February 1967 under poster criticism.
			Chang Kuo-hua	6.11.67	Lt.Gen. Since 1952 Commander, Tibet MR. May 1967 appointed Political Commissar, Chengtu MR. November 1967 appointed Head of Preparatory Group for Szechwan Provincial Revolutionary Committee.
Deputy Commanders:					
Li Wen-ch'ing	1965	Under criticism since February 1967.			
Wei Chieh		Lt.Gen.			
Yu Shu-sheng	1.10.66	Maj.Gen. Also Deputy Political Commissar	Liu Chieh-ting	Dec.1967	July 1967 appointed Deputy Political Commissar. November 1967 appointed Deputy Head, Preparatory Group for Szechwan PRC. He is a former Party Secretary in I-pin, Szechwan.
Teng Shao-tung		Maj.Gen.			
Political Commissar:			Teng Shao-tung	11.11.67	See 1966 list.
Li Ching-ch'uan	1.10.66	Under criticism since November 1966. May 1967 dismissed. September 1967 paraded before the masses. Replaced by CHANG KUO-HUA (from Tibet).	Hsieh Chia-hsiang	Dec.1967	1959 Commander, P.L.A. unit, Tibet MR. September 1967 appointed Deputy Political Commissar.
			Yu Hung-yuan	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Chairman, Szechwan Provincial Production Committee.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Liao Chih-kao	26.9.66	Under criticism since January 1967.	Hu Chi-cheng	9.12.67	Maj.Gen. 1960 "One of the leading Generals of P.L.A. units in Canton". October 1967 described as Vice-Commander, Chengtu MR.
Kuo Lin-hsiang	1.10.66	Maj.Gen. Under criticism since January 1967. Dismissed May 1967.	Wei Chieh	10.3.67	Under criticism since January 1967.
Yu Shu-sheng	1.10.66	See above	Chu Yu-t'ing	5.3.67	Deputy Chief of Staff.
Yu Hung-yuan		1954. Deputy Political Commissar, Artillery Forces, South-West Military Area.			

/FOOCHOW MILITARY REGION:

FOOCHOW MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Han Hsien-ch'u		Gen. Alternate Member, Central Committee, CCP; Member, National Defence Council. Concurrently Deputy Chief of General Staff.	Han Hsien-ch'u	31.12.67	See 1966 list. Frequent appearances in Peking during 1967. December 1967 under poster attack.
Deputy Commanders:			Liu Pei-shan	31.12.67	See 1966 list. Since July 1967 has appeared only in Peking.
P'i Ting-chun	13.11.66	Lt.Gen. 1964 Deputy to 3rd N.P.C.	Ch'eng Shih-ching	31.12.67	1961 Director, Political Department, Armoured Corps. 1967 Commander, Kiangsi MD. Concurrently Deputy Political Commissar, Foochow MR and responsible person of Preparatory Group for Kiangsi PRC. (January 1968: Now described as Chairman, Kiangsi PRC and Political Commissar of Kiangsi MD)
Political Commissar:					
Yeh Fei	1.10.66	Under criticism since October 1966. Alternate Member, Central Committee, C.C.P.; Secretary, East China Regional Bureau; 1st Secretary, Fukien Provincial Committee; Member, National Defence Council.			
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Liu Pei-shan		Lt.Gen. Deputy to 3rd N.P.C.; Member National Defence Council.			
Yen Cheng	10.3.66				
Lu Sheng	8.11.66	Lt.Gen.			
Chan Hua-yu	Oct.1965	Maj.Gen. 1958 Deputy Political Commissar, Tibet MR. 1965 "responsible officer of armed forces units on Fukien front".			
Chief of Staff:					
Hsiung Chao-jen	10.3.66	Maj.Gen.			

/FUKIEN MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
FUKIEN MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Chu Yao-hua	Jul.1966	Maj.Gen.	Fan Shih-jen	(1.10.66)	1965 2nd Secretary, Fukien Provincial CCP Committee. 1967 appointed Political Commissar, but no noted appearance.
Deputy Commanders:					
Mao Hui-i			Mao Hui-i	30.3.67	See 1966 list.
T'u Tse-sheng	8.11.66		Ho Ching-yu	1.10.67	"Fukien Frontier Troops"
Political Commissar:			Yen Hung	1.10.67	"Fukien Frontier Troops"
Yeh Fei	1.10.66	Please see under FOOCHOW MR.			
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Not known.					
KIANGSI MILITARY DISTRICT:					
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Wu Jui-shan		Member, Standing Committee, Kiangsi Provincial CCP Committee	Wu Jui-shan	26.2.67	Under criticism since August 1967.
Deputy Commanders:			Lin Chung-chao	26.2.67	See 1966 list.
Ni Nan-shan			Hu Ting-chuan	5.1.67	See 1966 list.
Hu Ting-chuan			Ni Nan-shan	5.1.67	See 1966 list
Li Kuo-liang		Sen.Col. Chief of Staff.	Li Kuo-liang	5.1.67	See 1966 list.
Political Commissar:			Chu Shih-feng	5.1.67	See 1966 list
Yang Shang-kuei	1965	1965 Secretary, East China Bureau. Brother of YANG SHANG-K'UN. 1966/67 "struggled against". Replaced by CHENG SHIH-CH'ING.	Cheng Shih-ch'ing	31.12.67	Please see under FOOCHOW MR.
			Yang Tung-liang	Dec.1967	1960 Commander, 203 Division, Nanking MR. 1967 Vice-Chairman, Kiangsi PRC. December 1967 Commander, Kiangsi MD. No noted appearances between 1960 and 1967
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Lin Chung-chao		Maj.Gen.	Wen Tao-hung	17.11.67	Member, Standing Committee, Kiangsi PRC. Deputy Political Commissar and Director, Political Department.
Chu Shih-feng					

/INNER MONGOLIA MILITARY REGION:

Up to 1966

1967

Note: Reports since November 1967 suggest that Inner Mongolia may have been made a Military District under Peking Military Region.

INNER MONGOLIA MILITARY REGION:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ulanfu	1.10.66	Under criticism since September 1966. May 1967 dismissed.	T'eng Hai-ch'ing	31.12.67	Chairman, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Revolutionary Committee, Acting Commander, Inner Mongolia MR and Deputy Commander, Peking MR. First noted appearance was in Peking on 18 August 1966, without designation.
Deputy Commanders:					
Liu Hua-hsiang			Liu Hua-hsiang	Dec.1967	See 1966 list.
Kung Fei	(1963)	Criticised February 1967.	Wu Tao	Dec.1967	See 1966 list. Vice-Chairman, Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee.
Liu Pin		Maj.Gen.	Liu Ch'ang	20.3.67	See 1966 list. February 1967 under criticism
Hsiao Ying-t'ang	1965	Maj.Gen. Sometime Deputy Chief of Staff, Chinese People's Volunteers, Korea.	Liu Pin	1.6.67	See 1966 list.
Political Commissar:					
Ulanfu	1.10.66	Please see above. Replaced by WU TAO (see below).			
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Wu Tao		Maj.Gen. 1959 Director, Political Department, General Staff Department, P.L.A.			
T'ing Mou	1965	Criticised February 1967.			
Liu Ch'ang		Maj.Gen. 1958 Director, Political Department.			

/KUNMING MILITARY REGION:

Up to 1966

KUNMING MILITARY REGION:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks
Commander:		
Ch'in Ch'i-wei		Lt. Gen. 1964 Deputy to 3rd N.P.C. 1965 Member, National Defence Council. 1966 Secretary, Yunnan Provincial CCP Committee. September 1966 Chief Instructor, Kunming Area Red Guards.
Deputy Commanders:		
Lu Jui-lin		Maj.Gen. 1955/57 Deputy Commander, Armoured Corps. 1958 Deputy Commander, Kunming MR.
Wang Yin-shan		Maj.Gen.
Tsui Wen-ping	13.9.66	Maj.Gen.
Ch'a Yu-sheng	1965	Maj.Gen.
Tien Wei-yang		Lt.Gen. 1957 Commander, Kweichow MD. First noted appearance in Kunming MR during 1966.
Political Commissar:		
Yen Hung-yen	13.9.66	28 October 1966 replaced by Li Ch'eng-fang. Under criticism since January 1967. 1967 committed suicide.
Deputy Political Commissar:		
Hu Jung-kuei	5.11.66	Maj.Gen. 1952 Head of Political Department, Yunnan Military District. 1958 Deputy Political Commissar, Kunming MR.

1967

Responsible persons:	Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Ch'in Ch'i-wei	1.10.67	Under criticism since January 1967. Both appearances during 1967 were in Peking.
Li Ch'eng-fang	1.10.67	Lt.Gen. 1960 Political Commissar, Wuhan MR. 1965 Member, National Defence Council, Commander Kunming Garrison and Secretary, Yunnan Provincial CCP Committee. 1967 Political Commissar, Kunming MR. 1 October, 1967 appeared in Peking.
Ch'en K'ang	31.12.67	Lt.Gen. A former Commander at Pei-p'ei Infantry School, Kunming, and a Commander in Kunming MR since 1956. 1965 Commander, Kunming Garrison. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Lu Jui-lin	31.10.67	See 1966 list.
Hsu Chi-hsiao	1.10.67	1958 Deputy Commander, Yunnan MD. First noted appearance since then was in 1967.
Wang Yin-shan	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
Tien Wei-yang	23.9.67	See 1966 list.
Chu Chia-pi	21.7.67	Gen. Did not appear between 1959 and 1966. Described as "one of the leadership comrades".
Li Tsai-han	24.12.67	February 1967 first noted appearance as Chairman, Kweichow PRC and Deputy Political Commissar, Kweichow MD. May 1967 Deputy Political Commissar, Kunming MR. Jun 1967 Political Commissar, Kweichow MD.
Wang Yen-ch'uan	21.11.67	Gen. 1964 Political Commissar "of a certain unit in Kunming".
Chang Li-hsiung	1.10.67	1962 "among leading officers of P.L.A. units in Kunming". 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Li Fa-ying	1.10.67	Sole noted appearance during 1967.
Ts'ui Chien-kung	1.8.67	Maj.Gen.
Liu Mao-kung	26.9.67	Maj.Gen. Air Force, with P.L.A. Kunming.

/KWEICHOW MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
KWEICHOW MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ho Kuang-yu		Maj.Gen. 1954 Chief of Staff. 1965 Member of Standing Committee of Kweichow CCP Committee. September 1966 Chief Instructor of Red Guards of Kweiyang Municipality.	Li Tsai-han	24.12.67	Please see Kunming MR.
			Ho Kuang-yu	22.12.67	See 1966 list. Member, Standing Committee, Kweichow PRC.
Deputy Commanders:			Shih Hsin-an	8.12.67	Maj.Gen. 1954 Director, Political Department and Deputy Political Commissar, until Jun 1967 Political Commissar, Kweichow MD.
Wang Nai-kuei	1965	Maj.Gen.			
Chang P'ei-jung		Maj.Gen.	Liu An-min	12.12.67	June 1967 Commissar of Rear Services, Kweichow MD. Vice-Chairman, Kweichow PRC.
Wu Jung-cheng			Chen Chieh-ti	8.12.67	April 1967 Deputy Commander, Kweichow MD. Member, Standing Committee, Kweichow PRC.
Political Commissar:					
Chia Ch'i-yun	1.10.66	Under poster attack since October 1966. August/September 1967 paraded, and replaced by SHIH HSIN-AN, who in turn was replaced by LI TSAI-HAN.	Chang Hsin-tien	7.12.67	March 1967 Deputy Political Commissar, Kweichow MD.
			Tien Hua-i	11.10.67	See 1966 list.
			Wu Jung-cheng	8.12.67	See 1966 list.
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Tien Hua-i		1965 Director, Political Department. Replaced by HSUEH KUANG.	Chang Pei-jung	8.12.67	See 1966 list.
			Chang Liang	8.12.67	September 1967 Deputy Commander, Kweichow MD.
			Hsueh Kuang	Dec.1967	Director, Political Department.
YUNNAN MILITARY DISTRICT:					
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Appointment uncertain			Li Hsi-fu	21.7.67	1959 Deputy Commander, but no noted appearance until February 1966, when he was merely described as "responsible person".
Deputy Commanders:					
Hsiung K'uei-tu	Apr.1966				
Hu Jung-kuei	5.11.66	Maj.Gen.	Chang Li-hsiung	1.10.67	August 1967 described as "responsible person of Yunnan MD". Since 1962 had been active in Kunming Military Region. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Ting Jung-chang	1.10.66	Maj.Gen.			
Political Commissar:			Li Ming	Dec.1967	See 1966 list.
Chou Hsing	26.12.66	Governor of Yunnan and Provincial Party Secretary.			
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Li Ming		Sen.Col.			

LANCHOW MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Chang Ta-chih		Lt.Gen. Alternate Member, Central Committee; Member, National Defence Council; Secretary, North-West Bureau.	Chang Ta-chih	25.12.67	See 1966 list. May 1967 criticised, but has made several appearances since September 1967.
			Hsien Heng-han	10.11.67	See 1966 list. Head of Kansu PRC.
Deputy Commander:					
Yang Chia-jui		Maj.Gen. Formerly Commander, Shensi MD.	Yang Chia-jui	25.12.67	See 1966 list. Deputy Head, Kansu PRC.
			Hsu Kuo-chen	25.12.67	Maj.Gen. Deputy Head, Kansu PRC.
Political Commissar:			Kao Wei-sung	25.12.67	See 1966 list. Deputy Head, Kansu PRC.
Liu Lan-t'ao	1.10.66	1st Secretary, North-West Bureau. Under criticism since October 1966. 1967 paraded. Replaced by HSIEN HENG-HAN.	Li Shu-mao	25.12.67	Gen. Deputy Head, Kansu PRC.
			Liu Jui-fang	30.12.67	Maj.Gen. Director, Political Department and Head of "Support the Left" Office.
Deputy Political Commissar:			Liu Hsien-chuan	(1968)	Deputy Commander. See also Tsinghai MD.
HSIEN HENG-HAN (2nd)		Lt. Gen.			
Kao Wei-sung		Maj.Gen.			
SHENSI MILITARY DISTRICT:					
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Hu Ping-yun		Maj.Gen. 1959 Deputy Commander, Lanchow MR. Since 1964 Commander of Shensi MD.	Hu Ping-yun	1.10.67	Both appearances during 1967 in Peking.
			Huang Ching-yao	2.12.67	1 October 1967 appeared in Peking. December 1967 appointed Commander. Formerly Deputy Commander, Heilungkiang MD.
Deputy Commanders:					
Hsu Li-shu			Ku Feng-ming	1.10.67	First appearance. Spoke at National Day rally
Sun Kuang	Dec.1965	Maj.Gen. 1952 Deputy Commander, Ninghsia MD. 1954 Deputy Commander, Tsinghai MD.	Kuang Sheng-chih	1.10.67	Maj.Gen. 1957 Political Commissar, Air Force Lanchow MR.
Political Commissar:			Liu Chien-kung	26.12.67	First noted appearance on National Day.
Identification uncertain.			Fang Sheng-pu	2.12.67	Maj.Gen. 1958 in Foochow MR.
Deputy Political Commissar:			Liu Chiang-ping	1.10.67	First noted appearance.
Yuan Ko-fu	Sept.1965		Hsu Li-shu	1.10.67	See 1966 list
			Pai Hsin-fu	26.12.67	First noted appearance on National Day, Sian.
			Yen Tzu-ching	1.10.67	First noted appearance

/NINGHSIA MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
NINGHSIA MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Chu Sheng-ta	No noted appear-ance	March 1963 appointment announced.	Chao Ping-lun	1.10.67	Formerly Deputy Commander, Tsinghai MD.
			Hsu Chung-yo	1.10.67	First noted appearance.
Deputy Commander:					
Chu Chih-kao	1965?				
Political Commissar:					
Yang Ching-jen	5.5.66	Secretary, North-West Bureau; 1st Secretary, Ninghsia Regional CCP Committee. Under criticism since December 1966.			
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Chiang Po	Nov.1964				
KANSU MILITARY DISTRICT:		Identifications uncertain.	Responsible persons:		
			Lung Ping-chu	10.11.67	Political Commissar. Member, Kansu PRC
			Chang Chung	25.12.67	Maj.Gen. Deputy Commander. Deputy Head, Kansu PRC.
			Chang Hsi-ting	9.11.67	Sen.Col. 1956 Director, Political Department Shensi MD. May 1967 criticised. November 1967 first noted appearance as responsible person of the Kansu MD.

/TSINGHAI MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
TSINGHAI MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Liu Hsien-chuan		Maj.Gen.	Liu Hsien-chuan	31.12.67	See 1966 list. Chairman, Tsinghai PRC.
Deputy Commander:			Chang Chiang-lin	Dec.1967	Active since July 1967. 1st Vice-Chairman, Tsinghai PRC
Tseng Cheng			Wang Wen-ying	5.3.1967	See 1966 list.
Political Commissar:			Lin Sheng	20.6.1967	See 1966 list. Member, Tsinghai PRC.
Yang Chih-lin	1.10.66	Secretary, North-West Bureau; 1st Secretary, Tsinghai Provincial CCP Committee. Under criticism since January 1967. Replaced by CHI WEI-CHUAN.	Lu Ching-hsien	1.10.67	First noted appearance
			Tseng Cheng	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
Deputy Political Commissars:			Chao Yung-fu	No noted appearance	1967 Red Guard press identified as a Deputy Commander of Tsinghai MD who had been "dragged out".
Wang Chao	8.10.66	2nd Secretary, Tsinghai CCP Committee and Vice-Governor. Under criticism since January 1967 and paraded.			
Wang Wen-ying					
Lin Sheng		Director, Political Department.			

/NANKING MILITARY REGION:

NANKING MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Hsu Shih-yu		Col.Gen. Alternate Member, Central Committee, CCP; Vice-Minister of National Defence; Secretary, East China Bureau.	Hsu Shih-yu	1.10.67	Sole appearance during 1967, in Peking.
			Tu Ping	31.12.67	Lt.Gen. All appearances since 1 October 1967 have been in Peking (see note under 1966 concerning Political Commissar).
Deputy Commanders:					
Lin Wei-hsien		Lt.Gen.	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	28.12.67	Political Commissar since June 1967. Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group. Leading member Shanghai MRC.
Chang Ts'ai-ch'ien		Lt.Gen.			
Wang Pi-ch'eng		Lt.Gen.	Lin Wei-hsien	1.10.67	See 1966 list. (May be Acting Commander).
			Wang Pi-ch'eng	30.8.67	See 1966 list.
Political Commissar:					
Chiang Wei-ch'ing	29.9.66	First Secretary, Kiangsu CCP Committee; Secretary of Secretariat, East China Bureau. Criticised since November 1966. Replaced by TU PING (who later appears to have been replaced by CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO).	Chang Ts'ai-ch'ien	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
			Liang Chi-ching	1.10.67	Deputy Political Commissar, Kiangsu MD. April 1967 transferred to Nanking MR. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
			Jao Tzu-chien	1.10.67	Lt.Gen. 1964 Commanding Officer, Shanghai Garrison.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Wang Liang-en		1965 Deputy Director, Political Department.	Chou Kuan-wu	7.12.67	Lt.Gen. 1959 2nd Political Commissar, Chekiang MD. (1968: Deputy Political Commissar, Nanking MR).
Chief of Staff:			Wang Liang-en	1.10.67	See 1966 list. All noted appearances during 1967 were in Peking.
Wang Yun-jui	Jan.1966	Maj.Gen. 1954 Deputy Chief of Staff, CPV, Korea.	Liao Jung-piao	1.10.67	Lt.Gen. 1950 Garrison Commander, Tsinan. 1952 Deputy Commander, Shanghai Garrison. 1957/1966 Commander, Anhwei MD. Now among responsible personnel of Nanking MR. Sole noted appearance in 1967 was in Peking.
			Note: The present position of the following personality is uncertain:		
			Ch'ien Chun	8.12.67	Lt.Gen. 1955 Deputy Commander, Chekiang MD. 1960 - 1965 Commander, Chekiang MD. February 1966 "responsible comrade of Nanking MR/military academies in Nanking". March 1967 reference to possible role in setting up Military Control Commission in Anhwei. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking. December 1967 included among "leading members of P.L.A. units stationed in Nanking and Kiangsu Provincial Military Area Command".

/ANHWEI MILITARY DISTRICT:

ANHWEI MILITARY DISTRICT:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Liao Jung-piao	5.1.66	Please see Nanking MR 1967. March 1966 replaced by YEN KUANG (see below).	Yen Kuang	26.1.67	Under criticism. Replaced by LI TE-SHENG.
Yen Kuang		Maj.Gen. Deputy Chief of Staff, Nanking MR.	Li Te-sheng	1.10.67 *	First noted appearance was in Peking @ National Day. Has since been described as "Commander of Army Unit 6408 (the 12th Army)".
Deputy Commanders:			Chang Wen-pi	1.10.67 *	Political Commissar. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Chang Chen-tung		Maj.Gen.	Chang Chen-tung	2.2.67	See 1966 list.
Chung Kuo-chu	1.10.66	Maj.Gen.	Ch'eng Yeh-tang	25.3.67	See 1966 list.
Ch'eng Yeh-tang		Maj.Gen. Deputy Commander, Rear Services and Director, Anhwei Provincial Group for Guiding Revolution and Production.	P'eng Sheng-piao	19.2.67	See 1966 list.
			Tai Yuan-lung	Nov.1967	1965 Deputy Commander, Rear Services Department. Now member of Anhwei Provincial Production Committee.
Political Commissar:					
Li Pao-hua	2.11.66	1st Secretary, Anhwei Provincial CCP Committee. Under criticism since December 1966. Paraded. Replaced by CHANG WEN PI.			
Deputy Political Commissars:					
P'eng Sheng-piao		Maj.Gen.			
Ma Tsung-huang	1.10.66				
Tu Wen (2nd)	Aug.1966				
Wang Wen-mo (3rd)	1.10.66				

/CHEKIANG MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
CHEKIANG MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
		Identification uncertain.	Lung Chien	26.3.67	Maj.Gen. 1965 Director, Political Department, Nanking MR.
Deputy Commanders:					
Liu Heng-yun		Maj.Gen.	Liu Heng-yun	27.2.67	See 1966 list.
Li Kuo-hou	7.10.66		Ho I-hsiang	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
Wan Chen-hsi	26.6.66		Kuo Cho-hsin	27.2.67	See 1966 list.
Ho I-hsiang			Nan Ping	26.12.67	March 1967 first noted appearance
Political Commissar:			Hsiung Ying-tang	1.10.67	Lt.Gen. 1957 Commander, Shanghai Garrison.
Chiang Hua	10.9.66	1st Secretary, Chekiang Provincial CCP Committee; Secretariat member, East China Bureau. Under criticism since September 1966. Replaced by LUNG CHIEN.	(Following two may be members of Shanghai Garrison):		
			Chang Wen-ho	1.10.67	First noted appearance.
			Chu Chuan-lin	Dec.1967	First noted appearance on National Day in Hangchow.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Chou Kuan-wu		Lt.Gen. February 1966 transferred to Nanking MR.	Leading Air Force personnel recently active in Military District:		
Kuo Cho-hsin		Maj.Gen.	Chen Li-yun	10.12.67	Responsible person, P.L.A. Unit 7350 and "supreme provisional organ of power in Chekiang".
			Pai Chung-shan	Dec.1967	
KIANGSU MILITARY DISTRICT:					
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Chen Mao-hui		Believed also to be Political Commissar.	Chen Mao-hui	7.4.67	See 1966 list.
Deputy Commanders:			Liang Chi-ch'ing	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Transferred to Nanking MR April 1967.
		Identification uncertain.	Liu Lin	8.12.67	See 1966 list. This is his first noted appearance for several years.
Political Commissar:					
		See above.			
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Liang Chi-ching		Sen.Col.			
Chief of Staff:					
Liu Lin		1957 Secretary, Nanking Municipal Committee.			

/PEKING MILITARY REGION:

PEKING MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Yang Yung	25.10.66	General. Former Commander, CPV in Korea. Alternate Member, Central Committee, CCP; Deputy Chief of General Staff; Member, National Defence Council. Under criticism since January 1967 and paraded.	Cheng Wei-shan	22.12.67	See 1966 list. Vice-Chairman, Peking MRC.
			Ch'en Hsien-jui	31.12.67	See 1966 list.
			Huang Chen-t'ang	6.10.67	See 1966 list.
			Fu Ch'ung-pi	31.12.67	See 1966 list. Vice-Chairman MRC.
Deputy Commanders:			Liu Ko-p'ing	31.12.67	1965 Vice-Governor, Shansi. 1967 2nd Political Commissar, Peking MR, concurrently 1st Political Commissar, Shansi MD and Chairman, Shansi PRC. Under criticism since December 1967.
Cheng Wei-shan		Lt.Gen.			
Han Wei		Lt.Gen.			
Fu Ch'ung-pi		Commander, Peking Garrison.	Huang Tso-chen	31.12.67	Maj.Gen. 2nd Political Commissar, Peking Garrison.
T'eng Hai-ch'ing		Lt.Gen.			
Political Commissar:			Wu Hsien-en	1.10.67	Director of Logistics.
Liao Han-sheng	1.10.66	Col.Gen. Criticised since January 1967. Replaced by LI HSUEH-FENG.	Cheng San-sheng	Dec.1967	Vice-Chairman, Tientsin MRC.
Deputy Political Commissars:			Hsiao Ssu-ming	Dec.1967	1952 Acting Commander, Shansi MD. 1960 Commander, Hopei MD. 1965 2nd Political Commissar, Hopei MD. 1967 Vice-Chairman, Tientsin MRC.
Chang Nan-sheng	18.8.66	Lt.Gen. Deputy Political Commissar, Peking Garrison.			
Ch'en Hsien-jui			Note:		
Wang Tzu-feng	1.10.66	Lt.Gen.	(1) Teng Hai-ch'ing		Since June 1967 has been described as leading member of Preparatory Group for Revolutionary Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (in November 1967 was appointed Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee) and Acting Commander of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Military Region. May concurrently retain position of Deputy Commander, Peking MR (please also see note under Inner Mongolia MR 1967 concerning possible change to Inner Mongolia MD under Peking MR)
Hsiao Wen-chiu		Maj.Gen.			
Huang Chen-t'ang					
			(2) Li Hsueh-feng		It is uncertain how long subject carried out duties of Political Commissar. He was under heavy criticism from October 1966, but has made frequent appearances in Peking during the second half of 1967. (1968: appointed Chairman, Hopei PRC)
			(3) Han Wei Hsiao Wen-chiu		Have appeared only under general heading of "responsible comrades from various general headquarters of the PLA, the Scientific and Technological Commission for National Defence various services, branches and academies, P.L.A. units in Peking, activists in studying Chairman Mao's works in the armed forces and representatives of model heroes".
			/HOPEI MILITARY DISTRICT:		

	Up to 1966			1967	
HOPEI MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ma Hui		1960 A Commander, Tsinan MR.	Ma Hui	1.10.67 *	See 1966 list (1968 Vice-Chairman, Hopei PRC)
Deputy Commanders:					
Fang Chih-chung	25.11.66	Maj.Gen. 1960 concurrently Commander, Tientsin Garrison.	Tseng Mei	22.11.67 *	1952 - 1963 Chief of Staff, Peking/Tientsin Garrison Command. (1968 Vice-Chairman, Hopei PRC)
Political Commissar:			Chou Ting-hsi	8.4.67	Deputy Political Commissar.
Lin T'ieh	Feb.1966	1st Secretary, Hopei Provincial CCP Committee; former Governor of Hopei; 3rd Secretary, North China Bureau. Under criticism since September 1966. Replaced by LIU TZU-HOU, who in turn was criticised in January 1967, and replaced by TSENG MEI. (Note: 1968 Liu Tzu-hou appointed 1st Vice-Chairman of Hopei PRC)	Li Hsiu-lai	8.4.67	Deputy Director, Political Department.
			Tung Chi-wu	1.10.67	General.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Li Chih-yuan	Apr.1965				
Lu K'o	Apr.1965				
SHANSI MILITARY DISTRICT:					
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ch'en Chin-yu		Maj.Gen.	Liu Ko-p'ing	31.12.67	Please see Peking MR.
Deputy Commander:			Chang Jih-ch'ing	31.12.67	Vice-Chairman, Shansi PRC.
Tsao Yu-ch'ing		1959 - 1965 Chief of Staff.	Ch'en Chin-yu	Nov.1967	See 1966 list
Political Commissar:			Kuo Yung-piao	1.10.67	Deputy Political Commissar. First noted appearance May 1967.
Wei Heng	Jul.1966	1st Secretary, Shansi Provincial CCP Committee; former Governor of Shansi. Under criticism since mid-1966. Replaced by CHANG JIH-CH'ING, who appears to have acted in this capacity only until LIU KO-P'ING was appointed.	Chin Sheng-yuan	17.3.67	See 1966 list.
			Tsao Yu-ch'ing	4.10.67 *	See 1966 list.
			Chao Kuan-ying	Mar.1967	Deputy Commander, and Deputy Commander, Shansi Provincial Frontline Command to Grasp Revolution and Stimulate Production.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Chang Jih-ch'ing (2nd)					
Chin Sheng-yuan					

/SHENYANG MILITARY REGION:

	Up to 1966			1967	
SHENYANG MILITARY REGION:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ch'en Hsi-lien		Col.Gen. Alternate Member, Central Committee CCP. Member, National Defence Council.	Ch'en Hsi-lien	31.12.67	Frequent appearances since July 1967 have all been in Peking.
Deputy Commanders:					
Tseng Shao-shan		Lt.Gen.	Tseng Shao-shan	1.10.67	Sole appearance during 1967, in Peking.
Chang Kai-ching	7.8.66	Maj.Gen. Vice-Governor, Kirin.	Sung Jen-ch'iung	31.12.67	Under criticism since May 1967. All noted appearances since July 1967 have been in Peking.
Political Commissar:					
Sung Jen-ch'iung		Col.Gen. 1st Secretary, North-East Bureau; Member, National Defence Council.	Chiang Yung-hui	7.11.67	1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
			Yang Chi	1.10.67 *	Sole appearance during 1967, in Peking. (1968 Deputy Chief of Staff).
Deputy Political Commissars:					
		No identifications for this period.	Li Po-ch'iu	1.10.67	Maj.Gen. Sole appearance during 1967, in Peking, and this was first noted appearance since 1960.
Chief of Staff:					
Tseng Szu-yu	1.3.66	August 1967 appointed Commander, Wuhan MR.	Ch'en Po-chun	1.5.67	Member, National Defence Council. Sole appearance during 1967, in Peking.
			(Note: 1968 Pan Fu-sheng		Political Commissar, Shenyang MR)
HEILUNGKIANG MILITARY DISTRICT:					
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Wang Chia-tao		Maj.Gen.	Pan Fu-sheng	14.11.67 *	Chairman, Heilungkiang PRC. Under criticism since September 1967. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Deputy Commanders:					
Huang Ching-yao			Kuo Chiang	18.9.67 *	May 1967 made first noted appearance (3rd Political Commissar. Member of Standing Committee, Heilungkiang PRC.
Wang Ming-kuei		Maj.Gen.			
Chang Wan-ch'un			Wang Chia-tao	1.10.67 *	See 1966 list. Under criticism since September 1967. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking. Vice-Chairman, Heilungkiang PRC.
Wang Chung-ch'un					
Political Commissar:			Huang Ching-yao	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Only appearance during 1967 in Peking. Now Commander, Shensi MD.
Ou-yang Ch'in	15.7.66	Member, Central Committee, CCP; 2nd Secretary, North-East Bureau; 1st Secretary, Heilungkiang CCP Committee. Under criticism and replaced by PAN FU-SHENG.	Chang Wan-chun	24.12.67	See 1966 list. Member Standing Committee and Chairman Production Committee, Heilungkiang PRC.
			Wang Chung-ch'un	1.10.67 *	See 1966 list.
Deputy Political Commissar:					
Li Fan-wu (2nd)	Feb.1966	2nd Secretary, Heilungkiang Provincial CCP Committee; Governor of Heilungkiang. Under criticism since October 1966.	Tsao Tzu-ping	1.10.67 *	July 1967 Deputy Commander.
			Wang Ming-kuei	16.2.67	See 1966 list
			Huang Ming-ch'ing	10.10.67 *	August 1967 Deputy Political Commissar.

/KIRIN MILITARY DISTRICT:

Up to 1966

KIRIN MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks
Commander:		
Lo Kun-shan	No noted appearance since 1962.	Maj.Gen. (Jan1968 replaced by HO YU-FA)
Deputy Commanders:		
Chiang K'o-cheng		Maj.Gen.
Chung Ming-piao		Maj.Gen.
Huang Ssu-p'ei		Maj.Gen.
Political Commissar:		
Wu Te		1st Secretary, Kirin CCP Committee; Secretary, North-East Bureau. 3 June 1966 transferred to post of 2nd Secretary, Peking Municipal Committee; became acting-Mayor of Peking; Vice-Chairman, Peking MRC; Political Commissar, Peking Garrison. October 1966 criticised, arrested and rehabilitated.
Deputy Political Commissars:		No identifications for this period.
LIAONING MILITARY DISTRICT:		
Commander:		
Ho Ch'ing-chi	1.10.66	Maj.Gen.
Deputy Commanders:		
Li Tai-chih	1.10.66	
Chang Hai-t'ang	1.10.66	
Political Commissar:		
Huang Huo-ch'ing	1965	1st Secretary, Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee; Secretary, North-East China Regional Bureau. Under criticism since January 1967, and paraded. Believed to have been replaced by YANG CHI.
Deputy Political Commissars:		
Huang Ou-tung	1965	Governor of Liaoning and 2nd Secretary, Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee. Under criticism since January 1967 and paraded.
Yang Chi		See Shenyang MR 1967.

1967

	Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Responsible persons:		
Ho Yu-fa	25.8.67 *	1960 Commander of Division, Shenyang MR. First noted appearance since that time.
Huang Szu-pei	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
Chiang K'o-cheng	27.11.67	See 1966 list.
Ting Chih	1.10.1967	First noted appearance. Spoke at National Day rally.
Chung Ming-piao	24.4.67	See 1966 list.
Note:		
Wu Te	6.11.67 *	February 1967 Hsinhau reported subject was returning to Kirin, but his frequent appearances during 1967 have all been in Peking.
Responsible persons:		
Liu Ch'un-fang	27.4.67	First noted appearance.
Li Ya-tien	1.10.67	
Wang Ying-chung	1.10.67	First noted appearance.
Lo Chun-yun	1.10.67	First noted appearance.
Liu Tsai-chin	1.10.67	First noted appearance.

/SINKIANG MILITARY REGION:

SINKIANG MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		1967: Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Wang En-mao		Lt.Gen. Secretary, North-West Bureau; Member, National Defence Council; 1st Secretary, CCP Committee, Sinkiang and PLA Production and Construction Corps. Under criticism since November 1966.	Wang En-mao	31.12.67	See 1966 list. Still under criticism. This most recent appearance was in Peking.
			Saifudin	31.12.67	See 1966 list. This most recent appearance was in Peking.
Deputy Commander:			Kuo P'eng	31.12.67	See 1966 list. This most recent appearance was in Peking.
Saifudin		Governor of Sinkiang; Secretary of Secretariat, Sinkiang Regional CCP Committee; Member of National Defence Council.	Chang Hsi-chin	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Criticised September 1967.
			Ting Sheng	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Criticised January 1967.
T'ao Chih-yueh		Col.Gen. Commander, Sinkiang Construction Corps; Member, National Defence Council.	T'ao Chih-yueh	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
			Hsing Yuan-lin	4.11.67	See 1966 list.
Chang Hsi-ch'in		Maj.Gen.	T'an K'ai-yun	4.11.67	See 1966 list.
Kuo P'eng		Lt.Gen.	Liu Fang	12.3.67	See 1966 list.
Hsu Kuo-hsien			Tso Ch'i	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Criticised January 1967. 1 October, 1967 appeared in Peking.
Ting Sheng		First Deputy Commander, Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps.	Li Ch'uan	12.3.67	See 1966 list.
Hsing Yuan-lin		Maj.Gen.	P'ei Chou-yu	1.10.67	Maj.Gen. Deputy Political Commissar, Sinkiang Construction Corps. Criticised January 1967.
Political Commissar:			Ts'ao-Ta-No-Fu	1.10.67	See 1966 list.
Wang En-mao		Please see above.	Hsiung-huang	1.10.67	Maj.Gen. Director of Political Department.
Deputy Political Commissars:			Hsu Kuo-hsien	23.5.67	See 1966 list.
Tso Ch'i		Maj.Gen.	Hsing Yuan-lin	(Jan.1968)	First noted appearance for **five** years.
Li Ch'uan		Maj.Gen. Secretary, Sinkiang CCP Regional Committee.			
T'an K'ai-yun					
Ts'ao-Ta-No-Fu		Maj.Gen.			
Liu Fang					
Chief of Staff:					
Hsing Yuan-lin		Maj.Gen.			

/TIBET MILITARY REGION:

Up to 1966

TIBET MILITARY REGION:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks
Commander:		
Chang Kuo-hua	1.10.66 (in Tibet)	Lt.Gen. Member of Praesidium, Tibet People's Congress; 1st Secretary, CCP Committee of Tibet Military Region. 1967 Commander of Chengtu MR. Under criticism.
Deputy Commanders:		
Ngabo Ngawang Jigme (A-P'ei A-Wang-Chin-Mei)	Jan.1966 (in Tibet)	Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, N.P.C. All noted appearances since January 1966 have been in Peking.
Chen Ming-i		Maj.Gen.
Sampho Tsewang Rinzing (Sang-Po Tsai-Wang-Jen-Tseng)	Sept.1965	Maj.Gen. Vice-Chairman, Lhasa Municipal Military Control Committee.
Chao Wen-chin	3.8.66	
Wang Ch'eng-han	25.3.65	
Wang Ch'i-mei	Aug.1966	General. Also Deputy Political Commissar; Deputy, Tibet Autonomous Region's 1st People's Congress. Criticised 1967.
Wang Kang		Maj.Gen.
Ts'eng Yung-ya		
Liao Pu-yun		Maj.Gen.
Political Commissar:		
Tan Kuan-san	Sept.1965 (in Tibet)	1965 Member, Secretariat, Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of CCP. 1967 noted as Deputy President, Supreme People's Court. Successor as Political Commissar uncertain.
Deputy Political Commissars:		
Wang Ch'i-mei		Please see above.
Lu I-shan		Sen.Col. 1959 Director, Political Department.
Jen Jung		General. 1956 Deputy Director, Political Department, CPV, Korea.

1967

Responsible persons:	Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Ts'eng Yung-ya	8.8.67	See 1966 list.
Chen Ming-I	1.10.67	See 1966 list. August 1967 criticised. 1 October 1967 appeared in Peking.
Lu I-shan	8.8.67	See 1966 list.
Wang Kang	10.6.67	See 1966 list.
Liao Pu-yun	10.6.67	See 1966 list.
Jen Jung	1.10.67	See 1966 list. Spoke at National Day rally.
Sung K'ai-yung	Aug.1967	First noted appearance.

/TSINAN MILITARY REGION:

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Up to 1966

TSINAN MILITARY REGION:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks
Commander:		
Yang Te-chih		General. Member, Central Committee, CCP; Member, National Defence Council; Standing Committee Member, Shantung CCP Provincial Committee; Shantung Deputy to 3rd N.P.C.
Deputy Commanders:		
Yang Yu-tsai	5.6.66	Hero of K.D.P.R.
Political Commissar:		
T'an Ch'i-lung	25.11.66	Lt.Gen. Alternate Member, Central Committee, CCP; Secretary, East China Bureau; 1st Secretary, Shantung Provincial CCP Committee; Deputy for Shantung to 3rd N.P.C. Under criticism since November 1966, and deposed early in 1967. Replaced by WANG HSIAO-YU.
Deputy Political Commissars:		
Hu Tse-yuan		
Li Yao-wen		Maj.Gen. Director of Political Department.

1967

Responsible persons:	Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Wang Hsiao-yu	31.12.67	1st Political Commissar, Tsinan MR and Political Commissar, Shantung MD. Chairman, Shantung PRC and Tsinan MRC. Former Deputy Mayor, Tsingtao and in 1956 was Deputy Chief Procurator, Shantung.
Yang Te-chih	31.12.67	See 1966 list. 1st Deputy Chairman, Shantung PRC.
Yuan Sheng-p'ing	11.11.67	Lt.Gen. 1959 Deputy Political Commissar, Peking MR. 1963 Member, Shantung Provincial People's Council.
Fan Ch'ao-li	11.11.67 *	Lt.Gen. 1952 Deputy Commander, Szechuan Army Area.
Yang Kuo-fu	11.11.67	Lt.Gen. Has been connected with affairs in Shantung since 1945.
Chang Jen-ch'u	1.10.67	Lt.Gen. 1946 Deputy Commander, 2nd Training Brigade, Southern Shantung MD. 1952 Commander, 26th Army, Korea.
Fu Chia-hsuan	1.10.67	
Ch'en Mei-tsao	1.10.67 *	Lt.Gen.
Li Yao-wen	31.12.67	See 1966 list.
Hu Tse-yuan	11.11.67	See 1966 list. First noted appearance since 1964.
Liu Jui-fang	26.11.67	This was subject's only noted appearance, but as he was listed before Yang Te-chih he probably holds some important position in the Region. (Liu Jui-fang of Lanchow MR is still appearing in that Region)

/SHANTUNG MILITARY DISTRICT:

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	Up to 1966			1967	
SHANTUNG MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
T'ung Kuo-kuei		Maj.Gen.	T'ung Kuo-kuei	1.10.67 *	See 1966 list.
Deputy Commanders:			Wang Hsiao-yu		Please see Tsinan MR.
Feng Jen-en			Ho Chih-yuan	1.10.67 *	See 1966 list.
Political Commissar:		Identification uncertain. 1967 Wang Hsiao-yu appointed.	Sun Fang-p'u	Dec.1967	Deputy Political Commissar.
Deputy Political Commissar:			Feng Jen-en	27.7.67	See 1966 list.
Ho Chih-yuan		Maj.Gen.			

/WUHAN MILITARY REGION:

WUH[illegible] MILITARY REGION:	Up to 1966: Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks	1967: A: Up to July 1967:	Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Ch'en Tsai-tao		General. Member, National Defence Council.	Ch'en Tsai-tao	15.3.67	See 1966 list. Under criticism since April 1967. Involved in "Wuhan Incident" of "Million Heroes" in July 1967. Replaced by YU LI-CHIN for short period until appointment of new Commander, TSENG SZU-YU (please see below).
Deputy Commanders:					
Li Ying-hsi	27.9.66	Maj.Gen.1953 Deputy Commander, P.L.A. Engineering Corps. Noted in Wuhan since 1955. Believed to have been arrested early 1967.	Chung Han-hua	15.3.67	Lt.Gen. 1950 Director, Political Department East Szechwan. 1958 Member, Adjudication Committee, Supreme People's Court. Under criticism since July 1967. Accused of complicity with Ch'en Tsai-tao in "Wuhan Incident". Replaced by LIU FENG (please see below).
K'ung Ch'ing-te		Lt.Gen. 1956 Commander, Wuhan Garrison.			
Pi Chan-yun	27.9.66	Lt.Gen. 1950 Deputy Commander, Honan MD.	K'ung Ch'ing-te	15.3.67	See 1966 list. Criticised September 1967.
T'ang Chin-lung		Maj.Gen. 1956 Commander of CPV unit, North Korea. Early 1967 committed suicide.	Han Tung-shan	15.3.67	Maj.Gen. 1952 Chief of Staff, Hupeh MD. July 1966 first noted in Wuhan as "responsible person". Criticised September 1967.
Yang Hsiu-shan		Lt.Gen.			
Yao Che		Lt.Gen. 1951 Commander, Suiyuan-Mongolian War Zone. 1956 Assistant Director, General Higher Infantry School, Nanking. 1966 Transferred to Wuhan.	Yang Hsiu-shan	19.1.67	See 1966 list. Believed to have died about June 1967.
			Yao Che	19.1.67	See 1966 list. Criticised September 1967.
Political Commissar:			B: After July 1967:		
Wang Jen-chung	18.10.66	1st Secretary, Central-South Bureau. Under criticism since October 1966. Replaced by CHUNG HAN HUA.	Tseng Szu-yu	6.12.67	Lt.Gen. 1958 Chief of Staff, Mukden MR. August 1967 appointed Commander, Wuhan MR.
			Liu Feng	6.12.67	Deputy Commander, P.L.A. Air Force, Wuhan. August 1967 appointed Political Commissar, Wuhan MR.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Chang Kuang-tsai	27.9.66	Maj.Gen. Believed to have been arrested early 1967.	Hsu Kuo-fu	5.12.67	Deputy Commander and Deputy Political Commissar, P.L.A. Air Force, Wuhan and Deputy Political Commissar, Wuhan MR. 1 October 1967 first noted appearance.
Lu Ping-an	27.9.66	Maj.Gen. Deputy Director, Political Department. Committed suicide in January 1967.	Chang Yu-hua	2.11.67 *	Director of Political Department and Deputy Political Commissar. 7 September 1967 first noted appearance.
			Liu Chien-hsun	6.12.67	Secretary, Central-South Bureau. October 1966 - August 1967 Secretary, Peking Municipal CCP Committee. August 1967 Chairman, Honan PRC and 1st Political Commissar, Honan MD. October 1967 appointed concurrently Deputy Political Commissar, Wuhan MR. Criticised February and June 1967.

/Leading Air Force personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

	Up to 1966			1967	
WUHAN MILITARY REGION con:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
			Leading Air Force personnel recently active in Military Region:		
			Liu Feng		Please see above.
			Wang Teh-kuei	2.11.67	1949 Director, Political Department, Nanking Garrison. 1967 Deputy Commander, Wuhan.
			Sun Ching-te	1967	Deputy Commander and Political Commissar.
			Hsiao Chien	19.8.67 *	Political Commissar.
			Hsu Kuo-fu		Please see above.
			Liao Kuan-hsien	2.11.67 *	Deputy Political Commissar.

/HONAN MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
HONAN MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Chang Shu-chih		Maj.Gen. 1951 Commander, Sian Garrison. 1955 Member, Szechwan CCP Committee. Noted in Honan since 1963.	Liu Chien-hsun	28.10.67 *	Please see Wuhan MR "Section B. After July 1967".
Deputy Commanders:			Chang Shu-chih	1.11.67 *	See 1966 list. Criticised February 1967.
Wang Tsai-kuei			Ho Yun-hung	Jun.1967	See 1966 list. Criticised and replaced by WANG HSIN (please see below).
Chen Kuei-chang			Wang Hsin	6.12.67	Second Political Commissar. September 1967 first noted appearance. Vice-Chairman, Honan PRC.
Chao Fu-hsing	Jul.1964				
Liu Ta-kun	Dec.1964		Hsu Kuei-chang	1.10.67	First noted appearance.
Yang Shu-yuan	11.9.65	Deputy Chief of Staff. (1960 - 1965)	Wang Hui	Dec.1967	Deputy Commander. Chairman Preparatory Group for Chengchow MRC. 1 October 1967 first noted appearance.
Political Commissar:					
Wu Chih-p'u	9.10.66	Secretary, Central-South Bureau. Member of Central Committee, CCP. 1967 criticised and replaced by LIU CHIEN HSUN.	Chen Kuei-chang	8.12.67	See 1966 list. Now described as "First Deputy Commander and Deputy Political Commissar" and concurrently (Deputy?) Commander, Chengchow Garrison.
Deputy Political Commissars:			Yu Ssu-kwei	16.4.67	See 1966 list.
Ho Yun-hung (2nd)		Maj.Gen.	Li Wen-cheng	(1968)	First noted appearance since appointment as Deputy Political Commissar in September 1965.
Yu Ssu-kwei		1964 Director, Political Department.			
Li Wen-cheng			Wang Tsai-kuei	Dec.1967	December 1967 first noted appearance since 1963. Responsible person of Preparatory Group for Honan PRC.
Wang Chuan-kuo	1965				
Kung Ting-yu	1965		Tu Ho-t'i	Dec.1967	September 1967 first noted appearance. Deputy Political Commissar.
			Liu Ta-kun	(1968)	Please see 1966 list - has now made first noted appearance for four years.
			Chao Fu-hsing	(1968)	Please see 1966 list - has now made first noted appearance for four years.

/HUPEH MILITARY DISTRICT:

	Up to 1966			1967	
HUPEH MILITARY DISTRICT:	Last noted (if not later than 1966)	Remarks		Last noted (up to end of 1967)	Remarks
Commander:			Responsible persons:		
Wu Shih-an		Maj.Gen. 1950 Deputy Commander, Rear Services Department, Hupeh. 1957 Commander, Wuhan Garrison.	Wu Shih-an	1.3.67	See 1966 list.
			Chou Chih-kang	15.3.67	See 1966 list.
Deputy Commanders:			Huang Hung-shen	23.3.67	Deputy Commander. Only noted appearances were during March 1967 (four times).
Wu Lin-huan	6.9.66				
			Tai Ko-lin	23.3.67	Deputy Commander. Only noted appearances were during March 1967 (twice).
Political Commissar:			P'an Shou-ts'ai	15.3.67	See 1966 list.
Chang T'i-hsueh	1.10.66	1964 Governor, Hupeh. 1966 Acting First Secretary, Hupeh Provincial CCP. Under criticism since January 1967, replaced by CHOU CHIH-KANG (see below). (please see note under 1967).	Chu Yeh-k'uei	1.10.67	1965 Deputy Director, Political Department. 1967 Deputy Political Commissar.
			Chang Hung	Sept.1967 *	Deputy Political Commissar.
Deputy Political Commissars:					
Chou Chih-kang		Maj.Gen.	Note:		
P'an Shou-ts'ai		Maj.Gen.	Chang T'i-hsueh	(Feb.1968)	Re-appeared, described as Vice-Chairman of Hupeh PRC, but there has been no reference to what position, if any, he holds in the Military District.
Chang Shu-ts'ai	27.9.66				

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En Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 186 11 March 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 186 of 11 March
Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore

People's Daily of 9 March reports that on 7 March Mao and Lin received more than 10,000 revolutionary fighters from the Army and Military Academies. They were accompanied by Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Li Fu-ch'un, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan. A second name list included Ch'en-yi, Liu Po-ch'eng, Li Hsien-nien, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Su Yu, Wu Fa-hsien, Wang Tung-hsing, Yeh Ch'un, Yu Ch'iu-li and 28 senior PLA figures from Central HQ Departments.

Sir D. Hopson

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Mr. Denson BB 13/3

The attack on Ch'i Pen-yu does not appear to have spread to the more senior ranks of the Cultural Revolution Group or their supporters.

FJB 13/3

Dr. Hearn send copy to Mr. K. Walker. FRD.

Copy Sent 13/3.

Hong Kong 13/3

(31)

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 250 28 MARCH, 1968

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2 ... MAR 1968
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ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 250 28 MARCH RFI TO HONG KONG AND POLAD SPORE WASHINGTON.

PEOPLE'S DAILY OF 27 MARCH REPORTS THAT MAO AND LIN RECENTLY MET MORE THAN 10,000 MILITARY CADRES FROM PLA GENERAL DEPTS, DEFENCE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, DEFENCE MINISTRY GENERAL OFFICE, VARIOUS ARMS AND PEKING GARRISON.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PUBLISHED NAME LIST OF THOSE ALSO PRESENT: CHOU EN-LAI, CH'EN PO-TA, K'ANG SHENG, CHIANG CH'ING, YAO WEN - YUAN, HSIEH FU-CHIH, HUANG YUNG-WHENG, WU FA-HSIEN, YEH CH'UN AND WANG TUNG-KHSING.

3. REPORTS SAYS THAT BEFORE THE RECEPTION LIN PIAO GAVE A VERY IMPORTANT INSTRUCTION TO THE PLA CADRES. IMPORTANT SPEECHES WERE ALSO MADE BY CHOU EN-LAI, CH'EN PO-TA , K'ANG SHENG, CHIANG CH'ING AND YAO WEN-YUAN.

SIR D HOPSON

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(32)

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 255

29 March 1968

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Jm. pm. 1/4

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 255 of 29 March, Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong and POLAD Singapore.

FC1/1455 FC 1/1/538.

My telegrams Nos. 245 and 251.

It is now reasonable to assume that Yang Cheng-wu, Yu Li-chin and Fu Ch'ung-pi have fallen. There would seem to be two possible explanations of this development. It could be the result of:

(a) a counter-attack by Leftists in leadership, instigated or supported by Mao Tse-Tung himself, who resents and wishes to halt pressure now exerted by PLA against revolutionaries, or

(b) a move by moderate elements in leadership, presumably headed by Chou En-lai, and supported by main weight of military opinion against an extremist group within military hierarchy.

2. On the scanty evidence available so far I, and I believe, majority of observers, are inclined to favour interpretation (b). My reasons include:

(a) interpretation (a) would represent an attack on military which would be quite contrary to the trend of present policies and would be likely to antagonise the PLA at a time when it is playing an indispensible role in the restoration and maintenance of order and industrial production;

(b) Yang Cheng-wu who leapt into prominence at beginning of cultural revolution is generally regarded as one of the most "revolutionary" of military leaders. He has appeared to be Lin Piao's man and may well be resented by many other Service Commanders.

FC. 1/5/31.

(c) The attendance list at the latest reception of military cadres (my telegram No. 250) shows Huang Yung-sheng, Commander Canton military region and Chairman of Kwang Tung Revolutionary Committee, as senior serving officer present. No other provincial military leader attended and it may be that Huang has been brought to Peking to sway Yang Cheng-wu as Acting Chief of Staff. Huang, who earlier was under sustained and serious attack by the revolutionaries, appears to be a conservative in cultural revolution terms.

(d) The attacks on Yang have coincided with official publication and rallies in support of Hsieh Fu-chih, Chairman of the

/Peking

Peking Revolutionary Committee, and usually thought of as a supporter of Chou En-lai.

3. Whilst acting against Yang, Yu and Fu, leadership has been at pains to give the impression that the cultural revolution continues. This could explain:

(a) The renewed and intensive campaign against T'an Chen-lin, who is accused of attempting to "reverse the verdicts on Rightists" but who seems to have been discredited long ago.

(b) The appearance and "important speeches" made by the members of the Cultural Revolution Group at the latest Mao receptions (my telegram No. 250, paragraph 3).

4. I must emphasize that the above is a preliminary and speculative assessment. The failure of many senior military figures, e.g. the Marshalls, to attend the latest reception is a rather puzzling feature. Poster references to a "behind the scene boss of Yang Chen-wu" (my telegram No. 251) may be an indication that other more exalted and possibly non military heads are yet to roll. What does seem certain is that this further manifestation of dissent among leadership must increase doubts of many Chinese about the Cultural Revolution itself. The disgrace of Yang Cheng-wu seems to represent a serious blow to Lin Piao's prestige although it is difficult to believe latter's position is in any real danger.

Foreign Office pass Washington 69, Hong Kong 177 and POLAD Singapore 86.

Sir D. Hopson

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 262 30 March, 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 262 of 30 March,
Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington and POLAD Singapore.

(32)

My telegram No. 255.

In Peking demonstrations similar to those of last few days have continued today but on a reduced scale. We have now seen several posters demanding that Li Fu-ch'un (member of the Politbureau Standing Committee) should reveal his "black links" with T'an Chen-lin and Yu Ch'iu-li (Minister of Petroleum). Li Fu-ch'un is also being accused of being "boss behind the scenes of the February counter-current" and has been described as a person of the Ho Lung type. Other posters describe Yu Ch'iu-li as Ho Lung's "able general" in the February counter-current.

2. There are many posters now on display welcoming the decision of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Vice Chairman Huang Yung-sheng (Commander of Canton military region and Chairman of Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee) as Chief of Staff and Wen Yu-ch'eng (3306-3768-2052) (formerly Chief of Staff of Canton military region) as Commander Peking Garrison. The People's Daily of 16 January revealed that Wen Yu-ch'eng had been appointed Deputy Chief of Staff.

Foreign Office pass Hong Kong 182, Washington 71, Singapore 88.

Sir D. Hopson

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WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 53 Saving 28 March 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 53 Saving of 28 March
Repeated for information Saving to:

FC 1/6/55.

Peking	No. 6
Governor Hong Kong	No. 4
POLAD Singapore	No. 12

Peking telegram No. 245: New attacks on P.L.A. Leaders

You may like to have first thoughts of State Department about latest events, based on reports from their Consulate General in Hong Kong and on monitored broadcasts. / Deputy Director of Asian Communist Affairs told Counsellor on 27 March that all three leaders had two things apparently in common. All had come to power during the most extreme stage of the cultural revolution. (Yu was one of those held in Wuhan last July.) All three were believed also to have formerly served closely with Peng Te-Huai, though this may be fortuitous. It could however equally be the reason which may later publicly emerge if their disgrace is confirmed.

2. On the face it seemed therefore that the pragmatists were again getting at the extremists. So far they had picked them off one by one; perhaps they were getting more confident of their strength. State Department see the hand of Chou En-lai in this, though his name has not been mentioned throughout the reports. They admit that there are certain unknowns still to be explained. A Japanese report talked of posters calling for "support of Mao's decision". Was this "decision" the removal of the three? Is Mao, however, likely to have made such a "decision" or are those who removed the three speaking in his name? The United States reports from Hong Kong also spoke of a parade of 100,000 people through Peking calling for the disgrace of the three; they also spoke of handbills being distributed calling for support of Mao, Chiang Ching and Lin Piao - these three names only being linked together.

/Is

Is this an initiative by the last solid Maoists? If so, what has happened to Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng?

3. State Department are also speculating that the old Marshals are re-establishing their authority within P.L.A. at the expense of upstart political officers like Yu. What they cannot clearly see at present is where Lin Piao stands. Nor are the references to support for Hsieh Fu-chih clear unless it is to differentiate him from Fu Chung-pi the leading military officer on the Peking municipal Committee.

4. Another line of speculation perhaps less plausible is based on the idea that there has again been an increase in internal propaganda about an imminent U.S. invasion and that these reports have been deliberately spread to create a war psychosis. In such circumstances the P.L.A., assuming that they were about to be called upon to fulfil their military role, may have demanded the overthrow of those who have been calling for a predominantly political role for the force.

5. State Department would be interested to hear what you think.

SIR P. DEAN

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Telno 265 2 April 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 265 of 1 April, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore and Washington.

My telegram No. 262. FC1/5/33.

The demonstrations in Peking, which we reported on Saturday, were not continued on Sunday or today. The attacks on Li Fu Ch'un have not been developed. Most posters criticising him have been removed or covered over, although at least one fairly prominent poster calling for him to be bombarded is still visible along the main street.

2. A number of posters have appeared describing Yeh Chien-Ying (A Marshal and [gp undec] member) as "The Black Boss behind Yang Ch'eng-Wu". The latter, who is still under heavy poster attack, has also been linked with Hsiao Hua (former Director of PLA General Political Department). Both these are being held responsible for a "bloody incident" which took place on 13 May last year (when a drama performance by PLA units was forcibly broken up). Hsiao Hua is also being connected with An Tzu-Wen (former Director of Organisation Department of Central Committee) although link between them is still not clear.

Foreign Office pass Hong Kong 186, POLAD Singapore 90 and Washington 73.

Sir D. Hopson

[Repeated as requested]

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ARCHIVES No. 31
- 5 APR 1968
FC 1/5

Cypher/Cat A

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 275 4 April, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 191 of 4 April
Repeated for information to:- Foreign Office

Your telegram No. 141.

We have no information about these posters, although it is possible that reports may be referring to the "bloody incident" of 13 May last year (my telegram No. 265 to Foreign Office). I do not believe such attacks on Yang Ch'eng-wu have any relevance to Viet Nam.

(35)

F.O. pass to Hong Kong No. 191.

Sir D. Hopson

[Repeated as requested]

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(37)

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Cypher/Cat A

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 276 4 April, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 276 of 4 April, Repeated for information to Hong Kong. Polad Singapore and Washington.

(35) My telegram No. 265.

There have been no more demonstrations nor, so far as I am aware, any significant developments in poster themes. A large number of posters continue to denounce Yang Ch'eng-wu, Yu Li-chin and Fu Ch'ung-pi and Mao Tse Chen-lin, Wang Li, Kuan Feng and Ch'i Pen-yu. It appears that all the posters criticising Li Fu-ch'un have now been covered up. The criticism of Yeh Chien-ying has not been carried further.

2. Judging from the above therefore the Yang Ch'eng-Wu crisis would seem to be over at least for the time being. Its origins remain mysterious. Denunciations of Yang, Yu and Fu in the posters and Red Guard newspaper give no idea of the true nature of them and the only clue we have so far is continuing and impassioned defence of Revolutionary Committees in official press (please see my telegram No. 266).

Foreign Office pass Hong Kong 192, Singapore 93 and Washington 75.

[Repeated as requested]

Sir D. Hopson

JMPA 5/4

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FC 1/5 W-37

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N.B.

AMENDED COPY(5 APRIL, 1968)

RECEIVED IN
AR [illegible]
5 APR 1968
FC 1/5.

Cyp[redacted]/Cat A

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 276 4 April, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 276 of 4 April.
Repeated for information to: Hong Kong POLAD Singapore
Washington.

35 My telegram No. 265.

There have been no more demonstrations nor, so far as I am aware, any significant developments in poster themes. A large number of posters continue to denounce Yang Ch'eng-wu, Yu Li-chin and Fu Ch'ung-pi and*many link Hsiao Hua with Yang. Most of the rest concentrate fire on earlier victims e.g. T'an Chen-lin; Wang Li, Kuan Feng and Ch'i Pen-yu. It appears that all the posters criticising Li Fu-ch'un have now been covered up. The criticism of Yeh Chien-ying has not been carried further.

2. Judging from the above therefore the Yang Ch'eng-Wu crisis would seem to be over at least for the time being. Its origins remain mysterious. Denunciations of Yang, Yu and Fu in the posters and Red Guard newspaper give no idea of the true nature of them and the only clue we have so far is continuing and impassioned defence of Revolutionary Committees in official press (please see my telegram No. 266).

Foreign Office pass Hong Kong No. 192, Singapore No. 93 and Washington No. 75.

Sir D. Hopson

[Repeated as requested].

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(38)

En Clair

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 296 9 April 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31
10 APR 1968
FE/SE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 296 of 9 April, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore, Washington.

People's Daily of 9 April reports a reception by Chinese leaders on 8 April of PLA airmen who have been decorated for shooting down United States planes. Present were Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-Sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Chun, Wang Tung-hsing, Chiu Hui-tso, Li Tso-peng and Liu Hsien-chuan.

Sir D. Hopson

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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J.I.R.D.
P.U.S.D.
Defence Dept.
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C.O. F.E. & P.D.

NNNNN

Copy sent to IRD 23/4.

Copy as usual. Collis +1 for MI

(39)

CONFIDENTIAL

We ought to submit about. Rec. [illegible]

Office of the British
Charge d'Affaires,
PEKING.

PEK/7

9 April, 1968.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 51
24 APR 1968
FC1/5

Mr Denson
Mr Boyd.

Dear James,

As we have already reported by telegram Yang Ch'eng-wu, Acting Chief of Staff of the P.L.A. since 1966, Yu Li-chin, Political Commissar of the Air Force, and Fu Ch'ung-pi, Peking Garrison Commander, fell from grace at the end of March. The formal announcement of their fall was almost certainly made on 24 March when the Chinese leaders headed by Mao and Lin Piao attended a meeting of some 10,000 P.L.A. cadres and Lin Piao delivered what the People's Daily described as "a very important instruction". Posters of Yang's replacement by Huang Yung-sheng and Fu's replacement by Wen Yu-ch'eng, both from Canton, were seen on 28 March. Posters condemning the three displaced men as plotters, careerists, and counter-revolutionaries were by then on every wall.

2. The sudden removal of these three very important military figures is the most serious upset the Chinese leadership has sustained since the stirring days of early 1967. The importance of the event was marked by the attendance of Mao and Lin at the cadres' reception. According to persistent rumour Mao himself broke all precedent and uttered a few words, croaking out "Down with Yang Cheng-wu". The crisis coincided with a rash of posters, Red Guard newspapers and demonstrations which suggested that the Cultural Revolution had taken on a new lease of life. According to posters, in addition to the meeting on 24 March, another at which most of the leaders spoke, with a particularly important speech by Chiang Ch'ing, was held on 27 March. Nevertheless, the crisis remains obscure in its origin and implications and anything said at this stage must be largely conjecture.

3. The most promising official clue seems to be the People's Daily editorial of 30 March, defending Revolutionary Committees and publishing Mao's latest directive, on the same subject. It seems reasonable to link this with the preceding crisis and the removal of Yang Ch'eng-wu. Such high-level defence, buttressed by holy writ, suggests that Revolutionary Committees have come under serious criticism. We know that Hsieh Fu-chih, as Head of the Peking Committee, was officially defended in posters some weeks before. Yang Ch'eng-wu, in particular through the Peking Garrison Commander, Fu Ch'ung-pi, could have been responsible for attacks on the Peking Committee and it seems he was in fact accused of such attacks in the speeches of 27 March. As regards the line of attack, our first thought on reading the editorial, with its emphasis on the revolutionary masses and the need for a leadership not divorced from the masses, was that criticism had been concentrated on the revolutionary component and that Yang might

/even

J. Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,
Far Eastern Department.

even have advocated some simplified administration based on cadres and P.L.A. alone. But it now seems much more likely that he was criticising the Revolutionary Committees for providing a means for too easy restoration of old cadres (see paragraph 6 below). Whatever their terms, such attacks must have been dangerous, since criticism of Revolutionary Committees amounts to a denial of a year or more's revolutionary work and, what is worse, casts doubt on the strategic insight of the Chairman himself.

4. A further line of investigation is opened up by a report, in the "Survey of China Mainland Press", No. 4148 of 9 March, of remarks by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Chiang Ch'ing and Yang Ch'eng-wu at a reception at an unspecified date to comrades of the Political Work Unit, the Literary and Art Unit and the Army Daily Unit of the Military Commission. This report reveals the existence of these three units which, according to Lin Piao, are charged with "finding out conditions at lower levels in the Army", "investigating and discovering problems, making suggestions and seeking instructions from related Departments". It also reveals some dissatisfaction on the part of Lin Piao and the Cultural Revolution Group with the style of work of these three bodies. They are told not to wrangle with each other. The Army Daily Unit is told to call more frequently on Ch'en Po-ta and Yao Wen-yuan and the Literary and Art Unit inevitably is told to seek more frequent advice from Chiang Ch'ing. It seems that Yang Ch'eng-wu, who had general responsibility for these bodies, was showing signs of following the dangerous precedent of Hsiao Hua, the former head of the General Political Department of the P.L.A., who sank without trace last summer. He was engaged on empire-building, asking for more men for his political unit. It also appears that he was also too apt to take responsibility upon himself without seeking higher advice. This overweening style seems to have aroused criticism, evident even in this short report, from Lin, the Cultural Revolution Group and even from Chou En-lai.

5. The speeches of 27 March, which have now come to hand and are enclosed with Ray Whitney's letter in this bag to John Boyd, do not cast much further light. They consist in the main of defences of the Cultural Revolution, fulsome praise of Cultural Revolution colleagues and generalised abuse of Yang Ch'eng-wu. He is, however, accused specifically of seeking to seize control of the Air Force via Yu Li-ch'un and of attacking the Peking Revolutionary Committee through Fu Ch'ung-pi. For good measure K'ang Sheng accuses him of plotting to seize the Peking Radio Station and the Liberation Army Daily, though this may be pure embroidery. Chou En-lai draws the parallel with Hsiao Hua.

(40) 6. The most helpful information on the matter, however, comes to us via the Russians and ultimately from posters reporting speeches on 24 March (Whitney gives a detailed report in his letter of today's date). According to this information, Yang Ch'eng-wu was originally appointed by Mao in disregard of Lin Piao and had developed dangerous ambitions by December of last year. He built up his position as the sole channel for transmitting the instructions of the Cultural Revolution Group to Provincial Military Commanders. He arrogated a special position to the Army in the administration of the country and in Revolutionary Committees and opposed the reinstatement of old cadres in Revolutionary Committees, since this naturally watered down Army authority. He is also alleged to have reduced the time allotted

/to

to Mao-study by Army men, though I personally do not make too much of this last point. His ambitions aroused the concern of Chou En-lai and Lin Piao who made a joint demarche to Mao, without success. The two then sought the help of Chiang Ch'ing, who was effective not only in persuading her husband but also in ferretting out black material on Yang Ch'eng-wu.

7. These theories may not coincide in every detail but they have sufficient in common to indicate that we are on the right lines. The picture of an ambitious man building up his position at the centre of the military hierarchy and thereby running foul of the Cultural Revolution Group, also a man who made some trenchant criticisms of Revolutionary Committees is not implausible. I suppose the correct communist classification for Yang Ch'eng-wu would be as a Bonapartist. He is now officially described here as a Right opportunist. Nevertheless the labels Right or Left may be inappropriate in this case. As with Hsiao Hua, the main reason for disgrace may be a power struggle rather than questions of principle. Equally the action against him seems to have united both wings of the present Government, both Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution Group. His dismissal seems to have been less a reaction from the Left or the Right than an attempt by the leaders to preserve what may be called the present revolutionary establishment.

8. One strand in the crisis I have not commented on is the pressure from the Left on certain old cadres under the guise of attacks on the "new February counter-current" and attempts to "reverse the verdict (sc. on old cadres) (see John Weston's letter of 2 April). This has meant renewed criticism of Tan Chen-lin, Director of the Office of Agriculture and Forestry (disgraced in 1967 and a very dead horse to flog) and, more interestingly, Yu Ch'iu-li, Minister of Petroleum (much criticised in 1967 but finally salvaged by Chou En-lai). It has also meant momentary criticism of Li Fu-ch'un (a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo) and of Marshal Yeh Chien-ying (a member of the Politburo and criticised in 1967 for suppressing the revolution in certain areas). It is hard to say how strong this pressure is but it certainly exists. Chiang Ch'ing took the opportunity of her speech of 27 March to make some further criticisms of Yu Ch'iu-li. The list of attendance at the meeting of 24 March is also interesting. The absentees were Li Fu-ch'un, Ch'en Yi, Liu Po-ch'eng, Li Hsien-nien, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, Su Yu and Yu Ch'iu-li. This was a military and not very representative meeting so that the absence of civilians may not mean very much. On the other hand none of the Marshals was present. This may well have significance. But we shall have to wait for a fully representative meeting, probably May Day, to draw any firm conclusions.

9. The following general comments may be made on the affair, subject to many reservations because of the incomplete state of our knowledge:

(a) The impassioned defence of the Revolutionary Committees reveals not only the flimsiness of the new administrative structures but also the delicacy of the operation on which the Chinese leaders are now embarked. While continuing to pay lip service to the Cultural Revolution, they are winding up the movement. They are therefore very sensitive to criticism that might encourage people to draw the logical conclusion from what is happening and begin to question the value of the Cultural Revolution itself and its author.

/Equally,

Equally, calls to "reverse the verdict" are threatening since to do so on one old cadre can very soon lead to demands to reverse the verdict on Liu Shao-ch'i himself. When the achievements of the revolution are so slight and the ground swell of doubt among the public is so great, criticism from almost any quarter can assume dangerous proportions. There is a parallel here with the period immediately after the failure of the Great Leap Forward and Mao is no doubt keenly aware of it. It is possible that he may be encouraging the pressure from the Left against the "new February counter-current" in order to preserve some freedom of manoeuvre for himself and to avoid a situation in which, as in 1959, he becomes the prisoner of the moderates.

(b) However we explain it, the affair seems to have been something of a setback to the P.L.A. In the person of the Acting Chief of Staff it has been convicted of showing insufficient deference to the Cultural Revolution Group. Yang had failed to consult Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing as often as he should and it seems that the latter still has a brief to meddle with Army matters under the cover of purifying art and literature. Although Yang may not have been a widely popular figure in Army circles, this interference with military concerns may produce a reaction from the P.L.A. The absence of the Marshals from the 24 March meeting is also relevant and there may be a question mark at least over Yeh Chien-ying.

(c) The episode has enhanced the importance of Chiang Ch'ing. She appears as the leading investigator of Yang Ch'eng-wu and apparently made the main speech on 27 March. Slogans saying "Learn from Chiang Ch'ing" and "Defend to the death Mao and Lin and Chiang Ch'ing" have been plentiful. A Peking Daily editorial of 7 April goes out of its way to pay tribute to her. It is also just possible that she may have taken the place of Li Fu-ch'un on the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Her name came sixth on the list, immediately after that of K'ang Sheng.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Anthony Elliott in Hong Kong, Michael Wilford in Washington, Reg Hibbert in Singapore and to Chancery, Canberra.

Yours ever

Percy Cradock

(P. CRADOCK)

(Folio 39 Para. 6. Refers)

Copy as current 1/for MO. Gillis

(40)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 31
24 APR 1968
FC1/5

JB pm 24/4

(PEK/7)

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

9 April, 1968.

Dear John,

The Yang Cheng-wu affair is a mystery which has produced many theories among observers in Peking. We have just been told of another which seems to us to be the most plausible we have heard so far. It was passed to us by the inevitable Bargmann, the DPA correspondent, who obtained it from the Russians. The Russians in turn got most of their information from their Mongolian allies whose physical characteristics permit them to continue to read Peking posters with relative ease. In handling this information one should therefore pay due regard to the number of links and languages through which it has passed.

2. According to this thesis Yang Cheng-wu's appointment as Acting Chief of Staff of the PLA was the personal decision of Mao Tse-tung and was made against the wishes of Lin Piao himself. Lin had therefore always borne something of a grudge against Yang. The final straw, and Lin's opportunity to act against Yang, whose growing power Lin felt to be a threat to his own position, came on 19 December last year. On this date Yang Cheng-wu addressed a meeting of PLA cadres in Peking. He said that it was good for the PLA to be connected with the masses but it should not get confused by them. It was also very good that classes to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung were organised in the PLA but the Army should never forget that it had a fighting task as well. Yang therefore laid down that the PLA should run Mao study classes for only one month each year. He went on to say that at present the Army had both great responsibility and great influence. It was the linch-pin of all revolutionary committees. The PLA should keep that influence but could only do so if it made sure that not too many old rehabilitated cadres got back into positions of power. If that happened, said Yang, the influence of the PLA would automatically be curtailed. He then emphasised that he was the only one who was authorised to pass on orders from the Cultural Revolution Group to provincial military commanders and that only orders issued and signed by him were valid.

3. Following this speech, so the story goes, both Lin Piao and Chou En-lai decided to act against Yang Cheng-wu and they made complaints about him to Mao. When Mao refused their requests for Yang Cheng-wu's dismissal, they turned for help to Chiang Ch'ing when she returned to the scene in January (it is thought after illness and convalescence). Eventually Chiang Ch'ing collected sufficient material on Yang Cheng-wu, Yu Li-chin and Fu Chung-pi and was able to persuade Mao to sign the order dismissing them on 22 March.

../4. At the

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

4. At the PLA rally on 24 March, which, according to Czech colleagues, was attended by the commanders and political commissars of all the Chinese military regions, Lin Piao began the proceedings by reading the order dismissing Yang, Yu and Fu. Lin denounced them as counter-revolutionaries who had planned a coup against the proletarian headquarters led by Mao and claimed that the demand for their dismissal had come from many within the PLA. Senior Army commanders believed that Yang had deliberately spread false orders, claiming that they came from the Cultural Revolution Group in order to create anarchy and chaos within the country to serve his own evil purposes.

5. Lin was followed by K'ang Sheng, who said that all should be extremely grateful to Chiang Ch'ing because she had discovered the plot and that her vigilance had made it possible to avert a coup d'etat. K'ang said that the crimes of Yang and his fellow plotters, whom he described, inter alia, as "dog's urine", were almost too great to be put into words. They were "splittists, opportunists and careerists" who had colluded with the extreme left, represented by Ch'i Pen-yu, Wang Li and Kuan Feng and also with the capitalist roaders led by China's Khruschev. Yang and company had tried to form an unsavoury alliance with all these evil elements to attack the proletarian headquarters. K'ang Sheng then concluded his speech with more fulsome praise of Chiang Ch'ing.

6. Chou En-lai followed K'ang and fully endorsed the decision to dismiss Yang, Yu and Fu. He then announced the appointment of Huang Yung-sheng as the new, permanent, Chief of Staff and of Wen Yü-ch'eng as the Commander of Peking Military Region. Chou claimed that Huang had worked for a long time to frustrate Yang Cheng-wu's plots against the proletarian headquarters. Chou said that Yang Cheng-wu's crimes were somewhat similar to the crimes committed by Lo Jui-ching "during the long absence of Vice Chairman Lin Piao". At the conclusion of Chou's speech Mao Tse-tung himself appeared on the platform to croak out "Down with Yang Cheng-wu".

7. Percy Cradock, in an accompanying letter in this bag, will be offering some comments on this account and also on the general implications of the Yang Cheng-wu affair. I would only say here that it seems to us to fit most of the facts that we know at present. It explains something of Chiang Ch'ing's role and could account for the current bout of adulation she is enjoying. It also fits in with other reports which have appeared in Red Guard newspapers that Yang Cheng-wu had been attacking revolutionary committees on the grounds that too many old cadres were now using them to creep back into power.

8. We have also obtained a digest of the speeches made at the rally on 27 March when Chinese leaders gave their version of the Yang Cheng-wu affair to 100,000 members of the PLA and the masses. I enclose one copy of this document but regret that our copying facilities and the time available does not permit me to do so for other recipients of this letter. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would arrange for other copies to be made as required.

../9. As the

As the authorised version of the incident which is intended for consumption by the Chinese public, these speeches, although very long, are not particularly informative. At least one can say that nothing in them conflicts with the version of Yang Cheng-wu episode which I have recounted above. You will see Chiang Ch'ing takes a leading role and that the other leaders give her the main credit for "dealing with" Yang and his group (e.g. page 4). K'ang Sheng (page 6) accuses Yang of being a man who in reality was on the side of Lo Jui-ching and Ho Lung. He claims that Yang collected black material on Chiang Ch'ing, colluded with Yu Li-chin to overthrow Wu Fa-hsien and grab power in the Air Force and with Fu Chung-pi to overthrow Hsieh Fu-chih and grab power in the Peking Revolutionary Committee. We have, incidentally, heard other speculation from the Russians that Yang attempted to displace Hsieh Fu-chih because of the latter's control of the Public Security apparatus.

10. Chou En-lai (page 7) is particularly careful to emphasise the great role played by the PLA in the course of the Cultural Revolution although this point is also made by the other speakers. Chou denounces Yang Cheng-wu as a right opportunist and appears to link him by implication with Hsiao Hua.

11. Finally, I enclose for all recipients of this letter a copy --- of a Red Guard newspaper on the Yang Cheng-wu affair. It does not throw a great deal of light on the situation but its allegations about the way Nieh Yuan-tze was manipulated by Yang, Yu and Fu and how the three criminals "used certain weaknesses and mistakes" in the Mao study groups organised by the Peking Revolutionary Committee and Peking Revolutionary Garrison are of some interest.

I am copying this letter to Frank Brewer in JRD, Colin Wilson in IRD, McKearney in PUSD, Denison Cross in DIS, George Walden and Ashworth in Hong Kong, Reg Hibbert in Singapore, Roy Spendlove in Washington and Peter Hewitt in Canberra.

Yours ever,

Roy.

(R.W. Whitney)

P. S.

Welcome back, mate!

Roy.

RESTRICTED

Enclosure 1 Peking letter PEK/7 1

9 April 1968.

RED GUARD NEWSPAPERS

EAST IS RED NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED BY THE PEKING GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE - 27 MARCH, 1968.

"Another Solemn Statement by the East is Red Commune Headquarters of the Peking Geological Institute on the Present Situation" (25 March 1968)

In view of the present situation the Headquarters of the East is Red Commune of our Institute issues the following solemn statement:-

1. Resolutely strike down the counter-revolutionary double-dealers, big plotters, big careerists and black hands behind the "February counter-current".Yang Cheng-wu, Yu Li-chin and Fu Ch'ung-pi.

2. Resolutely pluck out the counter-revolutionary small clown Nieh Yuan-tze, who was manipulated by the black behind the scenes boss to reverse the verdict on the February counter-current, to bombard Vice-Premier Hsieh and to overthrow the Peking Revolutionary Committee. Nieh Yuan-tze must come clean about her black relations with Yang Cheng-wu and the rest.

3. The Chinese People's Liberation Army is an incomparable People's Army created and led by our Great Leader Chairman Mao and directly commanded by Vice-Chairman Lin. We resolutely believe in the PLA, depend upon the PLA and defend the high prestige of the PLA. We swear to unite with the PLA and to fight victoriously side-by-side. We will certainly not permit anyone, under any pretext, to turn the spear of the struggle against the PLA.

4. The broad mass of our East is Red warriors will continue as in the past to be everlastingly loyal to our Great Leader Chairman Mao, Vice-Chairman Lin, Prime-Minister Chou, the Proletarian Headquarters led by Chairman Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group and ever swear to wage a bloody struggle to the end with all counter-revolutionary double-dealers.

15. 29/4.

Copy sent to Major J.D.B. Bimbe(...)

RESTRICTED

5. We must raise our revolutionary vigilance and prevent the class enemy from fishing in troubled waters. We must firmly hold to the main direction of the struggle and consolidate and develop the Revolutionary Great Alliance and Three-Way Alliance.

Strike down the great traitor Liu Shao-ch'i!
Strike down Tang Hsiao-p'ing! and
Strike down T'ao Chu!

Strike down Feng, Lo, Lu, Yang!
Strike Down Ho Lung!
Strike Down P'eng Teh-huai!

Strike down T'an Chen-lin!
Strike down Kuan Wang Ch'i Lin
anti-Party plotting clique!

Strike down Yang Cheng-wu, Yu Li-chin and Fu Ch'ung-pi!

Strike down the counter-revolutionary double-dealer
Chou Ching-fang !

Pluck out the counter-revolutionary small clown Nieh Yuan-tze!

Swear to fight to defend Chairman Mao, Vice-Chairman Lin, Prime-Minister Chou, Comrade Chiang-Ch'ing, the Proletarian Headquarters headed by Mao, the Cultural Revolution Group!

Resolutely defend and powerfully support the Peking Revolutionary Committee headed by Vice-Premier Hsieh!

Thoroughly smash the rightist reverse the verdict evil wind!

Long live the Great PLA !

Long live the invincible thought of Mao!

Long live our Great Leader Chairman Mao!

Editorial

Our great leader Chairman Mao, his close Comrade-in-Arms Vice-Chairman Lin Piao and the proletarian headquarters led by Chairman Mao have plucked out the bosses behind the scenes of the "February counter-current", the counter-revolutionary careerists and plotters Yang Cheng-wu, Yu li-ching and Fu Ching-pi. This is another great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line .... Our East is Red warriors resolutely support this brilliant stroke of our Party, Central Committee and Chairman Mao.

The plucking out of Yang, Yu and Fu is the announcement of the death sentence on the black general of the February counter-current T'an Chen-lin.

The plucking out of Yang, Yu and Fu marks the total disgrace of the counter-revolutionary small clown Nieh Yuan-tze who, under their manipulation sought to reverse the verdict on the February counter-current, bombard Vice Premier Hsieh and overthrow the Revolutionary Committee. .... The forward march of history always causes the reactionaries to greatly over-estimate their own strength and greatly under-estimate the strength of the people so that they muddle-headedly think to preen themselves as "heroes" attempting to turn back the main tide but quickly become contemptible worms. .... At present the black wind abroad in society to reverse the verdict on the February counter-current has been blown up by Liu, Teng, T'ao, Yang, Yu and Fu. They used the February counter-current group led by the counter-revolutionary small clown, Nieh Yuan-tze as their obedient tool with which they would achieve their own ends.

They hoped on the one hand in the name of opposing Kuan, Wang Chi to say that all the Central Committee directives which were not in accord with their wishes were the work of Kuan Wang-chi and thus bombard the proletarian headquarters. On the otherhand they used the pretext of opposing Kuan, Wang, Chi to blacken the names of all those people who did not follow their line and lumped them together with Kuan, Wang, Chi and described the revolutionary committees which they opposed as the "No. 2 group" of Kuan, Wang, Chi thus seeking to legalise their crimes of opposing the revolutionary committees.

This wave of thinking just like the extreme "left" reactionary wave which appeared earlier, pointed the spear against the headquarters of the proletariat against the new-born red political organs and against the PLA. It was simply that it wore different clothes and waved different banners.

They fanned the fires, spreading wounding lies and pointed the spear directly against Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih, the head of the Peking Revolutionary Committee and attacked this or that shortcoming or excess and used certain weaknesses and mistakes in the Mao Tse-tung-study groups organised by the Peking Revolutionary Committee and the Peking Military Garrison to point the spear against the Revolutionary Committee and the great PLA. .... East is Red warriors, revolutionary comrades, have we not always said that we must resolutely follow Chairman Mao's great strategic dispositions? Now we must immediately rise up and stand in the front line of the class struggle and actively and unceasingly open fire on the class enemy and resolutely oppose right opportunism, oppose right splittism and attack the rightist reverse the verdict evil wind.

../At the

At the same time we must constantly pay attention to keep the spear of the struggle directed against Liu, Teng and T'ao and must be consistently resolute in the revolutionary great criticism. We must at all times maintain high revolutionary vigilance and prevent the class enemy. in the struggle going on at this time, provoking factionalism or fishing in troubled waters. Misled comrades of the February counter-current group, have we not always said that one must be boundlessly loyal to Chairman Mao? Now is the time to take action to carry out your own promises. To reverse the verdict on the February counter-current is to oppose Chairman Mao. To be blind on this question is to be disloyal to Chairman Mao.

Copyset to MAS. S.D.B. Daily (Mr. O'D.) 29/4.

Original and 2 copies to Washington. per 26/5

FE/5.(W.40)

~~Important speeches by Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Chen Po Ta~~
~~[illegible] delivered on 27th April~~

100,000 words

Speeches delivered by the leaders to a ~~[illegible]~~ strong effect audience of Red Guards, workers, soldiers, farmers and students:

~~[illegible]~~ Premier Chou will send out the instructions of the early dates and orders of 8 alarm Red and Vice Chairman Lin.

Chou Enlai sent out the following decision of the Central Committee, State Council, Military Affairs Commission and Cultural Revolution Group dated 22 March 1969:

According to the decision of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin:

(I) Yang Cheng Wu has committed exceedingly serious mistakes and therefore it is decided to dismiss his from posts of Acting Chief of Staff, Standing Committee of Military Affairs Commission, Secretary General, Military Affairs Commission and First Secretary, General Staff Department.

(II) Wu Fa Hsien has committed exceedingly serious mistakes. Furthermore he is a renegade. He is dismissed from his posts of the Political Commissar, Air Force and Second Secretary, Party Committee Air Force.

(III) Fu Chung Si has made serious mistakes and is dismissed as Commander, Peking Garrison Command.

This decision is to be communicated to all fighters and commanders.

~~[illegible] Chairman Chiang~~ To-day's meeting is being held because some comrades wanted us to explain something and we also wanted to tell them something. International and internal situation is excellent. Imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries are confronted by a financial crisis. In name it is a financial crisis, in reality it involves rising prices, depreciating value of currency, hoarding, shortage of factories etc. . Isnt the fact that life has become difficult for imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries to our advantage? (Audience: Yes!) They are they are day by day approaching a disastrous exit. And we? Let us not speak of something distant. Let us just speak of the situation since we entered the cultural revolution. Our currency has been stable. Basic living standards and prices have been stable. In agriculture we had a bumper harvest last year. In industry there were several inventions. Naturally in some places fighting led to a decline in production. But the recent revolutionary great alliance

and revolutionary party alliance were achieved, production quickly shot up and production targets were exceeded. Isn't this an excellent situation? (Mao Tse-tung: Long live the victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line! Long live Mao Tse-tung!) Our task is improving day by day. Things look very encouraging. Comrades should compare these two situations a little. Isn't it excellent?

The situation in Chin is also excellent. 10 provinces and cities already have revolutionary committees. Another 4 provinces are soon holding central ratification. Most are in the process of formation and will come to Peking for solution. Before May Day, basically (sic) every province will have established revolutionary committees...

We must firmly oppose those who do not accept that the situation is excellent and seek to paint it in black colours. The Chin situation in Peking is excellent. Some people say that the revolution in Shanghai is in a better situation than in Peking. This has concrete analysis. Each has its good and bad points. We cannot say that such and such place is better than Peking, or that Peking is better than such and such place. We cannot speak in such an absolute terms. The excellent situation in Peking manifests itself in the fact that the working class and poor and lower-middle peasants can already accept the situation of revolutionary struggle (Mo Chun: Consolidate the Red regional revolutionary committees! Consolidate Peking revolutionary committee! Defend the party Centre led by Chairman Mao! Strengthen the pillar of proletarian dictatorship - Ed.). Firmly support Chiang Ching's "six September" decision!)

Comrades, I am an ordinary party member.... (She then goes on to develop in a display of modesty, interrupted by slogans led by Mo Chun and Hsieh Fu Chi calling for learning from and protecting Chiang Ching)... There is no one who is consistently correct all his life. I certainly am not such a person. I too have made mistakes and will still have shortcomings. If I make a mistake, comrades can bombard me and write posters about me. Some institutes say "fry" me, "simmer" me. When I have spare time I go there to see they "fry" me (laughter).... Chiang Ching then goes on to discuss double dealers, plotters and points out that with respect to them there is usually a "process of recognition" (Translator's note: That is, they are only gradually recognized and discovered as such), particularly to the work at the side of Chairman Mao cannot arbitrarily suspect a person. It needs very close investigation...

Before we can discover another bad thing we have examine it in all sorts of circumstances. Consistency. This was true also in cases of such renegades, counter revolutionaries and double faced careerists who turned their way from into the party as Lin Piao Tao, Peng Te Huai, Ho Lung, Peng, Lu, Yeh and Yang (Ye Chun: Down with Lo Jui Ching) (Nieh: Down with Yang, Kuan and Chi). If there had not been a Crash, they could never have been exposed. This is a great merit achieved by revolutionary young fighters....

(On "February adverse current"...

Last February, when the black general renegade Tan Chen Lin as representative, it emerged to "support" on Lin Piao Tao. Since this struggle took place in a very small circle the broad masses did not know. Therefore they with ulterior motives exploit this to mislead revolutionary young fighters, revolutionary masses, reversing black and white and saying: Whoever opposes Yu Chiu Li xx, xx, is opposing the Premier and opposing Chairman Mao". In fact Yu Chiu Li is (was ?) a confidante of Ho Lung. Chairman Mao says that you must (i) criticise and (ii) protect. We are still acting accordingly. But revolutionary fighters should not allow themselves to be cheated by us. This spearhead of the 'February adverse current' was primarily directed against the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao and Lin, PLA, the newly born revolutionary committees. It opposed the CPCR and refused to accept the achievements of CPCR, that is, refused to accept the achievements of revolutionary masses and revolutionary young fighters. Under the leadership of Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin, we crushed them and thoroughly exposed them.

From last May there emerged left deviationist adventurism (alternatively called "extreme left" or in form "left" and in reality right). Their top figures were Yang, Kuan and Chi. They were the claws of Lin and Chen, the nails planted by Lin and Chen in our revolutionary ranks.

Ye Chun: Down with the black claws of Lin and Yeh - Kung, Kuan and Chi. They were to oppose red flags, to oppose opposing red flags and went about practising ~~Communism~~ deception. They did not ask for instructions, did not report to us, blockaded us (that is, kept information away from us) and maliciously sought to bring evil up on us. Because they black claws therefore we dealt with them. We would not permit them to disturb Chairman Mao's strategic plan. But some people exploit this sort of swap to negate the victories of the CPCR, to negate revolutionary masses and the merits of revolutionary young fighters.

(Yo Chun:Defend to death C.R.group. Guard against the plotting activities of February adverse current. Down with Tan Chen Lin) Since they waved the red flag to oppose the red flag they were able to fool certain number of masses. Because of this we adopted a very cautious policy towards them,the policy of division. Wang and Kuan could not be separated. Chi Pen Yu's mode of operation was not identical and therefore we separated him for a period of time. But to separate him did not mean that there were no problems in relation to him. In the event in the latter half of last year he became even more frenzied and many improper things took place.. We, internally, carried out a series of principled struggles with him. My last November speech at the art and cultu e forum, was in fact meant to be a criticism of Chi without mentioning him by name. He colluded with Yang Ch)eng Wu, their collusions started very early. We did not know about it. Chi also colluded with Yu Li Chin and Fu Chung Fi. They incited the mass s and said that bad people had emerged in the cultural revolution group. They did this in order to negate the cultural revolution group. Furthermore all these bad eggs were dealt with by the cultural revolution group itself. (Chen Po Ta: By C iang Ching. The Premier and other leaders agreed with Chen Po Ta) I feel that all the merit should not be attributed to any person. It should go to our great leader Chairman Mao, to revolutionary masses, to PLA.

Yang Cheng Wu wrote an article entitled"Establish in a thorough going way the absolute authority of Chairman Mao and of his great thought". I oppose this article on two occasions in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. But he would not listen and insisted on publishing it. In fact what he wanted to establish was his own absolute authority. He was a double faced plotter who set up a very small mountain stronghold of his own instead of the big strong hall of China... On 8th March he supported Fu Chung Fi in organising a wanton armed intrusion on two vehicles into the premises of the cultural revolution group without the permission of the cultural revolution group! We firmly oppose this and seriously criticised him. From that day on, Yang suddenly said that he was ill. In fact, behind our backs, he daily held meetings, daily hatched plots. He wanted to capture power in the air force. Yu Li Chin wanted to use him to seize comrade Wu Fa Hsien's power....

The Peking University has two militant organisations. They wrote a letter to Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin and us. At that time we were holding a meeting. I did not receive it. I entrusted comrade Hsieh to go and get this letter. But....

something strange happened. Fu Chung-fi sent a man called xxx to the Peking University to get "to the bottom of it" collecting name lists, looking for behind the scene bosses etc. This was improper. In this way they seized the right of the revolutionary masses to transmit material to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao and cultural revolution group. That evening or next, comrade Nieh rang us urgentatedly to inform us of the crisis. We were already very tired, but we still went and met them. She reported on the situation to Chen Po Ta and me. I explained to her that I wanted. But that we did not know what had happened below. At the same time we frankly ~~heard~~ the facts and that Wang, Kuan and Chi ~~the~~ black claws and did not deserve such a fuss. However she acted in this way ~~with~~ that not impede the general direction, but she still carried out one battle(?) Nieh has shortcomings and has made mistakes. You should criticise her but also protect her.

To refer the verdict all on the February adverse current is evil. Tan Chen Lin is a renegade. I protested him in the past. But now I say "Down with Tan Chen Lin ! He is a black general of Lio and Teng. You to have ~~been~~ proof that he is a renegade".

In the history of our party, in the struggle between 2 lines, there has always been left deviationist adventurism as well as right conservatism. Today it is right conservatism and right ~~conception~~ which has acquired prominence among the revolutionaries. We must crush it. All the bad people I have discussed above had a common objective - to bring about capitalist restoration. Concretely they sought in vain to wreck the proletarian/headquarters headed by Chairman Mao, and Vice Chairman Lin. (Chiang Ching then goes on to pay fulsome tributes to the PLA and at that stage Wu Fa Hsien led the audience in slogans pledging loyalty to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Cultural Revolution Group etc.)

Chiang Ching then went on to make the standard remarks about the necessity of distinguishing between friends and enemies and about the necessity of raising one's vigilance. She concluded with a series of slogans which included the following in that order:

Long Live the Red Guards !
Long Live the PLA !

Speech of Jiang Ching: I fully support the decisions of Party Centre announced by the Premier which are based on the brilliant instructions of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao, that is the dismissal of Yang Cheng Wu and Fu Chung Fi and the dealing according to law( ) with Nieh Yuan Tzu.

Echoing Chiang Ching's view that with respect to double dealers there is a process of recognition, Kang Sheng goes on to say: "We did not previously see the true nature of Yang, Yu and Pu... But in the course of the cultural revolution many facts emerged to prove that Yang Cheng Wu was a double dealer. As Vice Chairman Lin has pointed out, his opposition to Lo Jui Ching was false and in reality he was a L.'s man. His opposition to Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang was false. In reality he was a confidante of Peng Chen. His opposition to Ho Lung was false. In reality as far back as Yenan times, he was a secret friend of Ho Lung. Now he wants to seize the power of the PLA and the air force. He pretended to oppose Wang, Kuan and Chi but in fact was their behind the scene boss. He was collecting black material on Chiang Ching along with Chi Pen Yu. He ordered Fu Chung Fi to break into the premises of cultural revolution group. In collusion with Yu Li Chin, he sought to over throw Wu Fa Hsien and grab power in the air force. In collaboration with Fu Chung Fi he sought to over throw Vice Premier Nieh and grab power in Peking Revolutionary Committee. He sought to capture the Radio Station, the Liberation Army Daily and the People's Daily and this is only what we have discovered upto now. I suspect that you comrades will later be able to expose even bigger problems.

No matter what tricks he used his ultimate objective was to reverse the such verdicts on the Lin-Yang-Hsu, on Liu Teng and Tao, Peng Te Huai, Lo Jui Ching, Ho Lung, Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang and on the February adverse current of KT Tan Chen Lin.

Kang Sheng then proceeds to elaborate further what Chiang Ching had said on the February adverse current. He says: They attacked the Head and Deputy Head of Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Po Ta and Chiang Ching. Particularly clear was their opposition to the Yenan rectification movement led by Chairman Mao... They slandered CRIT as being "metaphysical" and CPCM as "lacking party leadership". They pretended to protect old cadres and their relatives but in fact under that guise they protected those ghosts and monsters, the capitalist readers... They fooled a few people, particularly the youth to serve their anti-party clique... They wished to reverse the verdict even on that running dog of Soviet revisionism Wang Ming. However, there had been no Yenan rectification, then, there would have been no victory in the war of liber.tion..

CRIT tells us that the basic question of the revolution is the question of power. We must be on our guard against the "extreme left" and even more so against the extreme right, who wish to shake the proletarian headquarters, the PLA

and the new revolutionary committees.

Interesting to how some people used the attacks on Wang, Kuan and Chi to attack proletarian headquarters and the cultural revolution group, Kang Sheng went on to say: " What sort of a person was Kuo Mo - a KMT act, and an activist carrying out the policy of "SAN HO YI CHAO" of Liu Shao Chi and Wang Chia Hsiang. In 1962, in Moscow, he carried out the Liu-Teng line of "SAN HO YI CHAO", and was praised and awarded for this by Khrushchev. And what about Kuan Feng and Chi Pen Yu? They were confidantes of Peng Chen. Peng Chen used to invite Chi Pen Yu to dinner and Chi Pen Yu would in turn praise Peng Chen. This inside story we were not aware of before. It was exposed during the cultural revolution, particularly by Chiang Ching.

Praising the PLA, Kang Sheng claimed Pulling out of Yang Yu and Fu is a great triumph and merit of the PLA. Therefore we must guard against anybody exploiting this incident to turn the spearhead against the PLA.

Speaking about the revolutionary committees, Kang Sheng says that such bad people as Fu Chung Fi and Chou Ching Kung, must certainly be pulled out. But this must not be used to attack the new rei regimes - the revolutionary committees.

Kang Sheng ends his speech by calling upon his audience to raise their vigilance and not to assume that all double dealers, plotters and careerists have been over thrown. "So long as class struggle exists, a handful of counter revolutionaries will exist".

Assessment by Chen Po Ta: We have had five major struggles in the course of the Cultural Revolution against the following:

(i) Peng, Lo, Lu and Yang
(ii) Lin, Tung and Tao
(iii) February adverse current headed by Tan Chen Lin and co.
(iv) Wang, Kuan and Chi, and now against
(v) Yang, Yu and Fu at a time when Cultural Revolution is moving towards all round victory

Chou En Lai: He expressed his support for the above decision and speeches. He denounced mountain strong-holdism and sectarianism and pointed out that such tendencies were harmful to the party, PLA etc. His remarks appear to have been directed to the PLA members of the his audience. He pointed out that Yang Cheng Wu had taken the same road as Yang Yo Kuei and Lo Jui Ching and he had to fall in the same way. He expressed the belief that only a small

minority in the PLA were with Yang, Yu and Fu and called upon them to wake up and draw a clear line of demarcation between themselves and this clique. He emphasized the great role which PLA had played particularly in the course of GPCR. He went out of his way to praise the Wuhing Garrison Command who had looked after and protected 13 million Red Guards (Translator's note: probably reference to the great influx of 1966) and the GPCR led by Chairman Mao. He expressed the hope that PLA would establish new merits in the future.

It was inevitable that a new born organisation like revolutionary committee will make some mistakes but these were not important and the revolutionary committees were a great creation. He repeated Chiang Ching's prediction that by the May Day there will be "basically revolutionary committees all over the country".

He joined Chiang Ching in criticising Yang Cheng Wu's article. He said that even then a soldier from Fukien had written a letter criticising the article, in which he had pointed out that Chairman's authority had already been established as a result of many years struggle by millions of people. Chairman Mao has summed up the rich revolutionary experience and when it had been grasped it became the invincible MZT. "We should be proud that a soldier dares to criticise the Chief of Staff".

Chou then discussed the how revolution had been threatened at various time from the right and by the left First it was the February adverse current of last year from the right headed by Tan Chen Lin. "In summer the danger came from the other side -'extreme left'! This year there was a re-emergence of danger from right opportunism opportunism and Yang Cheng Wu exemplified this. Chou En-lai also included a brief critical reference to Hsiao Hua.

He paid a fulsome tribute to Chiang Ching's contribution to revolution. She has been an outstanding student of Chairman Mao's right from the days of anti-Japanese war. In the face of great danger she carried out underground activities and wrote articles. Recently the 8 models she had established had laid the revolutionary guide lines for transformation in the field of art and culture along Chairman Mao's line. Her February proposals when compared with Pang Chen February proposals show that her's were the right and his the black proposals. He informed the audience that the important editorial which appeared in

Appendix

8 4 Liberation Army Daily in April 1966 was the work of Chiang Ching at the behest of Lin Piao. He warned the people again against collecting black material on Chiang Ching. This came from Taiwan and Hong Kong. All those who collected this material in China will also be treated as counter revolutionaries. He criticized Cultural Revolution Group with having exposed Wang, Kuan and Chi.

He ended his speech by reiterating the tasks which lie ahead in the same terms as the Joint New Year Day Editorial of People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily, including the necessity for rectifying the party, Youth League and revolutionary rebel organisations.

....

(Please insert before the last paragraph on page 9)

He also made the usual remarks about international situation and the difficulties facing the capitalists and revisionists. He went on to say: The enemies surrounding us including U.S. imperialist, Soviet revisionist, reactionaries etc. also may organise a large scale world war against us. Therefore we must be united and prepared for it.

Grasp revolution and promote production. You workers and peasants have a very heavy task. You have to carry out production. You should unite on the basis of T.H.T. You should not absent yourself from work and abandon production posts, or indulge in counter revolutionary activities or occasions.

"Support the army and love the people". Refers to Chiang Ching's speech of 5th September.

....

41

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED

19 April 1968

Reply 26/4

Dear John,

40

I note that Ray Whitney in his letter of 9 April (PEK/7) to you about Yang Cheng-wu refers in paragraph 8 to a document of which he only had one copy. I shall be grateful if you will let me have a copy as he suggests.

Yours ever,

Michael Wilford

(K.M. Wilford)

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
26 APR 1968
FE/5

CONFIDENTIAL

(PEK/7)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31 - 1 MAY 1968 FE1/5

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

22 April, 1968.

Dear John,

In his letter to Murray of 9 April, Percy Cradock said that the origins of the Yang Ch'eng-wu affair were obscure and that anything we said at that stage must be largely conjective.

2. I regret to say that the past fortnight has brought us no further enlightenment and we have nothing significant to add to the views in Percy Cradock's letter and mine to you of 9 April. The only real development, if it merits such a description, is the claim made to me by one of our Soviet colleagues that new posters had appeared denouncing Yeh Chien-ying as the man behind Yang Ch'eng-wu (as reported in our telegram No. 324). Whether or not such posters did reappear, it is quite certain that the attack has not been developed and the position of Yeh remains obscure as ever. We must now wait to see if he appears on May Day, and even this will be far from conclusive, one way or the other.

3. Yang Ch'eng-wu himself seems to have sunk without trace save for one story which is so flimsy that it hardly bears repeating. Two days ago a Czech colleague who has in the past often produced useful information, asked me what was "going on" between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. After I had confessed ignorance - several times - he claimed that there were reports that Yang had gone to Hanci. He ducked my questions about what Yang could be doing there but finally, with heavy emphasis, pointed out that the former Acting Chief of Staff had been in Korea with the Chinese People's Volunteers. I was left to gather the obvious inference. Perhaps I might link this, but with every possible reservation, with a report given to me today by Hans Bargmann, the West German correspondent who has just returned from a visit to Hong Kong, where he talked to a communist official named Ma (who he believes is the editor of the Ta Kung Pao). According to Bargmann, Ma said that "in his opinion" China could never allow Comrade Ho Chi-minh to make peace with the Americans and that if necessary, every kind of assistance would be given to Vietnamese patriots who were ready to continue the war. It seems likely that both stories have been directed towards the West for obvious political purposes and neither may have any close relationship with hard fact.

4. To return to Chinese internal affairs. Although the national and the provincial Chinese press has devoted a very great deal of space to the American negroes' "struggle" since Mao's statement of 16 April, it has also pegged away at its defence of and advice to revolutionary committees, developing

/the

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

FE17/2 (133)

the various points made in the editorial of 30 March (our telegram No. 264). Other favourite themes have been calls for people to be on their guard against "rightist splittism, opportunism and conservatism", to carry on the great criticism and to dig out and strike down the "traitors and special agents" who allegedly continue to be buried in society. All these lines are only too familiar and tend to confirm the impression that the revolution has all but run out of steam. It seems likely that one of the subsidiary aims of the hullabaloo about the negro struggle, was to give a fillip to flagging revolutionary spirits (the major aims, as discussed by Leonard Appleyard in another letter in this bag were related to the Vietnamese question). The main objective of the leadership at present seems to be to complete its tally of revolutionary committees as quickly as possible and with the minimum of fuss.

I am copying this letter to Frank Brewer in J.R.D. Colin Wilson in I.R.D., Denison Cross in D.I.S. McKearney in P.U.S.D., George Walden and Ashworth in Hong Kong, Reg Hibbert in Singapore, Roy Spendlove in Washington and Peter Hewitt in Canberra.

Yours ever

Roy.

(R. W. WHITNEY)

Registry No. F E1/5 Dept

DEPARTMENT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
~~Top Secret~~ ~~Secret~~ Confidential ~~Restricted~~ ~~Unclassified~~	~~Flash~~ ~~Immediate~~ } * Priority ~~Routine~~

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence

~~*En Clair.*~~ ~~*Code*~~ *Cypher*

Draft Telegram to:—
PEKING
No. 466
(Date) 8/5
And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—
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7152
8/5

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) .....

(43)

(Date) 8/5

Despatched 9/4

CYPHER

[*Security classification —if any*] Confidential

[*Privacy marking —if any*]

[*Codeword—if any*] .....

Addressed to PEKING

telegram No. ..... *(date)* .....

And to .....

repeated for information to .....

.....

Saving to .....

Dismissal of Yang Ch'eng-wu (YANG CH'ENG-WU)

We should now like to show text of speeches by Chiang Ch'ing (CHIANG CH'ING) and others on 27 March (enclosed with Whitney's letter Pek 7 of 9 April) to usual TRUSTED CONTACTS contacts; we note that in gist of speeches on 25 and 27 March ~~[allusions ambiguous terms used]~~ has now been widely reported, eg. by ~~[Tass to Hsinhua etc]~~.

John Gittings in Far Eastern/Economic

Economic Review of 4 May.
Enclosure 16 Whitney's letter was
however classified Secret,
whereas most material of this
type is semi-restricted. Do you
have any particular reason
for wanting these speeches
held back?

Yours

Giles Austin

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

032717 E.W.& S.,Ltd. 164m 3/67.

FC 1/5

TOP (43)

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

[redacted]no 466 8 May 1968 (F)

FC 1/5

CONFIDENTIAL

Dismissal of Yang Ch'ang-wu.

(39)

We should now like to show text of speeches by Chiang Ch'ing and others on 27 March (enclosed with Whitney's letter Pek 7 of 9 April) to usual trusted contacts; we note that the gist of speeches on 25 and 27 March has now been widely reported e.g. by John Gittings in Far Eastern Economic Review of 4 May.

Enclosure to Whitney's letter was however classified Secret, whereas most material of this type is sent restricted. Do you have any particular reason for wanting these speeches held back?

SOSFA

F I L E S

Far Eastern Dept.
I.R.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

:::::

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ARCHIVES No.31
10 MAY 1968
FE1/5

(44)

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 402 9 May, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 402 of 9 May.
Repeated for information to: Hong Kong Washington.

(43)

Your telegram No. 466 (not to all addressees) [Dismissal of Yang Ch'eng-wee].

No repeat no objections to text of speeches of Chiang Ch'ing etc. being shown to usual trusted contacts. Translation enclosed with Whitney's letter PEK 7 of 9 April was obtained from Indian colleagues, who had classified the material secret. We have subsequently seen copies of original Chinese reports of the speeches and translation may now be down graded to restricted.

F.O. pass Hong Kong No. 286, Washington No. 99.

Sir D. Hopson

[Repeated as requested].

FILES
F.E.D.
I.R.D.

uuuuu

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
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23 MAY 1968
FC4/5

PW (45)

SECRET

SECRET

DI2/FE/6

The Foreign Office
Far Eastern Department
(Attn J.D.I. Boyd Esq)

Minutes also on FC 1/3
Letter sent in Peking 5/8 p.4 J3
On Yunnan
J3

CHINA: QUALITATIVE DISTINCTIONS WITHIN THE PLA.

FC1/3.
(13)

1. Chargé's Office in Peking has raised a query with regard to the meaning of "local troops" and "independent" units (PEK/7 dated 7 May 68).

2. We believe that a qualitative distinction can be drawn, in broad terms, between Field Armies and Military District troops. These could be described respectively as the 'Field Force' and the 'Local' or 'Regional' Force. We also believe that a further distinction can be drawn within Field Armies in that some divisions appear to have a higher degree of operational readiness than others. There are also a number of independent divisions, which are probably of higher quality than Military District troops, but which, in general, could probably be best described as belonging to the Local or Regional Force.

3. The fact that there is a distinction between the Field Force and the Local or Regional Force is not new, since Mao has said that: "This Army (PLA) is powerful because of its division into two parts, the Main Forces and the Regional Forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on the defence of their own localities and attacking the enemy there in co-operation with the local Militia and the Self-Defence Corps".

4. The movement of divisions to the Fukien Front from other parts of China in 1962, and similar types of movement during the Cultural Revolution, may be said to provide practical examples of the fact that the quality of the PLA Ground Force is uneven, in that the moves suggest to us either that there were no forces of high quality within a particular area or that they were insufficiently representative of the forces already there.

for H B Bailey Major

Col GS
Area Officer
DI 2
Ext 7840
21st May 1968

SECRET
SECRET

John. What do you make of this? (46)

JWG.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
27 MAY 1968
FE 1/55

FM HKONG MAY21/68 CONFD

TO EXTER EX164

INFO TOKYO TT WSHDC LDN PARIS PRMNY DE OTT TT MOSCO NATO DELHI

DE LDN

BAG BGRAD DE LDN

SITUATION IN CHINA

I HAD OPPORTUNITY OVER WEEKEND FOR BRIEF TALK WITH MIHAILO SHARANO-
VICH WHO HAS BEEN YUGOSLAV NEWS AGENCY CORRESPONDENT IN PEKING
SINCE LATE 1965.HE IS ON GOOD TERMS WITH DAVID OANCIA WHO ARRANGED
MTG.

2.TO MY SURPRISE SHARANOVICH BEGAN BY SAYING HE DID NOT/NOT AGREE
WITH CURRENT POPULAR INTERPRETATION OF MANOEUVRES WITHIN LEADERSHIP
IN PEKING.AS YOU KNOW,IT IS NOW MORE OR LESS ACCEPTED BY OBSERVERS
BOTH IN PEKING AND HKONG THAT DISMISSAL OF YANG CHENG-WU AS
ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF AT END OF MAR WAS COUNTER-ATTACK BY RADICALS
AMONG LEADERSHIP AIMED AT HALTING TREND TOWARDS GREATER MILITARY
CONTROL AND CREATION WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY
CTTEES OF NEW ELITE OF MILITARY LEADERS AND VETERAN
CADRES.SHARANOVICH HOWEVER HELD TO INITIAL ASSESSMENT THAT
ATTACK ON YANG HAD BEEN CONTINUATION OF EARLIER ATTACKS AGAINST
EXTREME LEFT AND HAD REPRESENTED ESSENTIALLY NEW VICTORY FOR COAL-
ION OF CIVILIAN PRAGMATISTS AND ARMY MODERATES IN PEKING AND
FURTHER DEFEAT FOR MORE RADICAL CULTURAL REVLN GROUP.

Not accepted by us (in this form at least)

3.ACCORDING TO SHARANOVICH THERE HAD BEEN EVIDENCE TO LINK
YANG CHENG-WU WITH EXTREME LEFTISTS WANG LI AND KUANG

...2

FENG WHO HAD FALLEN LAST SEP.AT ABOUT THAT TIME YANG HAD DELIVERED SPEECH CALLING FOR PURGE OF ARMED FORCES.MOREOVER,HE HAD SOUGHT TO SET HIMSELF UP AS RIVAL TO LIN PIAO.LIN HAD EVENTUALLY SECURED AGREEMENT OF CHOU EN-LAI THAT YANG WOULD HAVE TO GO.

4.SHARANOVICH ARGUED THEREFORE THAT THERE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN SHIFT TO LEFT IN PAST TWO MONTHS AS COMMONLY BELIEVED AND THAT ON CONTRARY MODERATES AND PRAGMATISTS CONTINUED TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION.CULTURAL REVOLUTIONARY GROUP WAS INCREASINGLY LESS POWERFUL.IT HAD ONLY FIVE PROMINENT MEMBERS NOW COMPARED WITH EARLIER FIGURE OF APPROX 20.MOREOVER THERE WERE INDICATIONS CHEN PO-TA MIGHT HAVE BEEN BEHIND YANG AND PROPOSED ARMY PURGE AND AS RESULT HIS POSITION SEEMED SHAKY.IT WAS TRUE THAT CULTA URAL REVOLUTARY GROUP HAD MADE GAINS IN MAY DAY LISTS BUT THIS WAS EPHEMERAL THING.MORE IMPORTANT WAS NUMBER OF MILITARY LEADERS WHO HAD ATTENDED CELEBRATIONS.EVEN OLD MARSHALS HAD PUT IN APPEARANCE.THERE WAS TENDENCY TO OVERARATE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF CHIANG CHING BECAUSE SHE WAS MAOS WIFE.

5.SHARANOVICH WENT ON TO DESCRIBE MAO AS LESS AND LESS A PROMINENT FIGURE.THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE SOMETHING ODD UNQUOTE ABOUT HIS APPEARANCE AT MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS.IF HE DIED IT WAS LIKELY THAT LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT/NOT ANNOUNCE IT IMMEDLY BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAD TO QUOTE CIVIL WAR UNQUOTE.THEY WOULD HAVE TO WORK THINGS OUT AMONG THEMSELVES FIRST.

6.SHARANOVICH DID NOT/NOT AGREE WITH OANCIAS BELIEF THAT

...3

THERE MUST BE FINAL SHOWDOWN BETWEEN CHOU AND LIN.IN HIS
OPINION THE TWO MEN WERE MOVING CLOSER.MAO HAD CHOSEN LIN AS
HIS SUCCESSOR BECAUSE HE DID NOT/NOT WANT POTENTIAL RIVAL
DURING HIS LIFETIME.CHOU PROBABLY DID NOT/NOT ASPIRE TO LEADER-
SHIP BUT IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ORGANIZE
QUOTE COUP DETAT UNQUOTE IF SITUATION DETERIORATED.
7.SHARANOVICH CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT CHINESE DISPLAYED
XENOPHOBIC TENDENCIES AT TIME WHEN INTERNAL CLASHES WERE SHARPEST
AND HE BELIEVED THAT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES FOR FOREIGNERS REFLECTED
INTENSIFICATION IN INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH WAS LIKELY
TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME

HATHEWAY

Covering Secret

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference your letter of 26 April (FC1/1), as requested we return herewith the original plus one copy made here. Pages 2,3,8 and 9 had to be retyped in order to get legible copies.

(K.M.Wilford)

Covering Secret

FE1/5 (W.40) Jpg pm (w min 40) 24/4

ARCHIVE

Important speeches by Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Chen Po Ta and Chou En-lai delivered on 27th March.

Speeches delivered by the leaders to a ~~200,000,000~~ 100,000,000 strong mixed audience of PLA, Red Guards, workers, peasants, teachers and students:

Chen Po Ta: Premier Chou will read out the instructions of the Party Centre and orders of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.

Chou En-lai read out the following decision of the Central Committee, State Council, Military Affairs Commission and Cultural Revolution Group dated 22 March 1968:

According to the decision of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin:

(i) Yang Cheng Wu has committed exceedingly serious mistakes and therefore it is decided to dismiss him from posts of Acting Chief of Staff, Standing Committee of Military Affairs Commission, Secretary General, Military Affairs Commission and First Secretary, General Staff Department.

(ii) Yu Li Chin has committed exceedingly serious mistakes. Furthermore he is a renegade. He is dismissed from his posts of the Political Commissar, Air Force and Second Secretary, Party Committee Air Force.

(iii) Fu Chung Fi has made serious mistakes and is dismissed as Commander, Peking Garrison Command.

This decision is to be communicated to all fighters and commanders.

Speech by Chiang Ching: To-day's meeting is being held because some comrades wanted us to explain something and we also wanted to tell them something. International and internal situation is excellent. Imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries are confronted by a financial crisis. In name it is a financial crisis, in reality it involves rising prices, depreciating value of currency, hoarding, shut-down of factories etc. . Isn't the fact that life has become difficult for imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries to our advantage? (Audience: Yes!) They are They are day by day approaching a disastrous exit. And we? Let us not speak of something distant. Let me just speak of the situation since we entered the cultural revolution. Our currency has been stable. Basic living standards and prices have been stable. In agriculture we had a bumper harvest last year. In industry there were several inventions. Naturally in some places fighting led to a decline in production. But the moment revolutionary great alliance

and revolutionary 3-way alliance were achieved, production quickly shot up and production targets were exceeded. Isn't this an excellent situation? (Hsieh Fu Chi: Long Live the victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line! Long live CPCR !) Our life is improving day by day. Things needs fear comparison. Comrades should compare these two situations a little. Isn't it excellent?

The situation in CPCR is also excellent. 18 provinces and cities already have revolutionary committees. Another 4 provinces are soon awaiting central ratification. Rest are in the process of fermentation and will come to Peking for solution. Before May Day, basically (sic) every province will have established revolutionary committee....

We must firmly oppose those who do not accept that the situation is excellent and seek to paint it in black colours. The CPCR situation in Peking is excellent. Some people say that the revolution in Shanghai is in a better situation than in Peking. This lack concrete analysis. Each has its good and bad points. We cannot say that such and such place is better than Peking, or that Peking is better than such and such place. We cannot speak in such an absolute terms. The excellent situation in Peking manifests itself in the fact that the working class and poor and lower-middle peasants can already manage the situation of revolutionary struggle (Yu Chun: Consolidate the Red regional revolutionary committees ! Consolidate Peking revolutionary committee ! Defend the party Centre led by Chairman Mao !// Strengthen the pillar of proletarian dictatorship - PLA. Firmly support Chiang Ching's "5th September" decision !)

Comrades, I am an ordinary party member.... (She then goes on to indulge in a display of modesty, interspersed by slogans led by Yu Chun and Hsieh Fu Chi calling for learning from and protecting Chiang Ching)... There is no one who is consistently correct all his life. I certainly am not such a person. I too have made mistakes and am still have shortcomings. If I make a mistake, comrades can bombard me and write posters about me. Some institutes say "fry" me, "execute" me. When I have spare times I go there to see they "fry" me (laughter).... Chiang Ching then goes on to discuss double dealers, plotters and points out that with respect to them there is usually a "process of recognition" (Translator's note: That is, they are only gradually recognised and discovered as such), particularly we who work at the side of Chairman Mao cannot arbitrarily suspect a person. It needs very close investigation...

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Before we can discover ~~another bad~~ thing we have to examine it in all sorts of circumstances. ~~Sometimes~~. This was true also in cases of such renegades, counter revolutionaries and double faced careerists who worked their way ~~its~~ into the party as Lie Yang Tao, Peng Te Huai, Ho Lung, Peng, Lu, Ho and Yang (Ye Chun: Down with Hsiao Hua) (Hsieh: Down with ang, Kuan and Chi). If there had not been a GPCR, they could never have been exposed. This is a great merit achieved by revolutionary young fighters....

(On "February adverse current")...

Last February, ~~when~~ the black general renegade Tan Chen Lin as representative, it emerged to reverse the verdict on Lie Yang Tao. Since this struggle took place in a very small circle the broad masses did not know. Therefore they with ulterior motives exploit this to mislead revolutionary young fighters, revolutionary masses, reversing black and white and saying: "whoever opposes Yu Chiu Li xx, xx, is opposing the Premier and opposing Chairman Mao". In fact Yu Chiu Li is (was ?) a confidante of Ho Lung. Chairman Mao says that you must (i) criticise and (ii) protect. We are still acting accordingly. But revolutionary fighters should not allow themselves to be cheated bythim. This spearhead of the 'February adverse current' was primarily directed against the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao and Lin, PLA, the newly born revolutionary committees. It opposed the GPCR and refused to accept the achievements of GPCR, that is, refused to accept the achievements of revolutionary masses and revolutionary young fighters. Under the leadership of Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin, we crushed them and thoroughly exposed them.

From last May there emerged left deviationist adventurism (alternatively called "extreme left" or in form "left" and in reality right). Their top figures were Wang, Kuan and Chi. They were the claws of Lie and Yang, the nails planted by Lie and Yang in our revolutionary ~~xx~~ ranks.

Ye Chun: Down with the black claws of Lie and Yang Wang, Kuan and Chi. They were to oppose red flags, ~~opposing~~ to oppose deception red flags and went about practising ~~disruption~~ deception They did not ask for instructions, did not report to us, blockaded us (that is, kept information away from us) and maliciously sought to bring evil up on us. Because they [redacted] black claws therefore we dealt with them. We would not permit them to disturb Chairman Mao's current strategic plan. But some people exploit this sort of affair to negate the victories of the GPCR, to negate revolutionary masses and the merits of revolutionary young fighters.

(Ye Chun:Defend to death C.R.group. Guard against the plotting activities of February adverse current. Down with Tan Chen Lin! Since they waved the red flag to oppose the red flag they were able to fool certain number of masses. Because of this we adopted a very cautious policy towards them,the policy of division. Wang and Kuan could not be separated. Chi Pen Yu's mode of operation was not identical and therefore we separated him for a period of time. But to separate him did not mean that there were no problems in relation to him. In the event in the latter half of last year he became even more frenzied and many improper things took place.. We, internally, carried out a series of principled struggles with him. My last November speech at the art and cultu e forum, was in fact meant to be a criticism of Chi without mentioning him by name. He colluded with Yang ChMeng Wu, their collusions started very early. We did not know about it. Chi also colluded with Yu Li Chin and Fu Chung Fi. They incited the mass s and said that bad people had emerged in the cultural revolution group. They did this in order to negate the cultural revolution group. Furthermore all these bad eggs were dealt with by the cultural revolution group itself. (Chen Po Ta : By C iang Ching. The Premier and other leaders agreed with Chen Po Ta) I feel that all the merit should not be attributed to any person. It should go to our great leader Chairman Mao, to revolutionary masses, to PLA.

Yang Cheng Wu wrote an article entitled"Establish in a thorough going way the absolute authority of Chairman Mao and of his great thought". I oppose this article on two occasions in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. But he would not listen and insisted on publishing it. In fact what he want to estabMsh was his own absolute authority. He was a double faced plotter who set up a very small mountain strong hold of his own instead of the big strong hold of China... On 8th March he supported Fu Chung Fi in organising a wanton armed intrusion on two vehicles into the premises of the cultural revolution group without the permission of the cultural revolution group! We firmly oppose this and seriously criticised him. From that day on, Yang suddenly said that he was ill. In fact, behind our backs, he daily held meetings, daily hatched plots. He wanted to capture power in the air force. Yu Li Chin wanted to use him to seize comrade Wu Fa Hsien's power....

The Peking University has two militant organisations. They wrote a letter to Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin and us. At that time we were holding a meeting. I did not receive it. I entrusted comrade Hsieh to go and get this letter. But....

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something strange happened. Fu Chung Fi sent a man called xxx to the Peking University to get "to the bottom of it" collecting name lists, looking for behind the scene bosses etc. This was improper. In this way they seized the right of the revolutionary masses to transmit material to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao and cultural revolution group. That evening or next, comrade Nieh rang us upagitatedly to inform us of the crisis. We were already very tired, but we still went and met her. She reported on the situation to Chen Po Ta and me. I explained to her what I wanted. But that we did not know what had happened below. At the same time we frankly ~~heard~~ stated the facts and that Wang, Kuan and Chi ~~who are~~ were black claws and did not deserve such a fuss. ~~However~~ If she acted in this way ~~with~~ which that not impede the general direction, ? But she still carried out one battle(?) Nieh has shortcomings and has made mistakes. You should criticise her but also protect her.

To rever the verdict ~~of~~ on the February adverse current is evil. Tan Chen Lin is a renegade. I protected him in the past. But now I say "Down with Tan Chen Lin ! He is a black general of Lio and Teng. Now we have ~~here~~ clear proof that he is a renegade".

In the history of our party, in the struggle between 2 lines, there has always been left deviationist adventurism as well as right conservatism. Today it is right conservatism and right ~~opportunism~~ opportunism which has acquired prominence among the revolutionaries. We must crush it. All the bad people I have discussed above had a common objective - to bring about capitalist restoration. Concretely they sought in vain to wreck the proletarian/headquarters headed by Chairman Mao, and Vice Chairman Lin. (Chiang Ching then goes on to pay fulsome tributes to the PLA and at that stage Wu Fa Hsien led the audience in slogans pledging loyalty to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Cultural Revolution Group etc.)

Chiang Ching then went on to make the standard remarks about the necessity of distinguishing between friends and enemies and about the necessity of raising one's vigilance. She concluded with a series of slogans which included the following in that order:

Long Live the Red Guards !
Long Live the PLA !

Speech of Kang Sheng: I fully support the decisions of Party Centre announced by the Premier which are based on the brilliant instructions of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao, that is the dismissal of Yang Cheng Wu and Fu Chung Fi and the dealing according to law(?)
with Ku Mu Chin.

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Echoing Chiang Ching's view that with respect to double dealers there is a process of recognition, Kang Sheng goes on to say: "We did not previously see the true nature of Yang, Yu and Fu.... But in the course of the cultural revolution many facts emerged to prove that Yang Cheng Wu was a double dealer. As Vice Chairman Lin has pointed out, his opposition to Lo Jui Ching was false and in reality he was a Lo's man. His opposition to Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang was false. In reality he was a confidante of Peng Chen. His opposition to Ho Lung was false. In reality as far back as Yenan times, he was a bosom friend of Ho Lung. Now he wants to seize the power of the PLA and the air force. He pretended to oppose Wang, Kuan and Chi but in fact was their behind the scene boss. He was collecting black material on Chiang Ching along with Chi Pen Yu. He ordered Fu Chung Fi to break into the premises of cultural revolution group. In collusion with Yu Li Chin, he sought to over throw Wu Fu Hsien and grab power in the air force. In collaboration with Fu Chung Fi he sought to over throw Vice Premier Hsieh and grab power in Peking Revolutionary Committee. He sought to capture the Radio Station, the Liberation Army Daily and the People's Daily and this is only what we have discovered upto now. I suspect that you comrades will later be able to expose even bigger problems.

No matter what tricks he used his ultimate objective was to reverse the ~~anti~~ verdicts on the ~~Lie-Teng-Hsi~~, on Lieu Teng and Tao, Peng Te Huai, Lo Jui Ching, Ho Lung, Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang and on the February adverse current of ~~of~~ Tan Chen Lin.

Kang Sheng then proceeds to elaborate further what Chiang Ching had said on the February adverse current. He says: They attacked the Head and Deputy Head of Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Po Ta and Chiang Ching. Particularly clear was their opposition to the Yenan rectification movement led by Chairman Mao... They slandered ~~CRT~~ as being ~~Khrushchevite~~ "metaphysical" and GPCR as "lacking party leadership". They pretended to protect old cadres and their relatives but in fact under that guise they protected those ghosts and monsters, the capitalist roaders... They fooled a few people, particularly the youth to serve their anti-party clique.... They wished to reverse the verdict ~~evgg~~ on that running dog of Soviet revisionism Wang Ming. However, there had been no Yenan rectification, then, there would have been no victory in the war of liberation.

~~CRT~~ tells us that the basic question of the revolution is the question of power. We must be on our guard against the "extreme left" and even more so against the extreme right, who wish to shake the proletarian headquarters, the PLA

and the new revolutionary committees.

Referring to how some people used the attacks on Wang, Kuan and Chi to attack proletarian headquarters and the cultural revolution group, Kang Sheng went on to say: " What sort of a person was Wang Li? - a KMT man, and an activist carrying out the policy of "SAN HO YI SHAO" of Teng Hsiao Ping and Wang Chia Hsiang. In 1962, in Moscow, he carried out the Liu-Teng line of "SAN HO YI SHAO", and was praised and awarded for this by Khrushchew. And what about Kuan Feng and Chi Pen Yu? They were confidantes of Peng Cheng. Peng Cheng used to invite Chi Pen Yu to dinner and Chi Pen Yu used in turn/praise Peng Cheng. This inside story we were not aware of before. It was exposed during the cultural revolution, particularly by Chiang Ching.

Praising the PLA, Kang Sheng claims: Pulling out of Yang Yu and Fu is a great triumph and merit of the PLA. Therefore we must guard against anybody exploiting this incident to turn the spearhead against the PLA.

Speaking about the revolutionary committees, Kang Sheng says that such bad people as Fu Chung Fi and Chou Ching Fang, must certainly be pulled out. But this must not be used to attack the new red regimes - the revolutionary committees.

Kang Sheng ends his speech by calling upon his audience to raise their vigilance and not to assume that all double dealers, plotters and careerists have been over thrown. "So long as class struggle exists, a handful of counter revolutionaries will exist".

Speech by Chen Po Ta: We have had five major struggles in the course of the Cultural Revolution against the following:

(i) Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang
(ii) Lin, Tsang and Tao
(iii) February adverse current headed by Tan Chen Lin and co.
(iv) Wang, Kuan and Chi, and now against
(v) Yang, Yu and Fu at a time when Cultural Revolution is moving towards all round victory

CHOU EN-LAI: He expressed his support for the above decision and speeches. He denounced mountain strong-holdism and sectarianism and pointed out that such tendencies were harmful to the party, PLA etc. His remarks appear to have been directed to the PLA members of the his audience. He pointed out that Yang Cheng Wu had taken the same road as Peng Te Huai and Lo Jui Ching and he had to fall in the same way. He expressed the belief that only a small

minority in the PLA were with Yang, Yu and Fu and called upon them to wake up and draw a clear line of demarcation between themselves and this clique. He emphasised the great role which PLA had played particularly in the course of GPCR. He went out of his way to praise the Peking Garrison Command who had looked after and protected 13 million Red Guards (Translator's note: probably reference to the great influx of 1966) and the GPCR led by Chairman Mao. He expressed the hope that PLA would establish new merits in the future.

It was inevitable that a new born organisation like revolutionary committee will make some mistakes but these were not important and the revolutionary committees were a great creation. He repeated Chiang Ching's prediction that by the May Day there will be "basically revolutionary committees all over the country".

He joined Chiang Ching in criticising Yang Cheng Wu's article. He said that even then a soldier from Fukien had written a letter criticising the article, in which he had pointed out that Chairman's authority had already been established as a result of arduous struggle by millions of people. Chairman Mao has summed up the rich revolutionary experience and when it had been grasped it became the invincible PLA. "We should be proud that a soldier dares to criticise the Chief of Staff".

Chou then discussed how revolution had been threatened at various times from the right and by the left First it was the February adverse current of last year from the right headed by Tan Chen Lin. In summer the danger came from the other side -'extreme left'. This year there was a re-emergence of danger from right opportunism opportunism and Yang Cheng Wu exemplified this. Chou En-lai also included a brief critical reference to Hsiao Hua.

He paid a fulsome tribute to Chiang Ching's contribution to revolution. She has been an outstanding student of Chairman Mao's right from the days of anti-Japanese war. In the face of great danger she carried out underground activities and wrote articles. Recently the 8 models she had established had laid the revolutionary guide lines for transformation in the field of art and culture along Chairman Mao's line. Her February proposals when compared with Peng Chen February proposals show that her's were the red and his the black proposals. He informed the audience that the important editorial which appeared in

Liberation Army Daily in April 1966 was the work of Chiang Ching at the behest of Lin Piao. He warned the people against collecting black material on Chiang Ching. This comes from Taiwan and Hong Kong. All those who collected this material in China will also be treated as counter revolutionaries. He credited Cultural Revolution Group with having exposed Wang, Kuan and Chi.

He also made the usual remarks about international situation and the difficulties facing the capitalists and revisionists. He went on to say: The enemies surrounding us including U.S. imperialist, Soviet revisionist, reactionaries etc. also may organise a large scale world war against us. Therefore we must be united and prepared for it.

Grasp revolution and promote production. You workers and peasants have a very heavy task. You have to carry out production. You should unite on the basis of TNTT. You should not absent yourself from work and abandon production posts, or indulge in counter revolutionary activities or economism.

"Support the army and love the people". Refers to Chiang Ching's speech of 5th September.

He ended his speech by reiterating the tasks which lie ahead in the same terms as the Joint New Year Day Editorial of People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily, including the necessity for rectifying the party, Youth League and revolutionary rebel organisations.

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Important speeches by Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Chen Po Ta and Chen Hsi-lien delivered on 27th March

Speeches delivered by the leaders to a ~~200,000~~ 100,000 strong mixed audience of PLA, Red Guards, workers, peasants, teachers and students

Chen Po Ta. Premier Chou will read out the instructions of the Party Centre and orders of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.

Chou En-lai read out the following decision of the Central Committee, State Council, Military Affairs Commission and Cultural Revolution Group dated 22 March 1969:

According to the decision of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin:

(1) Yang Cheng Wu has committed exceedingly serious mistakes and therefore it is decided to dismiss him from posts of Acting Chief of Staff, Standing Committee of Military Affairs Commission, Secretary General, Military Affairs Commission and First Secretary, General Staff Department.

(11) Yu Li Chin has committed exceedingly serious mistakes. Furthermore he is a renegade. He is dismissed from his posts of the Political Commissar, Air Force and Second Secretary, Party Committee Air Force.

(111) Li Chang Yi has made serious mistakes and is dismissed as Commander, Peking Garrison Command.

This decision is to be communicated to all fighters and commanders.

French Parliamentary Delegation Today's meeting is being held because some friends wanted us to explain something and we also wanted to tell them something. International and internal situation is excellent. Imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries are confronted by a financial crisis. As more it is a financial crisis, in reality it involves rising prices, depreciating value of currency, bankrupt, shutdown of factories etc. . But the fact that life has become difficult for imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries is to our advantage! (Audience: Yes!) They are They are day by day approaching a disastrous end. And us? Let us not speak of something distant. Let us just speak of the situation since we entered the cultural revolution. Our currency has been stable. Basic living standards and prices have been stable. In agriculture we had a bumper harvest last year. In industry there were several inventions. Naturally in some places fighting led to a decline in production. But the present revolutionary great alliance

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and revolutionary 3-way alliance were achieved, production quickly shot up and production targets were exceeded. Isn't this an excellent situation? (Hsieh Fu Chi: Long Live the victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line! Long live GPCR!) Our life is improving day by day. Things fear comparison. Comrades should compare these two situations a little. Isn't it excellent?

The situation in GPCR is also excellent. 18 provinces and cities already have revolutionary committees. Another 4 provinces are awaiting central ratification. Rest are in the process of fermentation and will come to Peking for solution. Before May Day, basically (sic) every province will have established revolutionary committee.....

We must firmly oppose those who do not accept that the situation is excellent and seek to paint it in black colours. The GPCR situation in Peking is excellent. Some people say that the revolution in Shanghai is in a better situation than in Peking. This lacks concrete analysis. Each has its good and bad points. We cannot say that such and such place is better than Peking, or that Peking is better than such and such place. We cannot speak in such absolute terms. The excellent situation in Peking manifests itself in the fact that the working class and poor and lower-middle peasants can already manage the situation of revolutionary struggle (Yo Chun: Consolidate the Red regimes revolutionary committees: Consolidate Peking revolutionary committee! Defend the party Centre led by Chairman Mao! Strengthen the pillar of proletarian dictatorship-PLA. Firmly support Chiang Ching's "5th September" decision!)

Comrades, I am an ordinary party member.....(She then goes on to indulge in a display of modesty, interspersed by slogans led by Yo Chun and Hsieh Fu Chi calling for learning from and protecting Chiang Ching)... There is no one who is consistently correct all his life. I certainly am not such a person. I too have made mistakes and still have shortcomings. If I make a mistake, comrades can bombard me and write posters about me. Some institutes say "fry" me, "execute" me. When I have spare times I go there to see they "fry" me (laughter).... Chiang Ching then goes on to discuss double dealers, plotters and points out that with respect to them there is usually a "process of recognition". (Translator's note: That is, they are only gradually recognised and discovered as such), particularly we who work at the side of Chairman Mao cannot arbitrarily suspect a person, It needs very close investigation.....

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Before we can discover the nature of a bad thing we have to examine it in all sorts of circumstances. This was true also in cases of such renegades, counter revolutionaries and double faced careerists who wormed their way into the party as Lio Tang Tao, Peng Te Huai, Ho Lung, Peng, Lu Lo and Yang (Ye Chun: Down with Hsiao Hua) (Hsieh: Down with Wang, Kuan and Chi). If there had not been a GPCR, they could never have been exposed. This is a great merit achieved by revolutionary young fighters.....

(On "February adverse current")....

Last February, with the black general renegade Tan Chen Lin as representative, it emerged to reverse the verdict on Lio Tang Tao. Since this struggle took place in a very small circle the broad masses did not know. Therefore they with ulterior motives exploit this to mislead revolutionary young fighters, revolutionary masses, reversing black and white and saying: "Whoever opposes Yu Chin Li xx, xx, is opposing the Premier and opposing Chairman Mao". In fact Yu Chiu Li is (was?) a confidante of Ho Lung. Chairman Mao says that you must (i) criticise and(II) protect. We are still acting accordingly. But revolutionary fighters should not allow themselves to be cheated by him. This spearhead of the "February adverse current" was primarily directed against the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao and Lin, PLA, the newly born revolutionary committees. It opposed the GPCR and refused to accept the achievements of GPCR, that is, refused to accept the achievements of revolutionary masses and revolutionary young fighters. Under the leadership of Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin, we crushed them and thoroughly exposed them.

From last May there emerged left deviationist adventurism (alternatively called "extreme left" or in form "left" and in reality right). Their top figures were Wang, Kuan and Chi. They were the claws of Lio and Teng, the nails planted by Lio and Teng in our revolutionary ranks.

Yo Chun: Down with the black claws of Lio and Teng - Wang, Kuan and Chi. They wave to oppose red flags, to oppose red flags and went about practising deception. They did not ask for instructions, did not report to us, blockaded us (that is, kept information away from us) and maliciously sought to bring evil up on us. Because they had black claws therefore we dealt with them. We would not permit them to disturb Chairman Mao's great strategic plan. But some people exploit this sort of affair to negate the victories of the GPCR, to negate revolutionary masses and the merits of revolutionary young fighters.

(Ye Chun:Defend to death C.R.group. Guard against the plotting activities of February adverse current. Down with Tan Chen Lin! Since they waved the red flag to oppose the red flag they were able to fool certain number of masses. Because of this we adopted a very cautious policy towards them,the policy of division. Wang and Kuan could not be separated. Chi Pen Yu's mode of operation was not identical and therefore we separated him for a period of time. But to separate him did not mean that there were no problems in relation to him. In the event in the latter half of last year he became even more frenzied and many improper things took place.. We, internally, carried out a series of principled struggles with him. My last November speech at the art and cultu e forum, was in fact meant to be a criticism of Chi without mentioning him by name. He colluded with Yang Ch/eng Wu, their collusions started very early. We did not know about it. Chi also colluded with Yu Li Chin and Fu Chung Fi. They incited the mass·s and said that bad people had emerged in the cultural revolution group. They did this in order to negate the cultural revolution group. Furthermore all these bad eggs were dealt with by the cultural revolution group itself. (Chen Po Ta: By C iang Ching. The Premier and other leaders agreed with Chen Po Ta) I feel that all the merit should not be attributed to any person. It should go to our great leader Chairman Mao, to revolutionary masses, to PLA.

Yang Cheng Wu wrote an article entitled"Establish in a thorough going way the absolute authority of Chairman Mao and of his great thought". I oppose this article on two occasions in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. But he would not listen and insisted on publishing it. In fact what he wan to establish was his own absolute authority. He was a double faced plotter who set up a very small mountain/strong hold of hi own instead of the big strong hold of China... On 8th March he supported Fu Chung Fi in organising a wanton armed intrusion on two vehicles into the premises of the cultural revolution group without the permission of the cultural revolution group! We firmly oppose this and seriously criticised him. From that day on, Yang suddenly said that he was ill. In fact, behind our backs, he daily held meetings, daily hatched plots. He wanted to capture power in the air force. Yu Li Chin wanted to use him to seize comrade Wu Fa Hsien's power....

The Peking University has two militant organisations. They wrote a letter to Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin and us. At that time we were holding a meeting. I did not receive it. I entrusted comrade Hsieh to go and get this letter. But....

something strange happened. Fu Chung Fi sent a man called xxx to the Peking University to get "to the bottom of it" collecting name lists, looking for behind the scene bosses etc. This was improper. In this way they seized the right of the revolutionary masses to transmit material to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao and cultural revolution group. That evening or next, comrade Mieh rang us urgitatedly to inform us of the crisis. We were already very tired, but we still went and sat here. She reported on the situation to Chou Fo Ta and me. I explained to her what I wanted. But that we did not know what had happened below. At the same time we frankly ~~heard~~ the facts and that Kung, Kuan and Chi ~~~~ black claws and did not deserve such a fuss. ~~Neither~~ she acted in this way ~~with~~ that not impede the general direction/but she still carried out one battle(?) Mieh has shortcomings and has made mistakes. You should criticise her but also protect her.

To rever the verdict all on the February adverse current is evil. Tan Chen Lin is a renegade. I protected him in the past but now I say "Down with Tan Chen Lin ! He is a black general of Mao and Tang. Now to have ~~have~~ proof that he is a renegade".

In the history of our party, in the struggle between 2 lines, there has always been left deviationist adventurism as well as right conservatism. Today it is right conservatism and right ~~~~ which has acquired prominence among the revolutionaries. We must crush it. All the bad people I have discussed above had a common objective - to bring about capitalist restoration. Concretely they sought in vain to wreck the proletarian/headquarters headed by Chairman Mao, and Vice Chairman Lin. (Chiang Ching then goes on to pay fulsome tributes to the PLA and at that stage Mr Pa Mafon led the audience in slogans pledging loyalty to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Cultural Revolution Group etc.)

Chiang Ching then went on to make the standard remarks about the necessity of distinguishing between friends and enemies and about the necessity of raising one's vigilance. She concluded with a series of slogans which included the following in that order:

Long Live the Red Guards !
Long Live the PLA !

Speech of Yao Wen-yuan: I fully support the decisions of Party Centre announced by the Premier which are based on the brilliant instructions of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao, that is the dismissal of Yang Cheng Wu and Fu Chung Fi and the dealing according to law(?)
with Ni Li Chin.

Echoing Chiang Ching's view that with respect to double dealers there is a process of recognition, Kang Sheng goes on to say: "We did not previously see the true nature of Yang, Yu and Fu.... But in the course of the cultural revolution many facts emerged to prove that Yang Cheng Wu was a double dealer. As Vice Chairman Lin has pointed out, his opposition to Lo Jui Ching was false and in reality he was a Lo's man. His opposition to Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang was false. In reality he was a confidante of Peng Chen. His opposition to Ho Lung was false. In reality as far back as Yenan times, he was a bosom friend of Ho Lung. Now he wants to seize the power of the PLA and the air force. He pretended to oppose Wang, Kuan and Chi but in fact was their behind the scene boss. He was collecting black material on Chiang Ching along with Chi Pen Yu. He ordered Fu Chung Fi to break into the premises of cultural revolution group. In collusion with Yu Li Chin, he sought to over throw Wu Fa Hsien and grab power in the air force. In collaboration with Fu Chung Fi he sought to over throw Yi Fenlei Hsieh and grab power in Peking Revolutionary Committee. He sought to capture the Radio Station, the Liberation Army Daily and the People's Daily and this is only what we have discovered upto now. I suspect that you comrades will later be able to expose even bigger problems.

No matter what tricks he used his ultimate objective was to reverse the mark verdicts on the Lin-Yang-bin, on Lin Yang and Tao, Peng Te Huai, Lo Jui Ching, Ho Lung, Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang and on the February adverse current of at Tan Chen Lin.

Kang Sheng then proceeds to elaborate further what Chiang Ching had said on the February adverse current. He says: They attacked the Head and Deputy Head of Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Po Ta and Chiang Ching. Particularly clear was their opposition to the Yenan rectification movement led by Chairman Mao... They slandered THT as being Sinbuphismand"metaphysical" and CPSU as "lacking party leadership". They pretended to protect old cadres and their relatives but in fact under that guise they protected those ghosts and monsters, the capitalist roaders... They fooled a few people, particularly the youth to serve their anti-party clique.... They wished to reverse the verdict even on that running dog of Soviet revisionism Wang Ming. However, there had been no Yenan rectification, then, there would have been no victory in the war of liberation.

THT tells us that the basic question of the revolution is the question of power. We must be on our guard against the "extreme left" and even more so against the extreme right, who wish to sieze the proletarian headquarters, the PLA

and the new revolutionary committees.

Referring to how some people used the attacks on Wang, Kuan and Chi to attack proletarian headquarters and the cultural revolution group, Kang Cheng went on to say: " What sort of a person was Yang Li? - a KMT man, and an activist carrying out the policy of "SAN HO YI SHAO" of Teng Hsiao Ping and Yang Chia Hsiang. In 1962, in Hopeh, he carried out the Liu-Teng line of "SAN HO YI SHAO", and was praised and awarded for this by Khrushchev. And what about Kuan Feng and Chi Pen Yu? They were confidantes of Peng Chen. Peng Chen used to invite Chi Pen Yu to dinner and Chi Pen Yu would in turn praise Peng Chen. This inside story we were not aware of before. It was exposed during the cultural revolution, particularly by Chiang Ching.

Praising the PLA, Kang Cheng claims: Pulling out of Yang Yu and Fu is a great triumph and merit of the PLA. Therefore we must guard against anybody exploiting this incident to turn the spearhead against the PLA.

Speaking about the revolutionary committees, Kang Cheng says that such bad people as Fu Chung Fi and Chou Ching Feng, must certainly be pulled out. But this must not be used to attack the new red regimes - the revolutionary committees.

Kang Cheng ends his speech by calling upon his audience to raise their vigilance and not to assume that all double dealers, plotters and conspirats have been over thrown.

"So long as class struggle exists, a handful of counter revolutionaries will exist".

Summed by Chou En Lai: We have had five major struggles in the course of the Cultural Revolution against the following:

(i) Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang
(ii) Lin, Tung and Yao
(iii) February adverse current headed by Tan Chen Lin and co.
(iv) Wang, Kuan and Chi, and now against
(v) Yang, Yu and Fu at a time when Cultural Revolution is moving towards all round victory

Chou Enlai: He expressed his support for the above decision and speeches. He denounced mountain strong-holdism and sectarianism and pointed out that such tendencies were harmful to the party, PLA etc. His remarks appear to have been directed to the PLA members of the his audience. He pointed out that Yang Cheng Wu had taken the same road as Yang Yo Huai and Lo Jui Ching and he had to fall in the same way. He expressed the belief that only a small

minority in the PLA were with Yang, Yu and Fu and called upon then to wake up and draw a clear line of demarcation between themselves and this clique. He emphasised the great role which PLA had played particularly in the course of GPCR. He went out of his way to praise the Peking Garrison Command who had looked after and protected 13 million Red Guards (Translator's note: probably reference to the great influx of 1966) and the GPCR ledby Chairman Mao. He expressed the hope that PLA would establish new merits in the future.

It was inevitable that a new born organisation like revolutionary committee will make some mistakes but these were not important and the revolutionary committees were a great creation. He repeated Chiang Ching's prediction that by the May Day there will be "basically revolutionary committees all over the country".

He joined Chiang Ching in criticising Yang Cheng Wu's article. He said that even then a soldier from Fukien had written a letter criticising the article, in which he had pointed out that Chairman's authority had already been established as a result of arduous struggle by millions of people. Chairman Mao has summed up the rich revolutionary experience and when it had been grasped it became the invincible TMTT. "We should be proud that a soldier dares to criticise the Chief of Staff".

Chou then discussed how revolution had been threatened at various times from the right and by the left. First it was the February adverse current of last year from the right headed by Tan Chen Lin. In summer the danger came from the other side-"extreme left! This year there was a re-emergence of danger from right opportunism and Yang Cheng Wu exemplified this. Chou En-lai also included a brief critical reference to Hsiao Hua.

He paid a fulsome tribute to Chiang Ching's contribution to revolution. She has been an outstanding student of Chairman Mao right from the days of anti-Japanese war. In the face of great danger she carried out underground activities and wrote articles. Recently the 8 models she had established had laid the revolutionary guide lines for transformation in the field of art and culture along Chairman Mao's line. Her February proposals when compared with Peng Chen February proposals show that her's were the red and his the black proposals. He informed the audience that the important editorial which appeared

SECRET

Liberation Army Daily in April 1966 was the work of Chiang Ching at the behest of Lin Piao. He warned the people against collecting black material on Chiang Ching. This comes from Taiwan and Hong Kong. All those who collected this material in China will also be treated as counter revolutionaries. He credited Cultural Revolution Group with having exposed Wang, Kuan and Chi.

He also made the usual remarks about international situation and the difficulties facing the capitalists and revisionists. He went on to say: The enemies surrounding us including U.S. imperialist, Soviet revisionist, reactionaries etc. also may organise a large scale world war against us. Therefore we must be united and prepared for it.

Grasp revolution and promote production. You workers and peasants have a very heavy task. You have to carry out production. You should unite on the basis of TNTT. You should not absent yourself from work and abandon production posts, or indulge in counter revolutionary activities or economism.

"Support the army and love the people". Refers to Chiang Ching's speech of 5th September.

He ended his speech by reiterating the tasks which lie ahead in the same terms as the Joint New Year Day Editorial of People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily, including the necessity for rectifying the party, Youth League and revolutionary rebel organisations.

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CONFIDENTIAL

(PEK/7)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
11 JUN 1968
FC1/5

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

4 June, 1968.

Dear John,

China has found a new hero. Joining the pantheon of Chang Szu-teh, Lei Feng and the rest we now have Men Ho, who was formerly the Deputy Political Instructor of the Second Battalion of the Fourth Regiment of a unit in Tsinghai Military District. On 28 May the People's Daily announced that Mao and Lin had personally approved a decision by the Central Committee of the CCP, the Military Affairs Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group to confer on Men Ho the title of "good cadre, boundlessly loyal to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line".

2. In keeping with the Chinese tradition that the best (safest ?) heroes are dead ones, the award was posthumous. Men blew himself up when working on the Pa Ts'ang state farm in Tsinghai. He was killed by a locally-made rocket which was intended to be used to disperse clouds and prevent hail storms (which would seem to be a relatively advanced agricultural technique for Tsinghai). Although the announcement of the award said it had been made "recently", in fact the incident occurred on 5 September 1967 which, fortuitously enough, was the 23rd anniversary of the day that Chang Szu-teh himself "laid down his life for the people". It appears that the leadership needed some time for reflection before deciding to canonize Comrade Men. Posters describing Men's exploits had already appeared in Peking by 22 May and since the first announcement in the People's Daily a massive press campaign has been in progress throughout the country. The PLA, in particular, have launched an emulation campaign and have composed songs, plays and articles lauding the achievements of their late colleague. A book on the life of Men Ho was published on 2 June.

3. Some Peking observers believe that there is nothing of special significance behind this campaign. They point out that it has provided copious material with which newspaper editors are able to fill their columns at a time when there is little of interest to report. The rate of progress in creating the last batch of revolutionary committees is painfully slow and it is fairly clear that, even in the Chinese press, the theme of the "revolutionary great criticism" cannot be maintained all the time. Some cynics also claim that Men Ho has been produced at this time simply as part of the normal process of replenishment of the stock of revolutionary heroes. However, the scale of the treatment accorded to Men Ho suggests that the reasons for the campaign go somewhat deeper than this.

../4. The most

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Far Eastern Department.

4. The most outstanding characteristic of Men was his alleged devotion to Mao. He is presented as a model of a new generation of communists who has brought this devotion to a new peak. The country is now asked to follow Men Ho's pledge of the "Four Everythings" (ssu-ko yi ch'ieh) - "Think of Chairman Mao at all times, obey him under all circumstances, closely follow him at all events and do everything for him". An interesting article on page 4 of the People's Daily of 31 May was prepared to concede that throughout Chinese history in the past there had been other heroes who were prepared to risk death or to suffer but emphasises that it is only Men Ho who did so for selfless love of Mao.

5. We are asked to believe that Men Ho showed his courage not only in battle (he had "seen action in the war years") or when handling grenades or faulty rockets, but in all aspects of his life. Men joined the Party in 1947 and the PLA in 1948. Inevitably, throughout his service he followed Mao and resisted the bourgeois military line of P'eng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing. It is reported, for example, (NCNA 053104 of 1 June) that in 1957 he denounced the "foreign sterectypes" which undermined the traditions of the PLA and that when training his squad he did not first teach them military affairs or skills but made them read Mao's "Serve the People". Men also took an active interest in political and cultural affairs. It is alleged that in 1961 he was shocked to hear of the revisionist scheme of "China's Khruschev" to carry out the 'san tzu yi pao' (the increase of private plots, free markets and small enterprises and the fixing of output quotas on the basis of households) in the agricultural sector and, recognising that "the army did not live in isolation", encouraged the men under his command to write letters to their families urging them to oppose such revisionist heresy. He also criticised plays on "feudal and capitalist themes" and organised his men in singing, acting and writing plays with appropriate revolutionary themes. It is recorded (NCNA 053104) that when one soldier suggested that he should concentrate on military skills rather than on singing and acting Men Ho reminded him of Chiang Ch'ing's exhortation - "Never look down upon literature and art! We should hold not only guns but pens too".

6. Men Ho's conduct in the Cultural Revolution had, of course, been exemplary. He responded positively to Chairman Mao's call to "Support the broad masses of the left". Having studied the situation in Tsinghai he came to realise that the 18 August Group was made up of proletarian revolutionaries and hence supported them unswervingly against the handful of capitalist-roaders in the province.

7. On the evidence of the material which has appeared so far, the main message of the Men Ho campaign seems to be directed at Chinese cadres, both military and civilian. The military must always be ready to concern themselves with civil affairs

../and to

and to give active support to the "broad masses of the left". Civilian cadres must courageously stand forward and play their part in the revolution. All must be infinitely loyal to Mao. They must "unite with all the people who can be united" but carry out an uncompromising attack on the class enemy".

8. Many previous press articles have indicated that cadres continue to be reluctant to "stand forward" again after the buffeting they have received during the Cultural Revolution and there is, therefore, nothing particularly new about this aspect of the Men Ho campaign. Perhaps the most interesting implication is that it is still necessary to exhort the military to involve themselves in the Cultural Revolution and the support of the left. It is another indication that Lin Piao may well be having difficulty in getting the PLA to follow him in wholehearted subservience to the Maoist line.

9. What seems to be an interesting by-product of the Men Ho campaign has been the appearance in Peking during the last few days of more posters attacking Nieh Jung-chen. He is accused of having oppressed the 18 August Group in Tsinghai. We have no details of these accusations but it may be that there are organisations controlled by the Scientific and Technological Commission in the province which have resisted the revolutionary activities of the 18 August Group.

I am copying this letter to Frank Brewer in JRD, Colin Wilson in IRD, McKearney in PUSD, Fradd in DIS, Robin McLaren and Ashworth in Hong Kong, Roy Spendlove in Washington, Reg Hibbert in Singapore and Peter Hewitt in Canberra.

Yours ever,

Roy.

(R.W. Whitney)

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

HAUT COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA

May 24, 1968.

Mr. John Denson,
Far Eastern Department.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

DE LA PART DU
HAUT COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA

J. W. GRAHAM

Attached 13 copies pm + Enclosures pm (48)

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
12 JUN 1968
FE 1/5

(PEK/7)

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

4 June, 1968.

SCAD — Mr O'Keefe
WAD ...

Dear John,

para 4 p 17/6

There was a short article of some interest in the People's Daily of 31 May about KMT troops on the Yunnan border in South-West China.

2. According to the article, 47 officers and men of the KMT who had been wandering about outside the borders of Yunnan recently decided to stop selling out to US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, and to lay down their arms and return to the motherland. The group is said to have included one officer of battalion commander, company commander and platoon commander rank respectively. They surrendered one '60' type artillery piece, one light machine-gun, thirty-three small arms, and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The article says the local PLA held a mass rally on 23 May to welcome back the repentant and presented them individually with rewards (chiang chin). The ex-KMT men were reportedly very moved at the lenient treatment they received. The same article reports that since January this year another 16 KMT officers and men have given themselves up, bringing with them one light machine-gun, five small arms and 191 rounds of ammunition.

3. The survival of remnants of the old Nationalist Army in the South-West border regions of China is beginning to assume an almost legandary quality. The leniency which, according to this report, is being displayed toward such KMT troops contrasts oddly with the current drive within China against people with alleged KMT backgrounds. It seems a fair conclusion that the present factional disturbances in Yunnan (see my letter PEK/7 of 7 May), which also embroiled the PLA, have provided an opportunity for renewed border harassment by pockets of KMT soldiery, and that the official encouragement and rewarding of surrender is intended to reduce this nuisance. That these soldiers are described as operating "beyond the border" rather than, explicitly, "from Burma" (their traditional provenance) is an added indication that the Chinese are here concerned mainly with the internal implications of this problem. Naturally it could not be admitted that KMT soldiers had been running round for years on Chinese territory, but in the mountainous and difficult terrain of Yunnan it would be no surprise if this was also true.

? FE1/7 (13) OR FE1/25 (14)

I am copying this letter to Robin McLaren and Ashworth in Hong Kong, Roy Spendlove in Washington, Reg Hibbert in Singapore, Bray in Tamsui, Chancery at Rangoon, Frank Brewer in JRD, Kathleen Draycott in IRD, McKearney in PUSD and Fradd in DIS.

Yours ever
John

(P.J. Weston)

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

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(PEK/7)

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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 51
- 2 JUL 1968

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.

18 June, 1968.

My Dear John,

In this letter I pass on to you various snippets of information arising out of posters seen or reported in Peking this week.

2. According to an East European colleague, a poster reports that Mao was shown during May, by Yao Wen-yuan, an article describing the experience of the Hsin Hua printing factory in "purging the ranks". In a directive of 19 May, Mao is alleged to have commented that this factory's experience was very good and should be copied by other units, and he put Yao Wen-yuan in charge of seeing that this was done. The rumour has arisen as a result of this poster (though it is not endorsed by the East European in question) that this directive foreshadows a new purge of the cadres. However, we think this inherently unlikely, and such an interpretation is not supported by current treatment of the cadre question in the central press. It is more probable that "purging the ranks" refers simply to the currently much publicised process of eliminating the last of the "class enemies", whether real or imaginary.

3. As I have already mentioned in my letter about Chou En-lai PEK/7, also by this bag, there have been reports of posters defending Chou during the past few days. I have seen one of these myself, which read as follows: "It will be difficult for the bosses of the Peking Engineering Institute East is Red to escape their criminal responsibilities for disregarding the Peking Garrison Notice of 19 May and bombarding Premier Chou and Vice-Premier Hsieh". The details referred to in this poster are not known to us, but it should not necessarily be presumed that the attacks on Chou En-lai were explicit. It would of course be quite in line with poster lore that one organisation should blacken the reputation of another by representing their acts as an attack on the Premier. Nonetheless, Chou's name has not been raised in a controversial way on posters for some time, and it is not impossible that he should be a target for zealous radicals. In another poster we have seen, Chou En-lai is quoted as saying that the Politics and Law Commune (cheng fa kung she) of the Politics and Law Institute is "not reliable".

4. Poster attacks on Nieh Jung-chen (Chairman of the Scientific Commission) have been seen again during the past week. A typical slogan read "Pluck out the behind-the-scenes boss of Yang, Yu and Fu; bombard Nieh Jung-chen" (signed by the 916 Organisation of the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building). Other posters referred to one Chang Chen-huan (1728-7201-3883 or 1403) as the stooge of Nieh Jung-chen for the reversal of verdicts.

../5. There has

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Far Eastern Department.

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5. There has also been a new rash of posters proclaiming determination to "Defend Chiang Ch'ing to the death".

6. As for news from the provinces, a French colleague reported seeing a poster about Tibet which said that there had been bloody suppression of revolutionaries in Tibet by the PLA on 7 May, and that this constituted a repetition of what had happened in Tsinghai on 23 February. There are also reports that posters have once again attacked Wang En-mao, Saifudin and Wu Kuang from Sinkiang, but we have not seen them ourselves.

I am copying this letter to Robin McLaren and Ashworth in Hong Kong, Roy Spendlove in Washington, Reg Hibbert in Singapore, Frank Brewer in JRD, Kathleen Draycott in IRD, McKearney in PUSD and Commander Fradd in DIS.

Yours Ever
John.

(P.J. Weston)

Enclr (50)

Now shown to FCO for pp 3?>

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31
11 JUL 1968
FC1/5

(PEK/7)

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING

2 July, 1968.

My Dear John,

An Indian colleague has shown us some very interesting material about military conscription in China in 1968, with particular reference to Kwangtung province. The original text was an unsigned tabloid pamphlet which the Indians saw and translated fully in Hong Kong. My summary of this document is attached to this letter as an Annex: the summary is based on a written precis of the full English translation, supplied by the Indians, and my own notes made during a half-hour perusal of the full translation itself. The Indians clearly regard the substance of the document as authentic. There seems no reason to doubt this, although perhaps the exactness of certain figures to the last digit may be an editorial embellishment.

2. There are several points worth noting about this material. Firstly, although the document envisages a net increase of half a million conscripts for the Armed Forces in 1968, after allowing for replacement of demobilised soldiers, the two reasons given for this expansion are only partly convincing. The references to attacks by revisionists and imperialists seem little more than routine, and there is no attempt to develop the case for expecting an expansion of the war in Vietnam or renewed hostilities in Korea, or to explain why this involves such a big increase in immediate recruitment. Even allowing for an "active expansion" in Chinese military preparedness, the new conscription target is of an unusual magnitude. Moreover, although Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, in his speech of 4 April (see Ray Whitney's letter PEK/7 of 7 May), hinted that the PLA was over-extended on some of its internal commitments, one would have thought that in general the Army's involvement in running industry, agriculture and indeed government itself would become less arducus in 1968, now that almost all provinces have Revolutionary Committees, the cadres are recovering their confidence and basic order has been restored.

3. It therefore seems probable that another powerful reason for the increase in recruitment not mentioned in Huang Yung-sheng's report is the need to provide discipline and employment for the large numbers of young people who as Red Guards and "rebels" provided much of the impetus for the Cultural Revolution during the chaos phase of 1966-67. At a time when the Red Guard movement had already exhausted its usefulness to the Maoist cause and the general emphasis of press comment and propaganda was toward moderation, military conscription offered (as it still does) a simple solution for coping with the large numbers of

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Far Eastern Department.

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young
unmanageable/turks who have seemed unwilling to accept the approaching end of the present movement. In this connection it is interesting to note that half the conscripts for the Army and Navy this year, and more than 80% of Air Force recruits, are to be found from among students and "socialist youth"; and that the age limit has been extended by three years to produce a largereligible conscript population. Another factor is that the influx of so many new recruits will have the, presumably desirable, side effect of making it possible for more trained soldiers to be diverted from internal non-military duties back to the Army's proper military functions, as Ray Whitney pointed out in his letter PEK/7 of 19 February.

4. Secondly, there has been a noticeable reversal on the question of educational standards of recruits. Whereas, for example, from 1962 to 1967 60% of recruits for the Army needed at least a lower middle school qualification, only 35% of those taken into the Army in 1968 will need to have reached a similar standard. The same is true of the Navy. In the Air Force educational standards remain higher than the other two services, but not as high as they were previously. The reason for this lowering of standards is of course to make it possible to implement the pure Maoist line as exemplified in Lin Piao's rubric that "three dirty artisans are worth one bourgeois Chu Ko-liang". The Army must be made up of people with the right class background and "political appearance", in order to prevent a reassertion of the bourgeois military line. This inevitably will invelvea lowering of cultural standards if many otherwise acceptable recruits are not to be debarred from service.

5. It is worth noting incidentally that in commending the officers for their alleged opposition to P'eng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, the new Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng seems openly to condone insubordination within the military ranks - an admission which in his high casualty office he might have done better to avoid. Another point to which I would draw your attention is the order of the Military Affairs Committee that there is to be "no stupid peaceful reduction in arms" in Chinese policy toward the armed forces. The way that this is put suggests to me that there is a view held among Chinese leaders that military commitments should be cut down. Otherwise why do the Military Affairs Committee refute the proposition so forcefully?

6. As for the recruitment figures themselves, I shall not attempt to comment on them in detail, except to say that the national total of around 1,000,000 for conscription in 1968 is not wildly at variance with the figure we heard in February (Ray Whitney's letter of 19 February), and the 7.2% contribution from Kwangtung seems about right in view of that province's population.

../I am

I am copying this letter, with enclosure, to Robin McLaren and Ashworth in Hong Kong, Reg Hibbert in Singapore, Roy Spendlove in Washington, Frank Brewer in JRD, Kathleen Draycott in IRD, McKearney in PUSD and Fradd in DIS.

Yours
Even
John.
(P.J. Weston)

ANNEX

Summary of a Tabloid Paper on Military Conscription.

The document was headed "Some decisions concerning compulsory military service conscription work 1968, throughout the province"; and sub-titled "A report by Comrade Huang Yung-sheng" with regard to certain Military Affairs Committee directives, dated 10 November, 1967 and delivered at a "Military Service Conference of Revolutionary Leading Cadres in Kwangtung at the level of special area and above". Forty-eight persons attended the conference, including revolutionary cadres at provincial and municipal level, from Hainan administrative area, special areas and military leading organs. It was presided over by revolutionary leading cadres of the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group.

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(51)

Poor chaps. This
must be a blow
JMMa 1/8

SCR 1/2/4841/66

51
- 1 AUG 1968
FE 1/5

15th July, 1968.

(50)

In your letter FEM/7 of 2nd July, you commented on a tabloid pamphlet on military conscription shown to you by the Indian Embassy.

2. As you know we pass on copies of most of your reports of a China watching nature to the American Consulate General here and I asked Charlie Hill in the Consulate General whether this particular pamphlet had come to the notice of the Americans. I said that I had seen no reference to it in any of the Consulate General's translations. Hill told me that the Consulate General was offered this tabloid some time ago at a fairly high price. Before committing themselves they had carried out paper chemistry tests, compared type faces with those commonly used in China, and had carefully examined the style of the text. They had concluded that the document was a clever forgery and had told the seller that they were not interested. Hill said that in the event the magazine "Newsweek" bought the tabloid and a small piece based on it appeared in "Newsweek" a few issues back. The Indians seem to have acquired another copy of the same thing.

3. As you know there is a market here for almost any printed material emanating from the Mainland, and the production of forgeries is a thriving industry. The Americans by now have a good deal of experience in distinguishing genuine material from the local product and I would be inclined to accept their judgement.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to J.D.I. Boyd in the Far Eastern Department and to the other recipients of your letter.

(R.J.T. McLaren)
Assistant Political Adviser.

P.J. Weston, Esq.,
Peking.

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq., ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy Sent to Lt. Col. Pierce 2/8. (M.O.D.)

(52)

EN CLAIR

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 704 2 AUGUST 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 - 2 AUG 1968

FE1/5

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.704 OF 2 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG, WASHINGTON, POLAD SINGAPORE AND SAVING TO MOSCOW.

PEOPLE'S DAILY OF 1 AUGUST CARRIES A JOINT PEOPLE'S DAILY/ RED FLAG/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY EDITORIAL TO CELEBRATE THE 41 ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE PLA ENTITLED QUOTE FIRM PILLAR OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT UNQUOTE. MAIN POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

2. THE HELP GIVEN BY THE PLA TO PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARIES TO SEIZE POWER FROM THE CAPITALIST-ROADERS AND THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF PLA REPRESENTATIVES IN REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES ARE QUOTE GREAT STRATEGIC MEASURES FOR STRENGTH-ENING THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AN IMPORTANT DEVELOP-MENT IN MAO'S PROLETARIAN THINKING ON ARMY BUILDING UNQUOTE. THE ARMY RESOLUTELY HELPS THE BROAD MASSES OF THE LEFT AND CLOSELY FOLLOWS CHAIRMAN MAO' GREAT STRATEGIC PLAN AND APPLIES HIS LATEST INSTRUCTIONS. QUOTE IT TRUSTS THE MASSES, RELIES ON THEM AND RESPECTS THEIR INITIATIVE . IT HAS ALWAYS POINTED THE SPEARHEAD OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE HANDFUL OF CAPITALIST ROADERS IN THE PARTY REPRESENTED BY CHINA, KHRUSCHEV. IT NEVER HESITATES TO PROTECT THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE OTHER REVOLUTIONARY MASSES EVEN AT THE COST OF LIFE AND BLOOD UNQUOTE.

3. CONSOLIDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IS QUOTE AN ISSUE OF KEY IMPORTANCE IN WINNING ALL-ROUND VICTORY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THIS IS THE COMMON DUTY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AND A MAJOR POLITICAL TASK FACING THE PLA. THE PLA MUST TAKE THE ROAD OF SUPPORT-ING THE GOVERNMENT AND POWERFULLY AND FIRMLY BACK UP

/REVOLUTIONARY

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AT ALL LEVELS. IT MUST TRUST, RESPECT, SUPPORT, HELP AND DEFEND THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES BY EXEMPLARY DEEDS. IT MUST ALSO GUIDE THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES TO PROTECT AND STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN PROLETARIAN ORGAN OF POWER UNQUOTE.

4. ENEMIES OF THE PROLETARIAT ARE ALWAYS TRYING, FROM THE RIGHT OR FROM THE EXTREME QUOTE LEFT UNQUOTE, TO SABOTAGE THE NEW-BORN REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE, TO UNDERMINE UNITY BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND THE PLA, UNITY BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES AND THE UNITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE ITSELF. THE PLA MUST JOIN THE MASSES IN EXPOSING AND FRUSTRATING SUCH CONSPIRACIES AND SCHEMES.

5. QUOTE. THE MASSES ARE THE SOURCE OF THE STRENGTH OF REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL POWER AND THE PLA SHOULD AT ALL TIMES MAINTAIN FLESH AND BLOOD TIES WITH THE MASSES UNQUOTE. THEY SHOULD BEHAVE CORRECTLY TOWARDS THE MASSES, CARRYOUT PATIENT POLITICAL WORK QUOTE AMONG THE MASS ORGANISATIONS WHICH HAVE COMMITTED ERRORS, EVEN SERIOUS ERRORS, UNQUOTE. THEY MUST PROTECT THE MASSES AND PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO UNITING WITH THOSE WHOSE VIEWS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THEIR OWN.

6. QUOTE COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS WHO ARE FIGHTING AT THE FOREFRONT IN HELPING THE LEFT, HELPING INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE, EXERCISING MILITARY CONTROL AND GIVING POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRAINING AND ARMY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES SHOULD DO STILL BETTER IN THEIR LIVING STUDY AND APPLICATION OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S WORKS AND BECOME GOOD EXAMPLES OF REVOLUTIONISATION AND MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE MASSES. THEY MUST BE MODEST AND PRUDENT, GUARD AGAINST ARROGANCE AND RASHNESS SO AS TO BE

/WELL

WELL BALANCED AND NOT RELAX THEIR FIGHTING WILL OR LOSE THEIR POLITICAL BEARINGS WHEN FACED WITH VICTORIES OR HIGH PRAISE UNQUOTE. THEY MUST CONTINUE TO LEARN FROM THE WORKING CLASS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES, MUST QUOTE RESPECT COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, OBSERVE THE SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM UNQUOTE AND CARRY OUT MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE.

7. THE PLA SHOULD STRENGTHEN PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR AND EXERCISE FULL VIGILANCE AGAINST SABOTAGE AND SUB-VERSION AND AGRESSION CARRIED OUT BY CLASS ENEMIES ABROAD AGAINST OUR PROLETARIAN STATE POWER.

a. THE PLA MUST BETTER PUT INTO EFFECT CHAIRMAN MAO'S PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN ALL ASPECTS OF ARMY BUILDING. THEY SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE REVOLUTIONARY SENSE OF ORGANISATION AND DISCIPLINE AND TIGHTEN UNITY AND UNIFICATION INSIDE THE ARMY. THEY SHOULDCONTINUE TO BUILD THE ARMY SO AS TO MAKE IT BOUNDLESSLY LOYAL TO MAO, HIS THOUGHT AND HIS PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARY LINE. FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW.

SIR D. HOPSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Copy To LE Cos Plans Dir. IRD PUSD (53)

(PEK/7)

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
Peking

PEKING.

23 July, 1968.

My Dear John,

You may care to know that, according to the Polish Assistant Military Attaché here, new units of the PLA were moved into Canton on 12 July. Our source said that they came from the 55th Army and he thought they might previously have been stationed in Szechuan. Apparently they were adopting far more forceful means of dealing with the disturbances in Canton than those employed by their predecessors (from the 47th Army).

2. We are not ourselves able to confirm this report by any independent information. However, it is worth passing on to you, particularly since the Poles maintain a Consulate in Canton.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ashworth and McLaren in Hong Kong.

Yours ever
John

(P. J. WESTON)

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J. D. I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

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EN CLAIR

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 706 2 August, 1968

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ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 706 OF 2 AUGUST, RFI TO HONG KONG WASHINGTON POLAD SPORE SAIGON PARIS HANOI MOSCOW AND NEW DELHI.

HUANG YUNG-SHENG (PLA CHIEF - OF - STAFF) MADE THE MAIN SPEECH AT A RECEPTION FOR ARMY DAY ON 1 AUGUST.

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS.

(A) OVER THE PAST 41 YEARS THE PLA HAVE QUOTE DEFEATED DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLASS ENEMIES, PERFORMED IMMORTAL MERITORIOUS DEEDS IN SEIZING POLITICAL POWER, ESTABLISHING THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND DEFENDING AND BUILDING OUR GREAT SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND AND MADE GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE STRUGGLES AGAINST US. IMPERIALISM, SOVIET REVISIONISM AND THE INDIAN REACTIONARIES UNQUOTE . AT THIS POINT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS (LESS THE JUGOSLAVS AND RUMANIANS) AND INDIAN MILITARY ATTACHE WALKED OUT.

(B) QUOTE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISES OF IMPERIALISM, HEADED BY THE US, RAPIDLY DEEPENING AND MODERN REVISIONISM WITH THE SOVIET REVISIONIST RENEGADE CLIQUE AS ITS CENTRE IS DISINTEGRATING WITH EACH PASSING DAY UNQUOTE.

(C) QUOTE FINDING IT HARDER AND HARDER TO GET ALONG, US IMPERIALISM AND SOVIET REVISIONISM ARE STEPPING UP THEIR COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY COLLUSION ON A WORLD - WIDE SCALE.

THEY HAVE CONCOCTED THE SO-CALLED ''TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS'' IN A VAIN ATTEMPT TO PRESS FORWARD WITH THE LONG DISCREDITED POLICY OF NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL UNQUOTE.

/(D) QUOTE

(D) QUOTE ON THE QUESTION OF VIETNAM, WITH SUPPORT FROM SOVIET REVISIONISM, US IMPERIALISM IS PEDDLING ENERGETICALLY THE PEACE TALK SWINDLE, VAINLY TRYING TO GAIN ON THE CONFERENCE TABLE WHAT THEY CANNOT GET ON THE BATTLEFIELD UNQUOTE. QUOTE ARMED WITH MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND THE CHINESE PLA FIRMLY SUPPORT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN FIGHTING TO THE END TILL COMPLETE AND FINAL VICTORY IN THEIR WAR AGAINST US AGGRESSION AND FOR NATIONAL SALVATION UNQUOTE. QUOTE AT PRESENT US IMPERIALISM, SOVIET REVISIONISM AND INDIAN AND OTHER REACTIONARIES ARE INTENSIFYING THEIR EFFORTS TO FORM A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND TO CREATE BORDER TENSION BY FREQUENTLY ENCROACHING UPON OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS AND AIR SPACE UNQUOTE. QUOTE WE WARN US. IMPERIALISM AND ITS ACCOMPLICES IN ALL SERIOUSNESS: SHOULD YOU DARE TO IMPOSE A WAR UPON THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND THE CHINESE PLA TEMPERED THROUGH THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION WILL SURELY BREAK YOUR BACKBONES UNQUOTE.

-SIR D. HOPSON

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FM HONG KONG TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 707 3 AUGUST, 1968

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ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 707 OF 3/8 RFI TO HONG KONG POLAD SINGAPORE WASHINGTON.

PEOPLE'S DAILY AND NCNA OF 2 AUGUST REPORT A DEFENCE MINISTRY RECEPTION ON 1 AUGUST TO CELEBRATE THE 41 ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE PLA. AMONG THOSE LISTED AS PRESENT WERE:

2. HUANG YUNG-SHENG, WU FA-HSIEN, CH'EN YI, LI HSIEN-NIEN, LIU KO-PING, HAN HSIEN-CH'U, WEI KUO-CH'ING , CHANG KUO-HUA, TSENG SSU-YU, SAIFUDIN, WANG EN-MAO, CH'IEN HSUEH-SEN, WANG PING-CHANG, KUO MO-JO AND TSENG SHAN.

SIR D. HOPSON

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The Foreign Office
Far Eastern Department
(Attn: J. Boyd Esq)

CHINA: SUMMARY OF A TABLOID ON MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

50 (Ref: PEK/7 of 2 Jul 68)

DI 2 were grateful to receive the above document together with the assessment of the Chargé's Office in Peking and offer the following comments, as attached at Annex A.

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FAR EAST NEWS No. 31
- 1 AUG 1968
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W D B Raikes
Col GS
Area Officer
DI 2
Ext MB 7840
16th Jul 68

Mr Boyd (acting) phoned 1/8. He was most appreciative that this doc. was fake. In any case the comments are hardly unmistakable if Peking

SECRET

Annexes 'A' & 'B' attached FC 1/5

CHINA: SUMMARY OF A TABLOID ON MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

(REF: PEK/7 of 2 JUL 68)

1. The net increase of half a million men in the Armed Forces for 1968 commands credence, but rather within the context of political expediency (as suggested in para 3; also in para 26 of Flag 'A') than that of the strategic eventuality alleged in the basic document to be the main reason for the expansion. The calls for 'war preparedness' appear, moreover, to be less than in 1964/5.

2. A TAIWAN analysis of recruitment for this year (Flag 'B'), perhaps surprisingly, does not, however, suggest a net increase in personnel strength for the Armed Forces.

3. The Chargé's forecast (in para 2) that in general the Army's involvement in the civil sphere in 1968 would become less arduous is not easy to reconcile with the well publicised requirement for the formation of Three-in-One Alliances in depth, nor with the statement in the basic document that the expansion was secondarily to enable the PLA to take the full burden of its 'three supports and two military duties' responsibilities. The speech by a Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee on 4th April (Chang - PEK/7 of 7 May referred to in para 2) pointed to widespread demand, in Shanghai, for PLA representatives to take part in Alliances; and made clear that the requirement was not being met; but emphasized that to weaken the strategic dispositions of the Forces, to this end, would be very dangerous.

4. There has so far only been fragmentary evidence of the Army handing over civil commitments to their proper authority. We would suggest, furthermore, that this process could cover a considerable period, during which the Armed Forces would seem likely to have to remain continuously available and ready to take on these commitments anew. This unsatisfactory situation must at least continue until the Party's authority has been restored - including that of Public Security Bureaux and the Police - and a Party Congress held, but this event may not take place until next year, although forecast for this, in view of the slow progress made.

5. The case for an expansion in the personnel strength of the Armed Forces would thus seem compelling; but if a large influx of recruits were to take place, some dilution of overall personnel quality must be inevitable: in view

/of the ....

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of the premiums on training time which the still very great civil commitments must set, quite apart from the admitted lowering of educational standards. The continuing emphasis on People's Warfare (as opposed to 'open warfare') and on political qualities (which People's Warfare entails), suggest that this dilution of standard is acceptable to the leadership.

Conclusions

6. The case for an expansion in the personnel strength of the PLA is strong, both within the context of political expediency (in order to absorb troublesome Red Guards) and by virtue of the large, and by no means fulfilled, PLA commitment to take part in Three-in-One Alliances.

7. An, as yet, unsubstantiated figure of half a million has been reported as the net increase for 1968. A large expansion,of this magnitude, must entail a dilution of overall personnel quality, but the continuing emphasis on People's type warfare, which would not require such high standards of technical training as open warfare, suggests that this dilution is acceptable.

SECRET

Annex A

CHINA: SOME PERSONNEL ISSUES AFFECTING THE PLA DURING THE 60'S

Introduction

1. In September 1959, P'eng Te Huai (the Minister of Defence) and Huang Ke Ch'eng (the Chief of Staff) were removed from office and replaced by Lin Piao and Lo Jui Ch'ing: apparently on the grounds of P'eng's criticism of the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes at the July meeting of the Central Committee (CCP) in Lushan (Kiangsi); and of his heading the so-called Anti-Party Group, which stood accused of trying to do away with the Party's absolute leadership over the Army; to abolish Army political work and civil construction duties; and to disband the Militia.

2. The cumulative effects of the Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, and the stark reality of the abrogation by the Soviet Union, in June 1959, of the 1957'Agreement for New Technology in National Defence' cast a shadow over the prospects of modernization and advancement in all fields that was to be hardened by China's increasing isolation from the comity of nations, owing to the intransigence of Maoist policies. The outlook for the future evidently led to the conviction, in the leading hierarchy, that spiritual values must be called upon to offset as far as possible the debilitating effects upon morale of the material shortcomings.

The reassertion of the primacy of ideology

3. In October 1960, at a time when military morale had been adversely affected by the agricultural crisis; and when the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, in July 1960, had added to the shortage of technical staff, Lin Piao sought to balance matters by calling for a breakthrough in ideological work, on the basis of the 'Four-Firsts'. These had been formulated at the second Lushan meeting, in August 1959, when the 'bourgeois' military policies of P'eng Te Huai were criticized and the primacy of ideology reaffirmed.

4. The new political drive was endorsed by a resolution of the Military Affairs Committee on 'The Strengthening of Political and Ideological Work in the PLA', and was lent ultimate authority by reference to Mao's Kutien Speech + of 1929 (Fukien), in which the first extended treatment of the question of political control in the Army was provided.(+ The Kutien Speech concentrated

/upon the creative ....

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upon the creative use of political work in improving Army solidarity and discipline; the establishment of good relations with the people; and the erroneousness of conceptions such as the purely military viewpoint.

In the latter part of 1960 and throughout 1961, a number of 'discipline enforcement campaigns' were launched as well, such as those of the 'Four-Good Company' and the 'Five-Good Soldier', all of which had primarily a political content designed to enhance fighting morale and political attitude. The theoretical aspect of these campaigns was supplemented in practice by the attachment of high-ranking officers and political cadres to Companies as living exponents of Mao's revolutionary will. As many as 51,000 were reported to have been detailed to implement the Four-Good Company campaign in this way.

The restoration of the Party at Company level

6. By 1960, a considerable deterioration in Party representation at Company level had arisen, partly because the prevailing policy of modernization during the period of Soviet assistance after the Korean War had led to enhancement of the Battalion and the Regiment at the expense of the Company. This trend was now reversed and the Company made the firm base for the Army's political and indeed operational control. A statement by General Hsiao Hua (the Director of the PLA General Political Department), in 1963, that the Company is the basic fighting unit, illustrated a fact that must by then have become well established.

7. In the same month that the Soviets withdrew their technicians, a concerted effort was made to restore Party representation throughout the PLA. The work of readjusting Party Branch Headquarters began in July 1960 and was completed in February of 1961. During this period, 82 per cent of the total number of Party Branch Headquarters in the PLA were readjusted, the remaining 18 per cent being mostly those belonging to newly established units. The readjustment was carried out on the basis of the rectification movement of 1960. This movement exposed the existence of 143 (+) rotten and partially rotten units and 5,000 low grade Party Branch Headquarters ((+) Enlarged figure is 409). In order to retrieve the situation, 78,000 cadres from various levels of Party organs were sent into Company ranks to give assistance: many higher commanders directing the 'struggle' in person, on the basis of 'persuasive instruction', and through criticism and self-criticism.

8. An inspection carried out after the readjustment had been completed showed that of 20,000 Party Branch Headquarters in the PLA, only 5 per cent did not

come up to standard; whereupon a new readjustment of these was initiated, to the extent that "not a single one of them would be missed".

9. Before the readjustment, the majority of Sections had no Party members; most Platoons no Party Cells; and in the entire Army, about 7,000 Companies had not set up Party Branch Headquarter Committees, and some had them only in name. But by March 1961, more than half of all Sections had Party members, 80 per cent and more of Platoons had Party Cells and Companies which had no Party Branch Committee established such Committees and Branch Headquarters universally established Liaison Committees. 229,000 new Party members were elected and unreliable elements dismissed.

Further regulations governing political work in Companies

10. In July 1961, Regulations were announced concerning 'The Administration of Educational Work in the Companies of the Armed Forces'. These Regulations were followed, in November, by the publication of Ten Principles', concerning political education at Company level; and by further Regulations of a similar nature, in March 1963. The publication of the Ten Principles, so soon after the Regulations of July, may be said, in the light of other evidence, to have been spurred by the existence of many shortcomings in personnel relations. The 1963 Regulations, on the other hand, may have reflected the continuing struggle between the 'professional' and the 'ideological' schools of thought. It is noteworthy that in February 1963, Hsiao Hua (who was to come under severe censure during the Cultural Revolution) appeared to emphasize the military role of the PLA, by his statement that: "the principal task of the Army is to fight battles". He also insisted upon the necessity of good military training, in view of the greater complexity of arms and equipment compared with the Army's early days. The charge of organizing competitions in military skills instead of promoting politics, is one that has been brought against Lo Jui Ch'ing, the Chief of Staff dismissed in 1965.

Personnel problems of a structural nature

11. There were also personnel problems of a purely structural nature, due primarily to the policy of modernization, but which were aggravated by the withdrawal of Soviet aid, such as: the excessive turn-over and numerous changes of duty among officers, especially among basic level officers in divisions and in regiments; the large transfers of qualified personnel as

Instructors to military schools, owing to the increase in the number of students; the large number of promotions for organizational purposes, which deprived lower echelons of trained personnel; and shortages of technical staff.

The 1961 Provisional Regulations for Extended Service

12. In July 1961, Provisional Regulations governing the extended service of personnel on active duty were enacted, in order to meet the needs of modernization; to ensure that technical and other essential personnel were retained; and to increase overall operational value. The authority for the Regulations was based on the original 1955 Military Service Law, which stipulated that NCO's who had completed their terms of active duty could serve on extensions in accordance with troop requirements and out of personal willingness. The new Regulations evidently brought all conscripted personnel within the scope of the extensions; and rationalized a situation which had already existed for several years, apparently in rather arbitrary fashion.

13. Personnel envisaged for extended service under the new Regulations were mainly: those with technical skills requiring a long training; Section Leaders of all arms; members of first line Border Defence units of both the Army and the Navy; air defence troops; cavalry troops; members of the Central Garrison Division (Peking), and other units of similar nature; also members of units guarding secret factories. The proportion of total strength to be retained in each of the three Services was given as Army 23% to 25%; Air Force 20% to 25%; Navy 20% to 25%. Personnel serving on extensions were entitled to wear insignia specifying service of one to three years; four to seven years; and over eight years.

The 1961 bi-annual pattern of conscription

14. A bi-annual pattern of conscription was also introduced from the summer of 1961. The sources of conscription were almost exclusively those from urban areas and middle schools. These factors suggest an attempt to achieve greater flexibility in meeting regional and national requirements, and to secure recruits of a higher educational standard, though this was not to be at the expense of ideological reliability and physical fitness, for both of which particularly high standards appear to have been set in that year.

/The "Learn from the PLA" movement of 1963

The "Learn from the PLA" movement of 1963

15. The continuation of adverse agricultural conditions through 1961 brought some relaxation of political controls in the civil sphere, but the improvement in agriculture in 1962 led to a harsher political climate and to the beginnings of the 'Socialist Education' campaign, which formed the basis of the present Cultural Revolution.

16. In 1963, a nationwide 'Learn from the PLA' campaign was launched as an instrument of Mao's policy for the progressive regimentation and moulding of the nation according to his precepts. The campaign entailed some deviation of effort for the PLA from strictly professional duties, but was nevertheless consistent with the idea of merging civil and the military identities into a single operational whole. The intention was to establish a complete network of political controls in the economy of the nation, similar to the system of political commissars in the PLA and staffed by demobilized PLA personnel. In May 1965, a Press report indicated that as many as 200,000 ex-PLA members were so employed. The campaign directly involved Military Region organizations in receiving political workers for instruction from Ministries; and in providing assistance in the running of political training courses. A number of serving officers were also given political and governmental posts concurrently with their military posts; and others were transferred to work in business and financial enterprises.

The Reactivation of the Militia

17. From the early summer of 1964, and especially after the Tonkin Gulf crisis of August, official nervousness at the possibility of foreign invasion - which was earlier portrayed by the movement of divisions to the Fukien Front in 1962 - became translated into a drive for war-preparedness, which was to take shape in: civil defence measures and urban evacuation plans; the reactivation of the Militia; and, in January 1965, in increased terms of service for the PLA.

18. A determined effort to re-exert discipline over the Militia (which had considerably decayed during the economic crisis) had been made in 1961; and although the military activities of the Militia were made subordinate to those of production, a sense of urgency was clearly detectable, in that year, with regard to the need to build-up the Militia as a strategic asset in national

defence planning. The time-scale for the accomplishment of this Militia task was given as three years, that is by the summer of 1964, when the need for a well-founded Militia fortuitously arose.

19. The sudden, nation-wide reactivation of Militia training from the summer of 1964 - and which was to continue into 1966, until the conduct of the Cultural Revolution made this impracticable - must have accentuated problems created by the 1961 Militia build-up (when 57,000 PLA cadre took part in the work of 'strengthening and improving' the Militia and rural Communes). The Military Region Staff commitment, for the control and implementation of Militia training, and of joint Army-Militia exercises, together with the concomitant requirement for increased transfers of trained Army personnel as Militia Instructors and 'back-bone' elements, must have imposed an appreciable strain upon Regular training time and personnel resources. A very large number of Regular personnel of junior officer and NCO rank from the 'Old Guard' who had reached the limit of their career capability are reported to have been transferred in this way.

20. These transfers could scarcely have been made-good in the short-term, by recruitment. It is for consideration therefore whether some sacrifices in the organizational strength and structure of those formations and units without an immediate strategic role could have been made, in order to meet these extraneous commitments. Moreover, the 8-year reorganization and re-equipment programme, which may have started in 1961, gave some sanction for change. The statement of General Hsiao Hua, in January 1964, that strenuous efforts were being made to streamline the organization of the PLA; and the earlier emergence of selected divisions and companies having 'special status', all pointed to continuing developments and fluidity in organizational matters.

The 1965 Conscription Statute

21. On 19th January 1965, a new Conscription Statute proclaimed a general increase of one year's service for the PLA: Army four years (specialists and Public Security Force five years); Air Force five years; Navy six years (fleet) and five years (shore-based). At the same time, Ministry of National Defence Regulations provided for extensions of service in categories of up to eight years or more; and laid down a requirement of 25 per cent veterans (that is about 600,000 men, which approximates to a 'normal' year's intake) as compared with total strength, thereby setting a seal upon the Provisional

Regulations of 1961. This 25% proportion of veterans was reported, in March 1965, to have been tried out for four years and now to be official policy.

22. A report on this new Statute and Regulations reiterated the need for specialist personnel, as the Provisional Regulations had done, and elaborated upon them from the aspect of morale and value-for-war, as follows:

a. There are a great number of new conscripts each year, but they are of relatively low educational and cultural level and are unable to grasp modern techniques within three or four years. Therefore, terms of service must be extended in order to raise quality.

b. If well-trained soldiers, particularly technical servicemen, were to leave the Services after their terms were up, the new conscripts would be unable to carry out their operational duties satisfactorily in case of war. Therefore, the military service period should be lengthened to ensure the maintenance of effective operational strength.

c. In the past few years, there has been some wavering of thoughts and fear of war among servicemen, and the present number of experienced men is not enough to control the wavering. Therefore, the Ministry of National Defence must keep 25% of veteran soldiers in military units by extending their service.

d. The Ministry of National Defence stipulates that, beginning this year (1965), there should be increased training of the "special-type" servicemen, so that they may be able to grasp modern techniques. The basic and 'back-bone' elements for training are: first-class Section leaders and old, experienced soldiers. Therefore, the continued service of these can be set at eight years or more, so that units will be kept permanently effective and capable of undertaking all operational duties.

The rationale of the 1965 Conscription Statute

23. The immediate effect of the overall additional year's service, proclaimed by the 1965 Statute, would have been to increase the personnel strength of the

PLA, through the retention of those called-up at the beginning of 1962 (Army), unless appropriate modification in the 1965 intake were to have been made and, at the same time, accompanied by a corresponding demobilization of personnel on perhaps the longer terms of extended service under the 1961 Provisional Regulations. The numbers conscripted at the beginning of 1962 may not in fact have been very large, partly because the intake had been spread bi-annually since 1961 and also because the Provisional Regulations would, ostensibly, have resulted in a smaller annual intake requirement.

24. A large increase in personnel strength at the beginning of 1965 might well have been regarded as detrimental to the PLA's best interests: given the increased training commitment for the Militia and the national pre-occupation with the fear of foreign invasion. The selective retention of personnel already trained must have seemed infinitely preferable, at that time, to an influx of recruits requiring training. There is also the testimony of Press statements, of November 1964, supporting a thesis of relative stability in PLA personnel strength. The source and means of expansion was clearly seen as the Militia, which was regarded as an inexhaustible fund of replenishment. Further, that the gigantic size of the Militia and the ready availability of its members - at least of those who are ex-regular - solved the so-called contradiction between the maintenance of a small Army in peacetime and the employment of a large Army in wartime. Statements of this nature interpreted in the light of the earlier, 1961, intent to improve the quality of the PLA's personnel holding, and of the limited material means available, all suggest that the purpose of the 1965 Statute was again to improve quality rather than to increase numbers. It could even be argued that the personnel strength was then, and is now, far too large, at least for open-type warfare. Conscription was stopped in 1966 and 1967, apparently for reasons connected with the Cultural Revolution, but was restarted at the beginning of 1968.

The early 1968 conscription pattern

25. It had been rumoured in some quarters that a larger number of recruits were to be inducted than in previous years and that some modification of standards for acceptance was countenanced. A Soviet propaganda broadcast stated that 500,000 Red Guards were to be called-up; and another unconfirmed source that the intention was to call-up 350,000 immediately, mostly middle

/school ....

students selected from all parts of China; and to call-up a further 350,000 during the summer (that is, a total of 700,000, which is about the 1955 figure). Moreover, information has been publicized that service in the Army is for two years and in the Navy for three years: thereby permitting a faster turn-over.

26. A policy of recruiting Red Guards into the PLA would afford opportunity for the selective removal of troublesome elements from the numerous revolutionary organizations and enable these elements to be disciplined. One report stated that conscripts would be given six months training and would then serve with the PLA for eighteen months, after which they would be given the 'option' of being demobilized or continuing in military service. Another report, referring to Kwangtung Province, cited the officially approved proportions of new recruits as 15% students, 15% young people who had been sent to the countryside; 30% farmers; and 40% other proletarians. These proportions suggest a manipulation of the intake in the interests of the current political situation, rather than in those of the PLA.

27. The decision to reimpose conscription could be regarded as a sign of confidence that the risk of throwing the PLA slightly off-balance, by accepting large numbers of recruits, whose suitability is perhaps open to question in some ways, can be accepted under present circumstances. The extent to which demobilization will take place in order to offset the intake is not yet apparent, but if the size of the PLA is to be maintained approximately static by demobilizing corresponding numbers of experienced, tested personnel, some impairment of the reliability and efficiency of the PLA could come about.

A new campaign for war-preparedness

28. During the early months of 1968, pre-occupation with the possibility of foreign invasion, and of the need for war-preparedness, emerged again, though not at the same intensity as during 1964/65. One result of the new campaign has been a call to rehabilitated and retired PLA men to be prepared to return to the 'front line' in uniform and act as 'backbone' elements in strengthening the building of armed units of workers. The calling-up of reservists in this way may possibly be designed to release Regular personnel from some of the non-military tasks acquired during the Cultural Revolution. Reservists are also being used, for purely Cultural Revolution purposes, to reorganize and to bolster organizations such as Public Security Bureaux and legal departments.

Conclusion

29. The selectivity in conscription exercised during the earlier part of the present decade, together with the policy of retention of veterans, must have made singular contribution to the reliability of the PLA during the high tide of Cultural Revolution; it now remains to be seen whether the quality of personnel that has been achieved is to be diluted for political purposes falling within a more limited context.

JDB
8th May 1968

CONFIDENTIAL
CHINAT
B01003 5515 Hq 25 June 68

Annex 13

(6) PARTICULARS OF CHINESE MILITARY RECRUITMENT FOR THIS YEAR. NO: 1217/68

From collected sources: Owing to the cultural revolution, the Chinese Communists stopped recruting work for one year. They started recruting again in November, 1967, and completed their quota by the end of March, 1968. Particulars of recruting are more positive than in former years and the numbers recruited greater.

The quantity of recruits entered and soldiers retired amounts to about one third of the total Army, 800,000 men.

With regard to Navy and Air Force, signs of recruting and retirement have not been noticed. But judging from the custom, the required number to match what has been recruited and retired from the Army would be about 200,000 men. It is therefore estimated that the number of recruits entered and veterans retired will run to one million.

But the Chinese Communist Army still contains one third who have done over their time, of the years 1962, 1963, and 1964. One third are of the 1965 and 1966 classes, whose time is not yet expired. So that although one third are new recruits, there is no visible effect on the Army's fighting strength.

CHINAT

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Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 716 5 August 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 716 of 5 August. Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore and Saving to Moscow.

(52) My telegram No. 704:

The army day editorial emphasises non-military functions of PLA, particularly in relation to revolutionary masses and revolutionary committees. The PLA are required at same time both to guide, and to respect the initiative of, the masses: requirements which reflect the different emphasis from moderates and cultural revolution extremists respectively within the Chinese leadership.

2. The editorial also reflects considerable official concern at problems facing revolutionary committees. The appeal to PLA to support Government and firmly back up revolutionary committees suggests anxiety lest army, which is the sole guarantee of social order, should become weary of its difficult role in protecting new regime from masses, and masses from each other. It is however hard to see how firm PLA backing for revolutionary committees, especially in places like Canton, can fail to attract criticism from militant revolutionary organisation.

3. The references to apathetic discipline and unity of the PLA suggest that there is already some demoralization within the ranks. The warning against losing one's political bearings may refer to Yang Ch'eng-wu. It is interesting that editorial does not mention discrediting of Peng Te-huai/Lo Jui-ch'ing line on army building: the theme may be too divisive for the present occasion, when emphasis is on internal and external unity.

4. In general there is less praise and more exhortation than usual and PLA seem less in favour than of old. The editorial even suggest strains between PLA (or more probably some provincial commanders) and central cultural revolution group. The Yang Ch'eng-wu affair is no doubt one cause; the army's impossible brief in dealing with the masses another. The Chinese attendance at the army day banquet (much lower level than last year's) supports this impression.

Foreign Office pass to Washington, Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore and Saving to Moscow.

Sir D. Hopson

[Repeated as requested]

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(59) Confd Reply s/c pm 58

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(PEK/7)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 - 9 AUG 1968

FE/6.

Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires, PEKING.

30 July, 1968.

My dear John,

We are always on the lookout for indications about the way political campaigns are being implemented in the PLA and the state of Army morale in general. For this reason you may be interested in a couple of articles in the People's Daily which appear to bear upon these subjects.

2. The first article comes in the People's Daily of 18 July. It deals with the saga of a small cargo boat belonging to the South China Fleet. The boat only has a small crew so that on many occasions leading cadres have been left behind on shore. The boat has thus been under the command of more junior personnel. According to the article, both the ordinary crew members and these junior cadres showed some hesitation about plunging into the 1966 "Four Good companies" campaign when it was set in motion. The sailors and cadres were apparently infected with the bourgeois military thinking exemplified by Peng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing as well as ideas about "doubting everything". As a result, in the latter half of 1966 discipline in the boat slackened and officers and crew found themselves at loggerheads. The article goes on to relate the history of various "Four Good company campaigns" which all ran into troubled waters though in the end of course everyone came round to the right way of thinking.

3. Other problems arose when certain crew members began to argue that as they came from good proletarian backgrounds there was no need to have so many political indoctrination lessons. What they lacked was not political awareness but technical training so that they demanded a reduction in the time devoted to political matters. This heresy was of course swiftly dealt with. Similarly, when the "Protect the Army, love the people" movement was launched last year, some cadres argued that they had gone through this exercise practically every year. They had got the point a long time ago and saw no reason to go through the whole rigmarole again. As a result, relations between the Army and the people suffered. The article went on to ask the pertinent question - why did all these heresies keep recurring when they should by rights have been discredited a long time ago? This was of course due to the influence of many years of bourgeois thinking among certain Army commanders.

4. The second article, which comes in the People's Daily of 20 July, is entitled "Discipline is the guarantee for the implementation of the line". It appears under the joint seal of the Liberation Army Daily and NCNA. The subject is a model naval unit No. 82 of the North China Fleet which has rarely put a foot wrong since Liberation. Nevertheless, the article makes clear that a good deal of propaganda was

../necessary

J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department.

necessary against indiscipline and anarchist ideas. Accerding to the article it was Le Jui-ch'ing and Peng Teh-huai whe were responsible fer speading these anarchist ideas as well as, paradexically enough, advecating militarism and slavishness. The article gees en te repeat the standard ecenium that Mae's instructiens must be implemented wittingly er unwittingly - any attempt te brand this as "slavishness" is quite impermissible. The article alse emphasises the need te maintain discipline at the same time as improving relatiens between efficers and men. Finally, the article ends up by asserting the need te maintain high standards in military training.

5. These twe articles seem te me te shew three things. First, the Maeist military line is still net being swallewed wheleheartedly in the Army, where the more eenventienal theeries ef Mae's eppenents are still firmly entrenched. These heresies are net eenfined te senier cadres. The first article makes it clear that erreneeus ideas abeut the need te eencentrate en perfecting combat techniques sprung spentaneeusly frem junier cadres and erdinary sailers. "The Feur Geed companies" mevement, which has been elesely asseciated with Lin Piae personally, alse ran inte difficulties at every turn. If, as the article seems te suggest, the Maeist line has still net wen ever even the lewer ranks ef the Army this has, ef ceurse, sericus implicatiens fer the leadership. We have neticed that many recent articles in the Pecple's Daily have pertrayed Army men whe have been assigned te facteries as acting te seme extent as pelitical eemmissars ameng the werkers. In ether werds, they have been making sure that while the werkers get dewn te preductien they alse kept up their daily queta ef Mae-study. But if the Army itself is net eenvinced ef the Maeist philesephy then clearly it cannet be expected te prepagandise the present line effectively.

6. Secondly, the article appears te shew that the leadership is eencerned abeut indiscipline in the PLA. The successive public campaigns against tep Army eemmanders such as P'eng Teh-huai, Le Jui-ch'ing and new Yang Ch'eng-wu must have undermined the eenfidence ef the Army in its leaders. Seme recent articles have even commended Army units retrespectively fer resisting Le Jui-ch'ing's directives when he was Chief-ef-Staff. Mereever, the seldiers whe are new deeply invelved in civilian life cannet remain entirely immune te the general spread ef chaes, indiscipline and the questiening ef autherity threughout seciety. It is pessible tee that the campaigns initiated by Lin Piae te bring the efficers cleser te their seldiers have eentributed te a lessening in discipline.

7. Thirdly, the articles themselves, and particularly the secend, appear te take a rather ambiguous line en the dilemma between emphasising pelitics er techniques and between demecracy and discipline. The astenishing accusatien in the second article that P'eng and Le were respensible fer the spreading ef anarchy in the Army seems te be in line with current attacks en Liu Shae-ch'i whe is alse accused ef fermenting extreme rightism and extreme leftism at the same time.

../Hitherte

Hithertc P'eng and Lc have mainly been accused of a totally different errcr-overemphasis cn ccnventicnal Army discipline and Army tanks. In scme instances the secend article almcst seems tc be speaking with the vcice of P'eng and Lc, particularly when it insists cn the need tc keep up military training.

8. Although these twc articles by themselves are anything but conclusive they appear tc betray scme concern cn the part of the leadership abcut the depth of resistance tc the Maoist line and the danger of a slackening in discipline in the Army dcwn tc basic levels. The leadership themselves seem tc be in twc minds abcut hcw tc remedy these defects withcut appearing tc step into the shoes cf their cppcnents. With the Army apparently cn the verge of taking firm actien against Red Guard factienalism these symptcms must be disturbing fcr the Maoists.

I am ccpying this letter tc Rcbin McLaren and Ashwcrth in Hcng Kcng, Rcy Spendlcve in Washingtcn, Reg Hibbert in Singapcre, Peter Hewitt in Canberra, Chancery at Tckyc, Frank Brewer in RD, Kathleen Draycctt in IRD, McKearney in PUSD and Ccmmander Fradd in DIS.

Yours ever,

Leonard

(L.V. Appleyard)

Indians is speculating how much new anti-violent Tamil has been fixed in M. by need to head off army discontent? JH

59

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To:—

L.V. Appleyard
Esq
Peking

From

[illegible]

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PLA

Thanks for your
interesting letter (Pek
No 30 July) about PLA ...
moodle. There seems a
good case for believing that
Mao's ~~spaulstuni~~ new tune
– its anti-violence one –
stems from its realization
that its troops had
about reached sticking point.

JM 9/8

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(59)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(FC 1/5)

12 August, 1968.

Dip
FB 12/8

P.L.A.

Thanks for your interesting letter (Pek/7 of 30 July) about P.L.A. morale. There seems a good case for believing that Mao's new tune - the anti-violence one - stems from the realization that the troops had about reached sticking point.

(58)

(J. D. I. Boyd)
Far Eastern Department

L. V. Appleyard, Esq.,
PEKING.

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(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9 August, 1968.

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Military Units

Your letter PEK/7 of 7 May about Yunnan raised the question of the distinction between "local troops" and "independent units". The problem has been batted around between departments here and I am sorry for the delay. The agreed conclusion, in brief, and at the level of Theory, is this. There is as you know a broad division of the P.L.A. into Field Armies and Military District Troops. The former are in principle available for operations anywhere; the latter concentrate on the defence of their own localities in co-operation, when necessary, with the local militia. Within the first broad category there are distinctions between divisions at different states of operational readiness; within the latter a distinction between the Military District troops, properly speaking, and certain independent divisions of better quality whose function is nevertheless also a local one (this is the distinction referred to in your letter). The independent divisions are presumably put there to beef up the local forces, and perhaps they also have a role in offsetting the built in danger than such forces might go local entirely; but how they are formed or whether they are simply detached ad hoc from the Field Armies is not known here.

(J. D. I. Boyd)
Far Eastern Department

P. J. Weston, Esq.,
PEKING.

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 746 13 AUGUST, 1968

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ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.746 OF 13 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG, WASHINGTON AND POLAD SINGAPORE.

PEOPLE'S DAILY OF 12 AUGUST REPORTS THAT ON 11 AUGUST MAO AND LIN PIAO RECEIVED PLA CADRES FROM FUCHOW, WUHAN, CHENGTU, KUNMING, SINKIANG AND TIBET REGIONS AND FROM OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.

THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY CHOU EN-LAI, CH'É PO-TA, KANG SHENG, LI FU-CH'UN, CHIANG CH'ING, CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO, YAO WEN-YUAN, HSIEH FU-CHIH, HUANG YUNG-SHENG, WU FA-HSIEN, YEH CH'UN, WANG TUNG-HSING AND WEN YU-CH'ENG.

2. ALSO PRESENT WERE: TUNG PI-WU, CHEN YI, LI HSIEN-NIEN, HSU HSIANG-CH'IEN, NIEH JUNG-CHEN, YEH CHIEN-YING AND AMONG OTHERS HAN HSIEN-CH'U, TSENG SSUYU. LIANG HSING-CH'U, CHANG KUO-HUA, WANG EN-MAO, SAIFUDIN, LI HSUEH-FENG, LIU KO-PING, CHANG JIH-CH'ING, WEI KUO-CH'ING AND YU CHIU-LI.

K. CRADOCK.

~~BT~~

GR ~~120/2~~

NNN

MR. CRADOCK

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... Pierce N.Z. MOD

DRAFT

To:—

PJ. Weston Gr. Peking.

Type 1 +

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PLA. 2Dj 15/8

Your letter of 23 July about PLA movements in the Canton Area aroused interest here. Our own information is that elements of either the 42nd or 47th ~~possibly~~ Army moved into Canton city from ~~outskirts~~ surrounding areas in mid July. By our reckoning it is the 54th and not the 55th that is in Szechwan; the 55th normally situated is reported to be in Hainan in the Luichow Peninsula. ~~If you can~~ ~~would be most grateful~~ ~~have confirmation~~ (If / Perhaps / in

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W(B)L 51-7423

~~in your letting it your~~
~~Polish colleagues be moved~~
~~to glad of confirmation~~
~~that~~

~~Perhaps you could find out~~
~~whether~~ .

~~Perhaps, if you could~~
remove the topic without
embarrassment, you could
see if your Polish colleagues
mentd what he said;
or whether he has
any other intriguing
gossip to add. If so,
we shall be glad to
know them.

2. Copies of this go to
the recipients of yours
and to Lt Col Pierce
in DLS.

If at an
opportune
moment, and
without
embarrassment,
you could
find the basis
of your
Polish colleague's
knowledge
further, we
should be
glad to hear
the results.

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(FC 1/5)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

15 August, 1968

P. L. A.

Your letter of 23 July about P.L.A. movements in the Canton area aroused interest here. Our own information is that elements of either the 42nd or 47th Army probably moved into Canton city from the surrounding areas in mid-July. By our reckoning it is the 54th and not the 55th that is in Szechwan; the 55th is normally situated north of Hainan in the Luichow Peninsula. If, at an opportune moment, and without embarrassment, you could test the basis of your Polish colleague's knowledge further, we should be glad to hear the results.

2. Copies of this go to the recipients of yours and to Lt. Col. Pierce in D.I.S.

(J.D.I. Boyd)

P.J. Weston, Esq.,
- PEKING -

pp 16/8

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63

Far Eastern Department.

RECEPTION FOR 20,000 P.L.A. CADRES, 11 AUGUST, 1968.

The Army Day reception on 1 August in the Ministry of National Defence, unlike that of last year and recent receptions for P.L.A. cadres currently engaged in Mao-study in Peking, was not attended by Chou En-lai, members of the Cultural Revolution Group and members of the Political Bureau. Heading the Army Day list were four people - Huang Yung-sheng (Chief of General Staff), Wu Fa-hsien (Deputy Chief of General Staff), Ch'en I (Vice-Premier) and Li Hsien-nien (Vice-Premier). On 11 August another reception for P.L.A. cadres was held and once again Chou and other leading personalities were present.

2. The reception was for Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and other leaders to meet some 20,000 P.L.A. cadres among whom were:-

comrades attending Mao's thought-study classes for cadres of units of ground, naval and air forces stationed in Foochow, Wuhan, Chengtu, Kunming, Sinkiang and Tibet areas;

delegates to the second congress of "four good" companies of the Navy;

delegates to the second congress of activists in the study and application of Mao's thought from artillery units stationed in the Peking area;

"revolutionary fighters" from various parts of the country attending Mao's thought-study classes.

This reception was the third of its kind since the beginning of June, each of them being attended by some 20,000 "comrades". On 3 June, especially mentioned in the preamble to the report were cadres of ground, naval and air forces stationed in the Nanking and Shenyang areas. The 30 June report specified representatives of units stationed in Tsinan, Kwangchow and Lanchow. "Areas" presumably indicates "Regions". The latest study classes thus seem to have been the third of a course designed for the Military Regions, all of which have now been covered with the exception of Peking (and Inner Mongolia if still a separate Region). The June receptions also included cadres attending other courses or conferences among them being "leading comrades" from areas not specified in the introductory report, e.g. from Sinkiang, Tibet, Foochow, Kwangsi, Kunming, Shansi. It would appear that these people were needed in Peking for discussions about problems in their areas. In August many of them were shown in the Regional list, while representatives from Shansi and Kwangsi, where there have continued to be problems, were specifically named but grouped with representatives from the Peking area.

/The leading group in attendance on Mao and Lin Piao.

The leading group in attendance on Mao and Lin Piao

3. The list of those with Mao and Lin who received the cadres was almost identical with the lists for the receptions on 3 and 30 June. Li Fu-ch'un who on 3 June had been excluded from the group and placed at the head of the Politburo list, but who on 30 June had been restored to his position in the main group following K'ang Sheng, was again shown below K'ang Sheng. This suggests that at present he retains his standing in the central leadership. The only other point of interest in this group was the addition of Wen Yu-ch'eng who on the two previous occasions, and on Army Day, had been included among the group of "leading comrades of the General Departments, the Science and Technology Commission for National Defence and other departments of the P.L.A." Wen has risen rapidly; a rise, it would seem, linked with the rise of Huang Yung-sheng. /a Until late 1967 he was Commander in the Canton Military Region. In September, 1967 he was with Huang in Peking, and on 18 December he was reported as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In the last two months he has been present at the reception of distinguished foreign visitors, e.g. the President of Tanzania and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. A Red Guard news item of 1 July this year (Survey of the China Mainland Press No. 4222 of 22 July) claims that Wen has been made a member of the "reorganised Administrative unit" of the Military Commission. According to this news item the unit now comprises Huang Yung-sheng, Wen Yu-ch'eng, Wu Fu-hsien, Di Tso-peng (Navy), Ch'iu Hui-tso (Logistics), Yeh Chun (Mrs. Lin Piao) and Liu Hsien-ch'üan (Chairman Tsinghai Provincial Revolutionary Committee).

The Politburo

4. There was no change in this list from that of 30 June, Thus Nieh Jung-chen and Yeh Chien-ying who have been under criticism continue to appear.

Departmental and Service lists.

5. The list of "leading comrades in the General Departments etc" headed by Su Yü (Vice-Minister of Defence) showed little change from that of 30 June. Ch'en Hua-t'ang was added. He appeared for the first time in this classification on Army Day. In 1960 he was a Commander in the Foochow Military Region, and between July and October 1967 he appeared in Peking among "responsible members" of P.L.A. departments. He seems, therefore, to have advanced somewhat in the P.L.A. hierarchy recently. There did not appear to be any significant changes in the list of "leading comrades of the various services and areas of the P.L.A." headed by Hsiao Ching-kuang.

The Regional list.

6. All except six of the sixteen named had attended the June receptions. P'i Ting-chun, Deputy Commander Foochow Military Region, was an addition to previous lists. He had not been noted since November, 1966. Chou Hsing, Political Commissar, Yunnan and former Governor and Provincial Party Secretary, was also an addition, but was in Peking for Army Day, the first

/time

time he had been noted since December, 1966. Ngapo Ngawang-jigme, a Deputy Commander, Tibet, had not been present in June or on Army Day; his appearances since January 1966 have all been in Peking, usually as a Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress. The two representatives from Chengtu (Liang Hsing-chu and Chang Kuo-hua) had attended the Army Day reception, as had Lung Shu-chin, Commander Hunan Military District. It is difficult to account for the inclusion of Lung, since if he is still a Commander in Hunan, there was no place for him, the Canton Military Region not being one of the areas specified. He may have been called to discuss problems of mutual interest to Kunming and/or Chengtu and was included in this group because there was no other convenient place to put him. He may, of course, have been transferred to one of the other Regions. Tseng Yung-ya from Tibet had attended the 30 June reception; his presence in August suggests, as does that of P'i Ting-chun from Foochow and Chou Hsing from Yunnan, an intensification of effort to deal with the problems of those areas.

Now Hd. Q Yunnan IRC.

7. A personality of particular interest in this group is Tan Fu-jen. He has appeared at other receptions among those presumably stationed outside Peking, but he has been difficult to place with certainty. He was once a Deputy Political Commissar in the Wuhan Military Region, but until recently he has been noted as a Political Commissar of the Engineering Corps. Comparison of the new list with previous lists now leaves little doubt that he holds a leading position in the Kunming Military Region. He has consistently appeared before Ch'en K'ang, a "responsible person" of the Region. Both Ch'in Ch'i-wei and Li Ch'eng-fang noted in 1967 as "responsible persons" have been criticised and have not appeared since National Day, 1967 when they were in Peking. It is probable that Tan is designated as the head of the Region.

The Peking, Shansi, Kwangsi list.

8. The first eight in this list were from the Peking Military Region and the Peking Garrison. A curious inclusion was Li Hsueh-feng, who is Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Revolutionary Committee. He had not attended the June or the Army Day receptions. His inclusion as a leading comrade of "the P.L.A. units stationed in the Peking area etc.", and his placing immediately below Chang Wei-shan, the acting Commander of the Region, suggest that he holds a position in the Region. Liu Ko-ping who followed Li in the list is First Political Commissar, Shansi, and Second Political Commissar of the Region. Li Hsueh-feng may therefore be the Political Commissar of the Region. The Shansi Revolutionary Committee was represented by Yuan Chen, Vice-Chairman, as well as by Liu Ko-ping. A strong contingent represented Kwangsi - Wei Kuo-ching (Political Commissar and former Governor), Ou Chih-fu (Commander), Wu Chin-nan, Wei Yu-chu, Chiao Hung-kuang (members of the Preparatory Group and "responsible persons" in the Military District.)

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9. Appended to this list was "comrade" Yu Ch'iu-li, Minister of Petroleum Industry. He was not present on Army Day, but had attended the June receptions also in the also-ran position. He has been under criticism, and his presentation in this way may have been intended to show that no decision has yet been taken about his future.

F. Brewer

(F. Brewer)
China and Korea Section,
Research Department.

15 August, 1968.

Copied to:-

I.R.D.

P.U.S.D.(Lt. Col. Pierce, Ministry of Defence).

P.U.S.D. (Mr. McKearney).

RESTRICTED Reference FC1/6, (624)

Far Eastern Department.

SOME INDICATIONS OF DISCORD WITHIN THE P.L.A.

M. Denson 28/8 To ch

Entw.

M. Boyd 30.8. Jgs 31/8 pa. Jgs 2/9

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 30 AUG 1968 FC1/6

The Hong Kong U.S. Consulate-General's translation series Survey of the China Mainland Press and Selections from China Magazines have recently provided some indications of discord within the P.L.A. Allowance has to be made for the possibility that some of the "revolutionary" news sheets may not be reliable, but the items to which reference is made below have an authentic ring.

The Wuhan Military Region (SCMM 622 of 6/8/68).

2. In the first half of June this year representatives of the Wuhan Military Region were in Peking to discuss with central leaders certain problems, including "splitting" activities, affecting the P.L.A. in the Region. On 13 June Lin Piao issued instructions that Li Ying-hsi, a former Deputy Commander, should be detained in Peking and that "the new leadership of the Wuhan Military Region must be maintained". The Central Committee, also on the 13 June, discussed "the question of stability in the army" and the next day Chou En-lai telephoned instructions to Tseng Ssu-yü, Commander of the Region, making, according to an admittedly unchecked record, the following points:-

> THe Army must be united at all times.
> It must obey orders whether understood or not.
> Defiance of orders is intolerable, and to disrupt the Army's stability is breach of discipline and lack of loyalty to Mao.
> Only when the Army is stable will the Revolutionary Committee be consolidated and developed.

3. Trouble had evidently persisted in the Region after the Wuhan incident of 20 July, 1967. Li Ying-hsi who had been criticised in February, 1967, for trying to "seize power" in the Region, attempted to make a come-back after the Wuhan incident. He was accused of intriguing with civilians and some members of the Military Region to oppose Liu Feng, the Political Commissar appointed after the incident. This intriguing created bad feeling between Army units and dissension in the Hupeh Revolutionary Committee. Most of the senior officers involved with Li made a satisfactory self-criticism in Peking in June. Chang Kuang-tsai, a Deputy Political Commissar who spoke up for Li, and Pi Chan-yün, a Deputy Commander, were told to make further self-examination, but Li Ying-hsi was declared to have been the principal trouble-maker.

4. Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien and Wang Tung-hsing were present at the concluding session with the Regional leaders on 12 June. Tseng Ssu-yü and Liu Feng made the point that some people in Wuhan were making play of the fact that the "Party Committee" was called "provisional". It is not clear from the text whether this was a reference to the Party Committee of the Military Region or the representative group of the Party within the Revolutionary Committee. Chou En-lai informed the Chief of General Staff, Huang, that the Party Committee must not be a provisional but a formal one, and that the question of setting up the Party Committee organisation should be studied and a report submitted to the Central Committee. Ch'en Po-ta noted that some people were referring to the revolutionary committee as a "military government". This was a "reactionary slogan"; the Party's absolute leadership must be emphasised, for the Party must command the gun.

Shansi

5. We have recently seen a number of obscure references to what appears to be indecision or foot-dragging by the P.L.A. in its handling of problems in Shansi. The Mainland Magazine issue No.622 contains what purports to be instructions of the Chief of the General Staff issued on 13 May, 1968 to the Military Region on the question of Shansi. On 9 April Lin Piao and other leaders of the Central Committee had addressed "the whole committee" - apparently the Party Committee of the Region. Huang in his 13 May instructions, observed that "the failure to relay in full the speeches (of 9 April) ..... and to discuss them is a manifestation of lack of seriousness and sobriety."

6. It would be wrong to make too much of these isolated examples of problems in the P.L.A., but they could be indicative of a general malaise with which the Centre has had to deal in recent months.

(F. Brewer)
Research Department.

27 August, 1968.

Copied to:-

I.R.D.

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31
11 SEP 1968
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The Foreign Office
Far Eastern Department

RECOGNITION OF UNIFORMS OF PLA ETC.

(Ref: Letter from Chargé's Office, Peking of 10 Aug 68)

DI.2 offer the following reply to the above.

1. Since the dress reforms introduced on 1st June 1965 it has not been possible to identify the arms to which members of the CCA belong. The CCN are however distinguishable as a Service by their grey coloured uniform, whereas the CCA and CCAF wear olive green.

2. Border Defence/Military Internal Security Troops (which form a part of the CCA) wear the same uniform as the CCA(and CCAF).

3. The Civil Police wear the same tunic as the CCA (and CCAF), together with the "Liberation" cap, but the trousers worn by the Civil Police are dark blue.

4. People's Public Security Troops (PPST), formerly known as People's Armed Police (PAP), and Public Security Bureaux (PSB) personnel, probably wear the same uniform as that of the Civil Police. It is possible, however, that PPST on field duty such as when operating in frontier areas may wear the same uniform as the CCA (and CCAF).

D R Railey
major
for

DIRECTOR OF SERVICE INTELLIGENCE

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